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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to better understand GAO bid protest outcomes, whether
they are perceived as effective by stakeholders (particularly small businesses), and what
implications perceptions of outcomes have for small businesses. The rationale for this research
improves my business’s performance, as a small business owner in the U.S. Federal government
contracting space and informs other small business practitioners of the practical utility of GAO
protests.
The GAO protest system is a well-intended American innovation in accountability of
government agencies’ acquisition of supplies and services. The GAO reports protest outcome
rates are reflected as moderately effective, at approximately 45%, based on a protester obtaining
some form of relief from the agency because of voluntary agency corrective action or GAO
sustaining the protest. However, the reported success rate of protest outcomes where the GAO
sustains the alleged impropriety and recommends relief is an order of magnitude lower,
indicating minimal effective outcomes for protestors. This success or effectiveness rate is
negligible for many small business protestors and is perceived as such. The minimal practical
effectiveness caused some businesses to believe the GAO protest system has become a façade for
fair, independent adjudication of acquisition improprieties. This analysis of how these reported
outcomes is perceived by the government contracting community stakeholders, particularly small
businesses concerns, is the subject of this paper.
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The overall objective of the bid protest system is instilling confidence in the Federal
acquisition process, ensuring full and open competition within the guidelines of national policy
objective, and providing an accountability venue for contractors. Understanding the
stakeholder’s perceptions of these outcomes is the most important element in meeting this
objective. The empirical research of stakeholder interviews and protest action research indicates
that protest perceptions range across three interactive spectra: the cost-benefit tradeoff, fairness,
communications; additionally, they are impacted by a fourth element, emotions. Some
stakeholder perceptions tend to reinforce the GAO narrative of moderate effectiveness where the
benefits outweigh the costs. However, evidence that small business stakeholders are more attune
to the minimal effectiveness of the reported outcomes reinforces the small business perceptions
of limited utility. Years of action research by the researcher support the proposition that this
accountability façade is real. The appearance of moderate protest success covers up the serious
challenges small businesses face in pursuing GAO protests. The research concludes that
businesses and, more specifically, small businesses should only rarely consider filing GAO
protests.
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CHAPTER ONE:
VALUE OR CHALLENGE OF A BID PROTEST: COLEMAN FEDERAL PRISON
To the maximum extent practicable, the Comptroller General shall provide for the
inexpensive and expeditious resolution of protests (31 U.S. Code § 3554 (a)(1)
Procurement Protest System, Decisions on protests).
Introduction
Tanker Snyder paused for a moment to look out the window of his second-floor office at
about 9:00 p.m. on a warm March Tuesday night in Tampa. It had been another hectic day
bidding, losing, and occasionally winning, government contracts—not to mention following up
on recent bids and proposals. And, of course, determining new bid opportunities for the rest of
the week. Knowing that he had another two hours of work to get ready for the next day as he
gazed into the night to see the empty parking lot of the 6-story Crown Building. Empty, that is,
except for his vehicle. All this left him wondering if the AeroSage business model was evolving
into a growing and viable business. Was he leveraging his understanding of the playing field and
experience meeting mission-critical government requirements in the structured, transparent
government contracting business?
AeroSage LLC is the primary entity Tanker formed over five years ago, first to provide
consulting assistance to companies wanting to sell to the government. Recently, the company’s
focus shifted to providing products and services from a reliable network of suppliers to meet
Federal government requirements. Rather than teaching commercial companies how to fish in
the vast government contracting ocean, AeroSage would do the fishing itself. He knew what the
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fish needed to sustain them. After all, he had been one in this often-murky ocean. He now had
access to some of the best bait there was.
Tanker thought he knew the rules of the government acquisition game was played,
particularly in the real world from the strategic perspective he had operated within during his
military, hedge fund, and consulting careers. He knew that knowing and following the complex
rules would yield success. However, he had experienced several instances where contractors or
government contracting officers did not appear to either know the rules or play by them. Similar
to the military world, there are avenues to hold rule breakers accountability for improprieties in
government contracting. Alleged violations of acquisition laws and regulations could be
challenged. These protests would be adjudicated by an appropriate authority. He had been in
positions of authority responsible for fulfilling mission-critical requirements, many of which
could mean the difference between life or death. Tanker had enforced the rules and adjudicated
breaches. What he was wondering about is the tactical rule set of the acquisition protest system.
More importantly, Tanker wanted to understand the possible real-world outcomes, if he entered
into the bid protest world on this bid.
Government Acquisition Processes
The Federal government annually purchased over $350 billion of every type of good or
service imaginable from futuristic space vehicles to lawn mowing service in large and small
quantities (SBA Government Contracting 101). The process of government purchasing, or
contacting was necessarily much different than non-government purchase decisions. Kenney
asked the question “’why is a contract with the United States so different than a contract with
Wal-Mart?’” with “[t]he answer can be varied and prolonged, but ultimately lies in the very roots
of our nation” (Keeney, 2007, p. 7). Originally adopting the decentralized British system, the
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U.S. evolved during a series of procurement scandals--most involving war purchases through
proponent reforms during major conflicts from our founding through the Civil War to the current
conflicts such as captured in the movie “War Dogs” (Keeney, 2007; and movie). Kenney
answers the question that “[t]he basic difference between contracting with Wal-Mart and
contracting with the U.S. government is this: when Wal-Mart signs a contract, it is only guarding
its own interests. When the United States signs a contract, it is guarding the public’s interest”
(Keeney, 2007, p. 18).
Balancing Value, Transparency, and Policy
While both commercial and government contracting had the primary objective of acquiring
productive resources at the best value, the government has other often competing objectives
including assured effectiveness, promoting transparency and fairness, and implementing
legislated socio-economic policy. Federal government acquisitions seek to fulfill “[t]he visions
for the Federal Acquisition System is to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or
service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy
objectives” (FAR, 2005, section 1.102). Social and economic policy such as assistance for small,
disadvantaged, women, minority, or veteran-owned businesses. Virtually, every government
acquisition is measured against the specific policy goals (FAR, 2005; SBA). The compliance
with these policy objectives, which many contend cost the government more by limiting
competition within these socio-economic small business classes, is an important component of
success in federal contracting.
Federal government socio-economic policy is to ensure the “capacity of small business is
encouraged and developed” 15 USC Section 12 (a) Small Business Act
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It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist,
and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to
preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases
and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but
not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be
placed with small business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of
Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the
overall economy of the Nation. (Small Business Act 2(a))
Laws further subdivides owner’s enterprises into small businesses which are or were
disadvantaged because of race, gender, physical location, and economic background or earned
benefits through military service.
Competition in Contracting
Competition is a foundation of government contracting, just as it is in the broader
capitalist economy. Congress codified very detailed competition requirements as directed in the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) (Source: CICA and CRS Competition in Federal
Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Requirements). Yet government often restricts
competition to accomplish broader economic and social policies and provide for transparency in
the expenditure of public funds. The complicated rule set for government procurement is
necessary to both ensure fairness and achievement of these policies, as well as the oftencompeting interest of getting the best value with taxpayer money. There is persistent tension
between these guiding principles. As most all taxpayers do, Tanker wants the government to get
the best value price in its purchases through full and open competition. As a veteran small
business owner, he favors competition limited to small businesses particularly veteran-owned
business to accomplish the Congressional intent of the policies. This also provides a competitive
advantage by giving small businesses a chance to establish itself in the government market and
offset some of the burdens in dealing with the government compliance standards. Restricting
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offerors of bidders to small businesses or categories of small business can be done by setting
aside procurements or, in limited cases, sole sourcing purchased to a designated class of
businesses. Set-asides, critics claim, reduce competition and increase costs to the government.
However, researchers such as Denes show “that small business set-asides do not lead to higher
cost of contracted services as long as the pool of bidders is not reduced” (Denes, 1997).
Many commercial vendors, small and large have avoided or “refuse to sell goods and
services to the federal government based on the significant additional costs and risks associated
with government-unique specifications, auditing requirements and other onerous terms and
conditions” (Toomey, Foley & Lardner LLP, & Practical Law Commercial Transactions). The
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) has made progress in lowering these
procurement barriers. The legislation directed the use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) items
to the maximum extent possible and simplified procurement procedures including the
authorization for new simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) for acquisitions below a
prescribed dollar value, currently $150,000. This law incorporated into the FAR shifted the
government procurement strategy from lowest price to best value bidding and promoted the use
of fixed-price performance-based contracts.
Contracting Government Requirements
A government contract is a mutually binding legal agreement for the seller or vendor to
furnish supplies or services and for the government agency to pay for them with funds
appropriated by Congress (FAR, 2005, section 2.101). A contracting officer (CO or KO) has the
authority to obligate the government expenditures by authorizing a contract or contract
modification.
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The FAR is the primary regulation for use by all Federal Executive agencies their
acquisition of supplies and services with money appropriated by Congress (FAR, 2005,
Foreword). Each agency also supplements the FAR with their own subordinated regulations and
policies, waivers to the FAR, and other regulations used across multiple agencies contained in
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) which implement public policy such as the Small
Business Act or Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) supplement. Despite direction
(FAR, 2005, section 1.103) and efforts to minimize administrative costs, the FAR system is very
complex. The basis FAR, 48 CFR Volume I, Parts 1-51, and Volume II, Parts 52-53 is 1933
pages in length.
The Federal acquisition process starts with an agency determining a requirement for
goods and/or services and planning an acquisition method or contracting plan. If the agency’s
contracting officer (CO or KO) determines the appropriate method to purchase the goods or
services for the requirement is a contract, the agency issues a solicitation. If the anticipated
amount (based on governments independent price estimate) expected amount is greater than
$25,000, then the agency posts a solicitation on the government-wide electronic posting Federal
Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website, available at https://www.fbo.gov.2 (Halchin,
2006, p. 3). The solicitation is also, or sometimes depending on dollar value, only posted on an
agency website or commercial government bid site (e.g. FedBid, FedConnect). The solicitation,
at a minimum, must tell prospective offerors what the government wants to buy, instructions for
responding to the solicitation, the source selection method that will be used to evaluate offers,
the deadline for the submission of bids or proposals, and the small business size category for the
acquisition. Most all the solicitations and contracts are required to have the small business size
category defined by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for the
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industry of the predominate item or service the contract acquires. NAICS code determined by the
Department of Labor based on US Census data to describe of 1000 business categories. The
Small Business Administration (SBA) assigned either an average annual revenue figure (for
service industries) or an average annual total employee count (for manufacturing and supply
industries) to determine the threshold at which a business is determined to be “small” in that
industry. Protests of the contracting officers’ assignment of a NAICS code with corresponding
size standard or challenges to an individual offerors size status are filed with the contracting
officer. The contracting officer must forward these protests to the SBA for determination and
adjudication of the protest.
Contract Sausage Making
Federal contracting is categorized by several type parameters. First, contracts are
competed by the issuance of a solicitation which is either a request for quote (RFQ) or request
for proposal (RFP). A RFQ, also called an invitation to bid (IFB), invites vendors to bid on
specific products or services. It does not obligate the government to buy the item, nor does it
obligate the vendor to sell, or even provide a quote for, the product or service. Rather it is a price
quote which the government buyer can use to make an offer to purchase the item(s) from the
vendor. The vendor must then accept the offer from the government. Technically, the vendor
makes the decision to accept the government’s offer from the contractor’s price quote. An RFQ
is commonly used for simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) generally under $150,000. These
contracts which result from an RFQ are generally for a firm fix price (FFP) based on the lowest
price quoted or low price technically acceptable (LPTA) quote, solicitation, or resulting contract.
Supplies are commonly purchased, whether under SAP or not, with the lowest prices which meet
the specific requirement. In some cases, a brand name or single provider is specified in a
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solicitation. This requires a formal justification and authorization (J&A) and review by senior
acquisition officials. The federal government has a very high bar for this single available source
or brand name because this may limit competition and therefore the best value for the
government and ultimately the taxpayers.
A RFP is used for negotiated contracts where the government buyer request proposals or
offers (Note: there are also unsolicited offerors where a vendor proposes a novel or improved
method of meeting a valid government requirement). The offers are evaluated against the criteria
defined in the solicitation to determine, in most cases, the best value to the government. The
evaluations that have a subjective judgmental overtone are the source of many protests on best
value contracts. These protests question the agencies’ evaluation on several fronts, including
whether the criteria was properly articulated to meet a justified requirement and whether all the
offerors were evaluated fairly against the solicitation requirements.
Small Business Programs
Nearly every government purchase is part of one or more small business programs. This
is true whether the acquisition is reserved for small business or a small business category, is
scored against the agency small business goaling program, or requires a small business
subcontracting plan with specific goal achievement, no matter how large the contract is. The
Small Business Act directs that solicitations with an expected value of less than $150,000, the
simplified acquisition threshold, shall be reserved for small business. (SBA) This means that
agencies must be set aside for a particular small business category if two or more small
businesses can be expected to offer at a fair and reasonable price (FAR, 2005; SBA). The types
of small business program categories are summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1.1. Small Business Programs (Source: DoD Office of Small Business Programs, 2012)
These small business programs are essential to the government's support and promotion
of the engine of economic growth. Qualification for and compliance with small business
programs is often a basis for bid protests. These protests about vendors’ qualifications for small
business set-asides are made to the contracting officer, who forwards them to the Small Business
Administration (SBA) for adjudication. While a size challenge was not part of a GAO protest,
the proper use of acquisition rules for small businesses is a common factor in protests which can
be heard by the GAO. This fuel buy is a small business set aside for commercial items using
simplified SAP for a low-price firm fixed price bid. Small business program issues underlie this
potential protest.

9

To improve efficiency, promote competition, and expand the opportunities for small
business, the government policy directs agencies to use and acquire commercial items to the
maximum extent possible. FAR policy says “Agencies shall … [c]onduct market research to
determine whether commercial items or non-developmental items are available that could meet
the agency’s requirements …acquire commercial items or non-developmental items when they
are available to meet the needs of the agency, … [and r]equire prime contractors and
subcontractors at all tiers to incorporate, to the maximum extent practicable, commercial items”
(FAR 12.101).
AeroSage’s Reverse Auction Bids
AeroSage found contracting opportunities from a variety of sources, including several
agency and government sites. These ranged from the centralized Federal Business Opportunities
(FBO.gov) website to the commercial FedBid auction website, as well as many operated by
specific government agencies.
FedBid was a commercial bid and reverse auction service which solicited bids as an agent
for the select government agencies in accordance the FedBid terms of service. Several
government agencies utilized the FedBid, Inc. reverse auction commercial site to procure
commercial supplies using SAP. A reverse auction is essentially a bidding process where
suppliers provided automatically decreasing pricing which stops at a minimum level as set by a
vendor for the requested goods and services. Each bidder can see electronic notification that their
lowest bid is either “Lead” (lowest price within the acceptable price range) or “Lag” (not the
lowest bid or not within the acceptable price range). The rank order of the bids and prices are
forwarded to the contracting officer for evaluation and then contract award. The contracting
officer could also elect to resolicit or cancel the solicitation if, for example, no bids were in the
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acceptable price range. The procedures governing the FedBid reverse auction acquisitions are
described in Appendix 1.1.
In this procurement for commercial items, the private company, FedBid Inc., identified
potential vendors, solicited offers or bids, conducted a reverse auction seeking lowest price,
prioritizing the acceptable officers for the contracting officer to evaluate and select a winning
vendor to award a contract for commercial items. In this case, FedBid acted on the government
behalf to provide the bids to the government agency contracting officer. As always it is the
contracting officer who makes the contract award for the obligation of government funds. A
protest would challenge the agency contracting officer, not FedBid.
David “Tanker” Snyder
Prior to founding AeroSage, David “Tanker” Snyder had spent nearly thirty years in the
U.S. Air Force. Over the course of his career, he had risen to progressively more senior
positions. His later assignments included installation commander at MacDill Air Force Base in
Tampa, Florida and director of strategic planning and programming for a major command and
combatant command (COCOM) where he dealt at the strategic level with government
acquisition. Earlier in his career, Tanker earned joint MBA and MSE (Systems Engineering)
degrees at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and School of Engineering and
Applied Science, preparing him to serve as an instructor and assistant professor of management
and operations research at the U.S. Air Force Academy in the Department of Management.
Military Career
During the latter half of his military career, Tanker had spent a great deal of time
operating at the strategic level, responsible for manning, funding, budgeting, and
programming—the military’s term for securing lifecycle funding in the Defense Department’s
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and Congress’s current and future year’s budget. His jobs also involved force structure
(personnel, weapons system, and base) realignment, and he served as award approving official
for hundreds of millions of dollars of operational contracts and programs. He had been
aggressive in this command, building a reputation for seeing project small and large earn
approval, funding, and execution for senior leadership. He was proud of all that he had
completed or set in motion during his just over two-year service at MacDill AFB. There he had
charted the course for over $750 million of contacted base infrastructure improvement—even as
he had supported the wing’s worldwide mobility mission and operations in Southwest Asia, a
turbulent region that included both Iraq and Afghanistan. Tanker had served as the Director of
Mobility Forces for the latest wars in the Middle East. He had also served as the chief of staff
and a command director in the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) and U.S. Space Command air, space, and missile warning center deep inside
Cheyenne Mountain.
Some of the many projects at MacDill where Tanker had led the team to execute included
the rebuilding of MacDill’s pier and pavilion, including construction of a state-of-the-art fitness
trail, programs, and the world-class Davis Conference Center. This center supported the two
combatant commands (COCOMs) headquartered at MacDill: the regional U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM)—responsible for fighting the wars in Southwest Asia—and the
functional U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), coordinating the military’s activities in
fighting the global war on terror as well as assisting all the regional combatant commands with
special operations within their area of responsibility. The MacDill’s Davis Conference Center
also regularly hosted the Air Force senior leadership CORONA conferences, the Air Force
equivalent to an annual board of directors and strategic planning meeting.

12

While his star was still rising, Tanker retired early from his military career. His Wharton
relationships gave him a unique opportunity to seamlessly transition at a senior level into the
fast-paced, competitive world of Wall Street deal-making. He could even move back to the just
completed waterfront condominium his family had purchased in Tampa, while periodically
commuting his New York office with one glass wall overlooking Central Park and the other over
a vast trading floor. So, the decision to leave the military—a career he had known all his life—
had required him to think long and hard. He had come from a military family. His father, a West
Point graduate, had been an assault helicopter battalion commander in Vietnam as well as
serving in a variety of jobs including assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA)
at West Point’s Department of Military Psychology and Leadership. While in that position, his
father had earned his Ph.D. at New York University Stern School of Business, after which he had
held a series of increasingly academic positions, including serving on the faculty of the U.S.
Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, with a sabbatical as assistant to the President of
Shippensburg University. After retiring, his father served as Executive Director of the University
Center, a consortium of five universities in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
From his father’s military career and Tanker’s service in the Air Force, Tanker had a
strong sense of duty, responsibility, and accountability. He was comfortable, having achieved a
sense of success in the standardized, rule-bound national defense arena, which also rewarded
boldness and creativity. Tanker knew that armies succeed and organizations thrive through
teamwork. Teamwork that comes from having the welfare, training, and equipping of the unit
foremost. Teamwork which relies on accountability that your fellow airmen will fight the way
they were trained. He had been ingrained with the proposition that military professionals are
creations of government and law (Obligation of Military professionals – Swain) and swear to
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“support and defend the Constitution” (oath of office). Tanker was a product of a profession
whose members ascribe to what has been described as the “unlimited liability clause” (Hackett
see OMP and others). This is the ultimate cost-benefit calculation where you can be asked to
give your life in defense of others and this nation.
Transition to the Private Sector
The chance to join his Wharton colleagues was not the only reason that the time seemed
right for Tanker to jump into the private sector. As a young boy, Tanker had moved twenty-one
times before he entered the U.S. Air Force Academy at the age of eighteen. He had lost count of
how many times he had moved since then. Feeling that he had served his country, Tanker looked
forward to putting down roots. Most importantly, Tanker wanted to build value in the private
sector capitalizing on his lifetime experience in the structure of the government. He was ‘bitten
by the entrepreneurial bug’ early in a military career which valued risk-taking and innovation,
and it was nurtured in graduate school. He was that type of entrepreneur that Gilbert Gonzalez, a
colleague in the Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) program that Tanker had enrolled in,
described being built on a desire for freedom to control your own destiny, rather than a passion
for a better mousetrap. Tanker has led great teams and wanted to build value by harnessing the
talents and service of other businesses who could fulfill governments requirements if they could
only into the government acquisition system. There are significant bureaucratic, logistical,
policy, and regulatory barriers to successfully competing for government business. Tanker could
be that navigator who shepherded the better mousetrap makers’ capabilities to the government’s
needs. This was a valuable role upon which he could build a profitable business. A business that
employed veterans with the values they had shared in the military.
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AeroSage
After his stint on Wall Street, Tanker founded the AeroSage Group of companies in
Tampa: AeroSage LLC, SageCare Inc., and AeroSage Innovations. Through these companies, he
sought to leverage key elements of his military experience. Having been an award approving
official, he was very familiar—albeit at the strategic level—with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation. Tanker viewed his later career activities to be the foundational source of the
competitive advantage of the AeroSage companies. Being a veteran with service-connected
disability ratings for a variety of ailments brought on by nearly thirty years of service as a pilot in
all aspects of military operations, his companies could qualify to compete in the Service
Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) class of business.
He had invested the previous five years building these SDVOSB companies, which were
verified by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He had started by consulting with larger
companies on winning federal contracts. From there, he had progressed to winning actual supply
and service contracts as the prime small business contractor. He had done so by teaming with
suppliers for a variety of products with whom he had built relationships in the past. On some
occasions, he had also sought out partners to bid on government contracts that he had identified.
Business Model
The AeroSage business model is based on the value proposition of providing products
and services to federal government agencies through a network of suppliers and partners. As
implemented by Tanker, his aim is to provide and build value through identifying government
needs, understanding the acquisition process, and effectively fulfilling these requirements with
the capabilities of AeroSage’s supplier network. As summarized on the AeroSage webpage
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(www.aerosage.com) “We understand the challenges and mission-critical requirements of
government customers and what industry must deliver to win.”
AeroSage sought to find opportunities in the vast amount of government public data and
by understanding agency needs, solicitation process, contracting rules and laws, invoicing and
other aspects of this complicated system. Utilizing the government programs and preferences
afforded small businesses and in Tanker’s case, Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small
Businesses (SDVOSB), AeroSage would have access opportunities which vendors may not have
access to or have the needed investment in knowledge and certifications. AeroSage would match
vetted suppliers with federal contracting opportunities in the vast pool of the Federal
government's requirements. Yet, AeroSage would be able to swim in the little pool at shallow
end where the big boys were restricted from usually entering. For good and noble reasons, the
government created small business policies to restrict competition in several small pools,
believing that these smaller groups would graduate into the adult pool or maybe even into the
open ocean. Tanker bristles at the notion that veterans are disadvantaged or a special socialeconomic class. He believes veterans have earned the assistance in building small businesses.
This opportunity is earned because, while their contemporaries were learning to be carpenters,
chefs, mechanics, salespeople, lawyers, or even starting their businesses, veterans were training
to be the best soldier, sailor, airman or marine they could be, which put veterans two to thirty
years behind civilian contemporaries in the private sector.
Although he has a significant service-connected disability rating putting his small
businesses clearly qualified as a SDVOSB and a VOSB, Tanker believes the distinction between
veterans and service-connected disabilities is abnormal and unnecessary. Veterans did not have
disabilities; they had abilities fostered in service to the nation that could be brought to the private
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sector. While many had impairments, as Tanker thought of service disabilities, all veterans
earned the same opportunity and assistance to serve the nation out of uniform in the U.S. free
enterprise economy. This assistance not only brings the substantial abilities of veterans to the
commercial and entrepreneurial marketplace,
The value proposition of this business evolved from providing consulting assistance to
companies growing their Federal government business to a provider of products and capabilities
needed by the government agencies. AeroSage has no products, inventory, logistics
infrastructure, or a better widget. Tanker’s companies have knowledge and grit to match the
capabilities of others with the requirements of government. Tanker would leverage his
background to broker commercial capabilities and products where the government has
requirements This was the ultimate arbitrage of his experience—earning a return on fulfilling
requirements with capabilities in an inefficient and sometimes distorted government
marketplace. He viewed this as a valuable service, not unlike a realtor, insurance agency,
brokerage firm or hedge fund. This was continued service to the country, only in the private
sector where reward is earned in building wealth, not in earning the next level of command or a
glowing citation accompanied by a shiny medal with a colorful ribbon attached. However, like
most brokers or arbitragers, margins are generally slim, and the real gain occurs by taking risks
to capitalize on market anomalies and knowledge gaps. To evaluate and price the risks, the
business must know the rules. By following the government’s rules, he could overcome entry
barriers and regulatory hurdles designed to advance policy and create transparency in spending
public money.
Many commercial vendors, particularly in the fuel supply market, do not want to deal
with government bidding, acquisition, invoicing, compliance issues, and payment issues. This is
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particularly true in the fuel dealer business where he saw opportunities. Fuel suppliers usually
have ‘NET 10 terms.’ The government will pay within thirty days from submission of an
acceptable invoice. The governments invoicing payment system makes it very difficult to submit
an acceptable invoice to receive timely payment. Additionally, in the fuel supply industry fuel
prices can change dramatically throughout the day at the different terminals. The base reference
price is not known until 6:00 p.m. the evening of delivery when the average rack price at one
terminal is published. The government wants a firm fixed price for fuel bids a day or two before
delivery. So, fuel brokers also have price risk which is factored into their margin pricing, as well
as the cost of capital or payment risk on government contracts. Tanker’s business model is that
his companies provide an indispensable conduit between commercial suppliers and government
agency contract requirements, thereby earning the margin or premium of working with the
government.
Challenges
In the military, Tanker had viewed himself in a role as analogous to being an orchestra
conductor who led a world-class team of musicians to make a wonderfully accomplished sound.
He likened his early jobs as a junior officer to playing first trombone, and then bass. By the time
he was operating at the strategic level, it was akin to leading a team to make great “music” while
understanding how to make each of the component instruments “play the perfect notes.” But,
Tanker recognized that he had relied heavily on the team and a large government staff with
subordinates, bosses, colleagues, and teammates. It had been a long time since he had actually
operated at the tactical level “playing a solo,” to return to the orchestra analogy. He chuckled to
himself as he persisted in his analogy to describe his career remake as a consultant and
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government contractor as an orchestra conductor. He conceded that he had almost no musical
talent or affinity, neither had he ever played an instrument nor read a musical note.
Tanker knew how the acquisition processes of the U.S. defense sector operated and how
government programs succeed. What he was learning rapidly, and too often, painfully, were all
the challenges of building a responsible small business including meeting payroll, making
bid/no-bid decisions, pricing bids, and all the government regulations (and opportunities)
imposed on small businesses. What Tanker found to be particularly challenging was working
with the basic entry level government contracting customer to build a small business. After all,
didn’t all the government contracting officers know the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
and follow these rules? Not exactly, he concluded. They did what it took to get their substantial
inboxes full of requirements to solicit and award contracts for a myriad of different products to
be resolved as quickly as possible and without causing trouble or delay for the agency end user.
The Bid and Award
AeroSage found a short notice opportunity on FedBid1 reverse auction site for delivering
6,000 gallons of on-road diesel fuel to the Federal Correctional Center (FCC) in Coleman,
Florida. The bid description said the requirement was for “Unleaded Fuel, On-Road, No Dye, No
Sulfur (6,000 gallons) MUST BE ABLE TO DELIVER ON THURSDAY MORNING MARCH
13, 2014 BY 9 a.m.” Coleman was in the immediate vicinity of AeroSage’s first and best fuel
supplier, Adams Oil in Gainesville Florida. Charlie Adams had taught Tanker much about the
fuel business when AeroSage first vetted Adams Oil for a large year-long fuel delivery contract
at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) in Gainesville. The bid was spelled out in the

1
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FedBid Buy #594154_02 (the _02 signified that it had been modified two times). AeroSage bid
(AS 1014-0120) was calculated in a standard bid calculation sheet Tanker had developed for
determining bid prices, costs, and margins. It was the 120th bid AeroSage had made in calendar
year 2014 by the March 12, 2014 bid closing.
After securing a vendor and a price, Tanker placed the bid on the FedBid reverse auction
site. Despite having to leave for an appointment, stopping in order to log on to FedBid site via
mobile Wi-Fi, he had succeeded meeting the deadline of 12:00 noon, as required by the FedBid
solicitation. Upon submitting the bid and at the close of bidding, AeroSage was listed as the
lowest bidder with the price within the acceptable range. Tanker went back to the appointment,
which was followed by a series of other meetings, and returned to the AeroSage office at about
3:30 p.m. to see an email from FedBid saying that they needed him to certify delivery
compliance by 5:30 p.m. Tanker confirmed with the supplier and provided his e-mail response to
FedBid by 5:00 p.m. It was not until later that evening that Tanker got around to checking his
phone messages, when he noticed he had a message recorded just after 1:00 p.m. earlier that day
from the contracting officer stating that AeroSage was the apparent award winner, but must
provide confirmation, by 2:30 p.m. that afternoon. The message asked if that AeroSage confirm
it could meet the delivery time certified in the bid (9:00 a.m. the next morning). After Tanker
checked his phone messages, he called the contracting officer at about 6:30 p.m., leaving a
message that AeroSage could meet this time and had responded to FedBid before their 5:30 p.m.
deadline.
Whether to Protest or Not?
Tanker found himself pondering whether it made sense to file a bid award protest with
the Government Accountability Office (GAO). That day he thought that he had won a contract to
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provide fuel to a federal agency in a small business set aside simplified acquisition through an
online bid site. When the electronic online bid closed at 12:00 noon that day, he could see his bid
was listed as “Lead.” These meant that he was the lowest bidder in the acceptable range. Other
bidders could only see that their bids were listed as “Lag” meaning that their bid was either not
the lowest bid or it was not in the acceptable price range, or possibly both. As part of their role,
acting for the government contracting officer, FedBid would always contact the lowest (and near
lowest) bidders to confirm their bid conformed to the requirements of the solicitation. Since this
was a lowest price technically acceptable bid with a firm fixed price for a commercial item,
Tanker knew that there was little to confirm. FedBid would just need to confirm that AeroSage’s
bid was correct including the requirement certified in the electronic bid submission the delivery
time of 9:00 a.m. the next day. The amounts involved were not large, and the contract’s margins
although comfortable, were relatively slim. Moreover, the government customer was likely to
have ongoing future requirements for fuel and other supplies. Would such a protest help or hurt
his chances for future business? How would this impact his ability to succeed in the fast-paced
government reverse bid acquisition process? Should he just drop it and just move on to the next
bids? On the other hand, Tanker firmly believed the award represented a violation of the law
and/or the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The protest process was specifically designed
to remedy such violations.
While there were three venues for protesting an acquisition impropriety, the most
common and commonly referred to generically as a protest, was filing a protest with the GAO.
Each protest forum had its own set of rules and someone different possible outcomes. A GAO
protest was what Tanker was pondering. He knew the more informal agency protest and the
costlier way to seek remedy through the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC or CFC) were not
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viable options. Tanker’s plan had always been to build the business on being a responsible
contractor with expertise in the complex federal government acquisitions market. For this
strategy to succeed, however, agencies needed to be held accountable for following proper
acquisition processes. He thought he knew the regulations. He relied on the contracting agency to
follow those rules. Tanker thought to himself, “Tell me the rules, we’ll all play by the rules… so
that I can compete, win, and build a successful business.”
Underlying the decision, he faced was the fact that this acquisition utilized a commercial
reverse auction process. This FedBid reserve auction had yielded some fast-paced bidding
opportunities. However, Tanker had recently had some issues with FedBid regarding their role
relative to the contracting agency, compliance with the Federal acquisition rules, and
pricing/payment of fees for fuel contracts. Therefore, the role of FedBid colored his decision
process of how to handle the alleged impropriety, to protest or not, loomed in his mind. Was the
commercial FedBid service acting as an agent for the federal government and were they
following the acquisition regulations? More importantly, would a GAO protest enhance
AeroSage’s growing business model and result in a return on the actions contemplated? Tanker
wondered what were his chances of achieving a successful outcome; or even, what is a
successful outcome?
The Aftermath
With delivery time scheduled for 9:00 a.m. the next morning, Tanker knew there was no
longer time to stop the scheduled delivery the next morning or even speak with the contracting
officer about the award as it was after business hours when the request to confirm was received.
A GAO protest would probably not stay the award or performance on the contract as required by
law (CICA), because the fuel would have most probably already been delivered. Tanker also
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understood the critical urgency that the Coleman Prison receive the 6,000 gallons of fuel by the
next morning.
The contracting officer had worked hard to fill this short notice requirement with a FedBid
reverse auction ‘request for quotes.’ Unfortunately, the contracting officer had also failed to
follow their stated rules of fairness or transparency by allowing response through FedBid until
5:30 p.m. that night.
•

Would the fuel supplied by AeroSage get delivered?

•

Could it still be stopped?

•

Did Tanker even want it to be stopped?

•

Would AeroSage be compensated for the lost margin?

•

Would FedBid and/or the contracting officer be held accountable for failing to follow the
rules?

•

Would AeroSage win a protest and benefit from the outcome, or would the costs of the
protest exceed the benefits?

•

What would be both the cost and the likelihood of winning a protest?

•

The fundamental business questions of any challenge, legal or administrative: What is the
desired outcome? What are the best and the likely gains from the desired outcome?
What are the greatest and likely loses from each of the desired outcome, likely outcome,
or the worst-case outcome? What is both the present value and long-term value of
possible outcomes?

All of these questions, with no definitive answers, weighed on Tanker’s mind after a 12-hour day
trying to build a small business. The next morning, an award notification was posted that the
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award was made to another vendor for a price that was $2,000 dollars more than AeroSage had
quoted. Tanker must decide how to handle and resolve this apparently improper award.
The Decision
Tanker knew what the contracting officer had done in his haste to execute the contract
award was not in accordance with the FAR and the solicitation. The fact that AeroSage had the
lowest priced technically acceptable bid in the FedBid reverse auction was not in dispute.
However, the contract was awarded to another vendor because AeroSage did not return a
message in the 45 minutes the contracting officer (CO) gave AeroSage in following the bid
closing. It was a requirement to follow the procedures, including the timeline specified for
responding. Tanker sensed that the error was a somewhat technical violation of rule to ensure
transparency, but realized he offered the government the best price. It seemed the immediate and
central decision was should AeroSage initiate a bid protest as outlined in the bid protest
regulations. If the fuel was not already delivered, an immediate protest would likely stop
performance on this contract award until it was resolved (Bid protest regulations).
What made this particularly challenging was that neither Tanker nor any of his
companies had ever gone through the formal bid protest process before. He had researched the
applicable Code of Federal Regulations for the and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) (Bid Protest Regulation 4 CFR § 21 Bid Protest Regulations,) as defined in the Federal
laws on the Procurement Protest System, Subchapter V of 31 U.S.C. 3551-3556 (see Technical
Note). He was well versed in the government systems and rules, and his career flourished as a
result. Rules that in his world often meant the difference between life and death, not something
as simple as to determine who would be awarded a fuel contract for $30,000. He wondered if it
would be helpful to let the contracting officer know of his proficiency with the rules in hopes of
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building a relationship with this contracting officer to curry favor by settling the issue between
them and avoiding the protest process. It seemed like an easy decision based on the return on
investment as the best he could hope for was either the re-competing of the contract or the
reimbursement of the bid protest costs, but not for the profit margin on this bid award.
Should AeroSage invest the time and opportunity costs from other bids and contracts to
gain an award that would earn a reasonable margin on this winning bid? Additionally, Tanker
hoped to build his business model on knowing the government bid and award process and
following the acquisition rules particularly as they provided substantial benefits and
opportunities to small businesses, including service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses
(SDVOSB). He also believed his companies had a responsibility to hold this contracting officer
accountable to follow the FAR, at least as Tanker saw it in his reading of the specific bid and
applicable clauses. He hypothesized that earning a reputation for his companies of knowing the
regulations, expecting contracting officer and agencies to follow the FAR, and challenging
alleged violations, AeroSage would gain the trust and respect of the governmental agencies.
Alternatively, Tanker knew that relationships were important in government contracting
(or any business) even within the context of ridged, yet complex directives of the FAR.
Contracting officers want to find a way to work with vendors they like and can make their job
easier. The result of the protest would work against developing a relationship and could even
cause the beginning of an adversarial reputation for AeroSage.
It seemed almost a trivial decision from an immediate return on investment standpoint,
particularly in the fast-paced FedBid reverse auction bidding process where the AeroSage’s win
percentage was near 5%. This made the volume of quotes and repeat opportunities important to
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the immediate opportunities. However, the decision loomed large because of the strategic impact
on AeroSage’s business model.
Also, Tanker worried if he knew enough about the fuel dealer business that had evolved
into a larger portion of his business. Despite his career expertise, did he know enough about the
tactical level of government contracting or even the bid protest process which is almost always
handled by lawyers? Did Tanker fully understand both the immediate costs of pursuing a protest,
as well as the unknown strategic implications? What are the immediate benefits, as well as the
long-term return including gaining the first-hand experience into the complex world of bid
protests?
Most importantly, Tanker wondered what would be defined as a successful outcome from
a protest. How would he and other veteran-owned small businesses perceive success, and how
would the outcome be reported? Would the SDVOSB community benefit in their respective
pursuits? Would a ‘win’ raise the awareness within the contract community to follow the rules
more closely? What is the right decision for AeroSage?
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Appendix 1.1. FedBid2 Government Acquisitions
FedBid Inc. is a private company which earns a fee by online solicitation of vendors capable of providing
a government requirement for commercial products. This fee was paid by the vendor when completing the
delivery of supplies. It is added to the price the vendor offered to the government. Vendors post their bid
prices with the lowest price their offer will go down to, if they are not the current lowest bidder. When the
solicitation bidding closes FedBid verifies that the bids meet the requirements forwarded a list sorted by
price of bids in the acceptable range. The contracting officer does the evaluation and award.
FedBid Procedures: From FedBid Inc. Terms of Service:
The Web Site provides an Independent Venue for Sellers to offer and sell Commercial Items and for
Buyers to post IFBs and purchase Commercial Items from Sellers. FedBid has no control over the quality,
safety or legality of the Commercial Items offered and sold, the accuracy of any related content, the
ability of Sellers to sell Commercial Items or the actual intent of Buyers to buy Commercial Items.
Although FedBid performs limited due diligence to qualify Sellers and Buyers as Subscribers, FedBid
does not guarantee nor does it control whether Sellers will complete the sale of Commercial Items they
offer or whether Buyers will complete the purchase of Commercial Items for which they have requested
Bids. Buyers may submit IFBs on an anonymous basis. Because FedBid does not and cannot control the
actions of users of the Web Site, in the event that You have a dispute with one or more users, You agree
to release FedBid from any and all claims, demands, and damages (actual, direct, indirect, consequential
and punitive) of every kind and nature, known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected, disclosed and
undisclosed, arising out of, or in any way connected with, such disputes. You also agree to waive the
provisions of any state law limiting or prohibiting a general release.
Bid Process
The Bid Process is as follows: 1) The Buyer posts an IFB; 2) Each Seller reviews the Specifications and
either submits or does not submit a Bid (during the Reverse eAuction process, each Seller may submit
multiple Bids); 3) If Seller submits a Bid, Seller MUST proactively confirm compliance with all
Specifications and be responsive to all Bid Validation or Due Diligence requests; or if Seller chooses not
to submit a Bid, Seller may submit a No Bid or not respond; 4) The Buyer reviews Bids, performs Due
Diligence, and decides to: i) Cancel the IFB, in which case all participating Sellers will be notified, ii)
RePost the IFB with modifications, in which case the Bid Process begins anew, iii) Extend the Buy to
allow for more Bids to be submitted; or iv) Select a Bid, in which case the Buyer enters the Authorization
Number into the Web Site, and each party receives the other party’s contact Information; and 5) Those
Sellers not selected may view the Selected Bid amount and, as permitted by the Buyer, the identity of the
Selected Seller. All Sellers submitting Bids on an IFB will compete in the Buy until the Buy process
expires as specified in the IFB and as determined by the Web Site system clock. Throughout the bidding
process, FedBid will rank the Bids based on Best Price; however, the Buyer maintains the right to use
Offline Factors for award decisions. FedBid will provide Sellers with their Bid Status, consisting of:
LEAD or LAG; LEAD-Pending Selection or LAG-Pending Selection; Selected or Not Selected; or
Cancelled. If two or more equal Bids are submitted, they will be ranked according to time of submission,
with the previously submitted equal Bid leading as compared to any subsequently submitted equal Bid.
Buys shall take place Monday through Friday between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m., Eastern Time, unless
otherwise specified by the Buyer. A Buyer is NEVER obligated to complete the transaction, regardless of
the status of the Buy, and a Buyer may select any of the participating Sellers in order to obtain the most
advantageous Bid in accordance with their contracting authority and applicable rules and regulations;
however, the Selected Seller may not retract or cancel its Selected Bid except in the extraordinary event
2
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that the Buyer: (a) materially changes the description and/or quantity of the Commercial Items specified
in the IFB, (b) has materially misrepresented the Commercial Items in the IFB, or (c) a system error has
occurred on the Web Site creating an error in the Bid(s) or IFB. A Buyer cannot award specific IFB line
items to multiple Sellers or otherwise designate more than one Selected Seller per Buy unless specified to
the contrary in the IFB. A Buyer cannot solicit or accept Partial Bids in a Reverse eAuction. Noncompliance with FedBid’s Bid Process may subject You to negative ratings from FedBid Subscribers and
may lead to suspension or revocation of some or all of Your FedBid access privileges. UNLESS
OTHERWISE STATED IN THE IFB, BIDS SUBMITTED BY SELLERS IN RESPONSE TO AN IFB
MUST BE IN U.S. DOLLARS AND MUST NOT INCLUDE ANY SALES TAX (STATE, LOCAL OR
OTHERWISE) OR ORDER COSTS.
Source: FedBid Inc. Terms of Service
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CHAPTER TWO:
GAO BID PROTESTS: ANALYSIS OF REPORTED OUTCOMES AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
A protest concerning an alleged violation of a procurement statute or regulation shall be
decided by the Comptroller General if filed in accordance with this subchapter [Title 31,
Subchapter 35] - 31 U.S.C. §3552(a) Procurement Protest System

Abstract
Since the first bid protest decision was published by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) in 1926, the GAO has provided an informal, quasi-legal forum for the resolution
of disputes concerning the awards of federal contracts (GAO-18-510SP). GAO considers
protests effective when the protesting contractor obtained some form of relief from the agency as
a resolution of the disputed improprieties (GAO Bid Protest Annual Reports). Industry analysis
of Federal government procurement protests finds GAO reporting a slightly increasing 44%
effective rate. These reported outcomes support the GAO narrative that their process provides
reasonable opportunity for vendors to achieve some sort of remedy for alleged prejudicial
improprieties in the government’s procurement of supplies and services. A protest outcome that
sustains the alleged violation is a more important measure of effectiveness since bid protests
regulations only require GAO to recommend relief when a protest is sustained. AO data also
shows that protest outcomes are relative only to the limited number of protests that are decided
on the merits. GAO reports that these outcomes of protests sustained on their merits are in the
range of 16% to 21% which conversely means roughly 80% of the decided protests are denied

30

recommendation of remedy for the protestor and the agency accountability. This finding shows
that the relevant effectiveness rate is relatively steady only at near 4% when analyzing
comparing sustained protests relative to the total protested allegations of impropriety closed each
year. Even so, many protest outcomes that are sustained fail to provide a meaningful or costeffective relief for the small business protestor. Therefore, the claimed utility of the current
GAO protest system is evasive for many contractors. GAO bid protest outcomes show minimal
effectiveness for small business protestors. The costs of bid protests are real, substantial, and
sometimes, enduring while the benefits from protests are minimal, especially for the small
businesses.
Introduction
The Federal government purchases every sort of product or service imaginable through
laws implementing the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Contractors competing for these
contracts may protest alleged violations of these rules by the government. A bid protest is a
challenge to the award or proposed award of a contract for the procurement of goods and
services or a challenge to the terms of a solicitation for such a contract (GAO.gov). The most
used venue for seeking adjudication of a protest dispute is with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO). Originally titled the General Accounting Office, GAO was renamed the
Government Accountability Office in 2004. The change better reflects the modern professional
services organization that GAO has become, particularly regarding the evolving bid protest
function (https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-is/history/).
Over the last decade or so, much Congressional and government interest, study, and
legislation has been directed at assessing the bid protest process for Federal procurements.
These efforts have been mainly used to determine the outcomes of protests: are they effective in
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correcting procurement improprieties and, most notably, do protests unduly delay acquisitions by
Federal agencies, especially in Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions. The GAO primarily
uses and highlights the percentage of protest outcomes, which they determine result in the
protestor receiving some sort of relief similar to the effectiveness rate (GAO Bid Protest Annual
Reports).
The Congressionally directed interest is in seeking to answer the question: Do the overall
benefits of identifying and correcting prejudicial violations of procurement rules of the Federal
acquisition system exceed the costs. In these studies, costs to the government are viewed
primarily in terms of acquisitions delayed or cancelled from the government’s or the procuring
agency’s vantage point. Few of the studies have addressed this question from the commercial
contractors’ perspective and virtually none have explored the question for small businesses. This
lack of attention to small businesses’ concerns is antithetical to national policies, laws, and
procurement regulations that seek to promote the sustained participation of small businesses in
Federal acquisitions. Therefore, small business protests make up the majority of the GAO
protests (RAND 2018).
The national policy, directed by the Small Business Act (Title 15 United States Code
(U.S.C.), Public Law 85-536, as amended) and implemented throughout the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), includes an array of mandated preferences for small businesses and subsets of
small businesses in various socio-economic categories. The Small Business Administration
(SBA) promulgates the FAR regulations for small business assistance programs, which include
total and partial small business set-aside contracts, small business goal achievement program,
financial assistance, accelerated payment, and mentor-protégé programs. Implementation and
execution of these uniquely government-regulated preferences for small businesses is a key part
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of our Federal acquisition system. The GAO protest forum offers a vehicle for adjudicating
alleged violations of these small business procurement rules as part of the broader process for a
contractor to challenge almost all Federal acquisition policies and procedures. While there is
increasing interest in determining the outcome effectiveness of protests to the acquisitions
system, such as those that warrant Congressionally mandated research from the government’s
perspective, there is a dearth of analysis of the effectiveness of GAO protests for small business
protestors.
The present industry analysis focuses on the questions of: what are the outcomes of GAO
bid protests for small businesses in Federal acquisitions, and are the protest outcomes effective
for those small businesses? Are the costs of pursuing GAO bid protests greater than the benefits
for small business protestors, particularly from the perspective of Service-Disabled VeteranOwned Small Businesses (SDVOSB)? Simplified, the research question is: Are reported GAO
protest outcomes effective for small business protestors.
Research Question
Are reported GAO protests outcomes effective for small business protestors? This paper
addresses the research question by reviewing the literature, legislation, seminars, conferences,
and research, much of which is from government sponsored sources. The protest data used is
from the GAO bid protest annual reports, GAO case reviews, RAND and Congressional
Research Service (CRS) quantitative studies. This paper is informed by the outcomes and their
implications as perceived through my action research of more than 200 GAO bid protests. While
the reported protest outcome data provided by GAO is for all GAO protests, this study analyzed
information from the vantage point of SDVOSB small businesses, many of whose situations
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involved disputes over the implementation of competition requirements and small business
preference procedures.
Federal Government Procurement of Supplies and Services
The Federal government spending on contracts for goods and services is approaching
$600 billion annually (Snyder 2019) as they purchase every kind of legal service and good
imaginable. The contracting process broadly begins with a solicitation, followed by offers or
bids, evaluation of the offers, acceptance of an offer(s), award of a contract, and performance of
the contract, and payment by the government. Commercial contractors (interchangeable with the
terms used by vendors or offerors in this paper,) compete in this unique, potentially lucrative
market with the expectation, shared by the public, that the acquisition process is fair, transparent,
and competitive in seeking the best value for the government requirements.
All Federal acquisitions are governed not only by laws and a comprehensive system of
regulations, but also by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and agency supplements to the
FAR. For example, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), along
with subagency policies and supplements, implements and supplements the FAR for the Defense
Department (and National Aeronautics and Space Administration - NASA, Government Services
Administration – GSA, and formerly the United States Coast Guard - USCG). The DFARS
contains requirements of law, DoD-wide policies, delegations of FAR authorities, deviations
from FAR requirements, and policies/procedures that have a significant effect on the public
(Federal Regiser). Federal laws are called the “United State Code” (U.S.C). The relevant
Federal agencies interpret and implement the U.S.C. through the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR). As supplemented, the FAR is the Federal regulation that governs procurements. The
FAR provides principles and rules for agency conduct of procurement. Also, the FAR contains
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the rulebook for vendors competing for these government contracts. The FAR is Chapter 1, Title
48 of the CFR.
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA pronounced “Seek-ah”) legislates
that Federal agencies shall obtain full and open competition using competitive procedures that
are best suited for the circumstances of the procurement (41 U.S.C §253 Competition
Requirements). The guiding principles of the procurement system are described in 48 CFR
1.102: The vision for the Federal Acquisition System is to deliver on a timely basis the best value
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public
policy objectives. (FAR 1.102 (a) Statement of guiding principles for the Federal Acquisition
System).
Like most commercial procurements, the goal of the Federal procurement system is to
timely provide the best value product or service to the customer. However, the Federal
government has unique and significant goals of providing this best value to Federal agency
customers while maintaining the public’s confidence and trust in the system and fulfilling public
policy objectives (48 CFR 1.102). Preeminent among the policy objectives of our free market
system is the goal to obtain full and open competition using appropriate competitive procedures
in the FAR (41 U.S.C § 3301 and 10 U.S.C. 2304) unless otherwise expressly authorized by
statute. An expressly authorizing statute directing an equally important policy objective mandate
is supplied by the Small Business Act (Title 15 U.S. Code, 15 U.S.C. 631, et seq., Public Law
85-536, as amended), which directs special programs and preferences for small business
concerns. Similar to its other programs, the Small Business Act deems that small businesses set
aside preferences and qualify as full and open competition when excluding sources, which are
best suited to economic security. As implemented in the FAR, the law directs a policy objective
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on equal footing as the full and open competition policy. This legislated policy is summarized in
law below:
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise is free
competition. Only through full and free competition can free markets, free entry
into business, and opportunities for the expression and growth of personal
initiative and individual judgment be assured. The preservation and expansion of
such competition is basic not only to the economic well-being but to the security
of this Nation. Such security and well-being cannot be realized unless the actual
and potential capacity of small business is encouraged and developed. It is the
declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist,
and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order
to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total
purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the
Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for
maintenance, repair, and construction) be placed with small business enterprises,
to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made
to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the
Nation. (15 U.S.C. § 631 (2)(a) Policy of Congress)
The law and corresponding acquisition regulations provide for several small business
assistance programs, including preferences for small business that may seem contrary to the
competition requirements. Specifically, small business concerns shall receive any award or
contract if such award or contract is, in the determination of the [SBA] Administrator and the
contracting agency, in the interest of (A) maintaining or mobilizing the full productive capacity
of the United States; (B) war or national defense programs; or (C) assuring that a fair proportion
of the total purchases and contracts for goods and services of the Government in each industry
category (15 U.S.C. §644). Although the law allows small business set asides and sole-source
contracts at nearly any value, the Small Business Act requires that set aside contracts be
exclusively reserved for small business concerns where:
[e]ach contract for the purchase of goods and services that has an anticipated
value greater than the micro purchase threshold [currently $10,000], but not
greater than the simplified acquisition threshold [currently $250,000] shall be
reserved exclusively for small business concerns unless the contracting officer is
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unable to obtain offers from two or more small business concerns that are
competitive with market prices and are competitive with regard to the quality and
delivery of the goods or services being purchase (15 U.S.C. §644(j)).
The law and corresponding acquisition regulations that provide for these several small business
assistance programs, including preferences for small businesses, may seem contrary to the
competition requirements.
As authorized by law, the SBA determines that a small business concern, eligible for
small business contracting assistance and preference programs, is a business that is
independently owned and operated, operates primarily within the United States or makes a
significant contribution to the U.S. economy, is not dominant in its field of operation, and is in
conformity with specific industry criteria and size standards (13 CFR 121). Small business
concerns have subsets of socio-economic categories like small disadvantaged (SDV or 8 (a)),
woman-owned, veteran-owned (VOSB), service-disabled veteran-owned (SDVOSB), and
Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small business concerns (15 U.C.S § 644).
In addition to SBA small business programs applicable to most all Federal agencies, the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has specific legislation (The Veterans Benefits, Health
Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Public Law 109-461, 38 U.S.C. § 8127 - §
8128), and the Veterans First Program, which mandates a separate, more comprehensive use of
set aside and sole-source contracts for VA procurements requiring use of VOSB and SDVOB, if
those business are on list of VA verified VOSB/SDVOBs.
These two dominate, but seemingly conflicting policy objectives directing full and open
competition and small business preferences and assistance policies create a somewhat uniquely
government contracting paradox. Federal procurement law and regulations resolve this apparent
contraction by deeming small business set asides and preferences as “full and open competition
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after exclusion of sources” (48 CFR Subpart 6.2). To fulfill the statutory requirements relating
to small business concerns, contracting officers may set aside solicitations to allow only such
business concerns to compete (48 CFR 6.203), by implementing the following policy in CICA
Competition requirements law: An executive agency may provide for the procurement of
property or services covered by this section using competitive procedures but excluding other
than small business concerns in furtherance of sections 638 and 644 of title 15 [Small Business
Act]. (10 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(2) & 41 U.S.C. § 253(b)(2), Exclusion of particular source;
restriction of solicitation to small business concerns).
The government acquisition system reconciles this enigma, which some contend that set
asides undermine purchasing efficiency so as to accomplish social goals. This reconciliation is
based on the theory that small business set asides accomplish goals of national security and
economic well-being that cannot be realized unless the actual and potential capacity of small
business is encouraged and developed (15 U.S.C. § 631). The subset of specific socio-economic
small business set asides may also accomplish social priorities. The socio-economic
subcategories are based on historically deemed disadvantages, except VOSB/SDVOSB.
For the small business owned by veterans, the favorable treatment and preference is an
earned benefit for serving the national defense. Veteran business owners, with or without
service-connected disability ratings, do not view themselves as disadvantaged. Rather, they are
utilizing the earned benefit, which aids in transition from military service to commercial
business. This preference benefit is also compensation for two things: 1) for not having an equal
opportunity to build a career in the private sector during military service, and 2) for the
presumption that veterans have a greater sense of understanding and meeting critical
requirements of government. This VOSB/SDVOSB contracting category has some distinct
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differences in law and practice concerning other socio-economic small business contracting
rules. These veteran-owned companies are also part of the larger aggregate class of small
business concerns in procurements with all the other agencies whose assistance and preference
propose to maintain and strengthen the overall economy and national security (U.S.C. § 631).
The implementation of the rules for providing preferential assistance to small businesses
in government contracting is a source of many disputes between agencies and contractors (and
often between small and large businesses). These disputes generate challenges to businesses
protesting improprieties in government procurement. Often, the protest outcomes for small
business are the result of allegations of agency impropriety in administering the small business
programs in procurements. These set aside solicitations do not have a direct analog to the
traditional commercial understanding of full and open competition. Rather, these small business
acquisitions are governed by a somewhat fluid, counter-intuitive rule set, which is not always
well understood, implemented, or supported by agency contracting officers. More than half the
GAO protests are by small businesses; many deal with disputes about the small business
program. With the VA having a separate VOSB/SDVOSB program, the protests and the
outcomes are often more specific to the VOSB/SDVOSB contracting section of the program.
The need for study of protest outcomes from the point of view of VOSB/SDVOSB stakeholders,
which are part of the broader small business protest outcomes, is a purpose of this research.
Protesting Alleged Violations of Acquisition Laws and Regulations
To ensure that agencies fulfill their vision in the expenditure of public funds, it is
necessary to provide the government and contractors methods of resolving disputes involving
allegations of improper actions that violate law or regulations. Hence, there is a need for a bid
protest system to ensure that the best value, public confidence, and public policy achievement are
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policed for government purchases. The public policy objectives of ensuring that small businesses
receive a fair portion of government contracts must be balanced with many of the other
objectives, such as maximizing competition and ensuring best value for the government.
Otherwise, there may be friction that can be the source of protests by small businesses.
My research is colored by the lens of small businesses, particularly those within
SDVOSB, who is looking to ensure agency fairness, integrity, and compliance with the goal for
small businesses’ support and growth. The bid protest system is critical to small business
participation in the Federal market, for that system protects the advantageous programs afforded
small business as described above. Critics of small business programs assume that these
programs cost the government more and increase the risk of performance. While this may
initially be true in some cases, the long-term enhancement and sustainment of the small business
backbone of the American free-enterprise system outweighs these costs and risks (48 CFR
Subpart 19.2). Recent research finds that small businesses “have lower transaction costs derived
from lower perceived risk of receiving a bid protest and via more efficient source selection
processes. Contrary to common bias, the performance level of small businesses is no less than
that of large business. Thus, small businesses engender lower transaction costs for correcting
supplier performance” (Hawkins 2018).
Small businesses are the genesis of much innovation, are usually more agile, and often
can provide cost saving benefits because of their lower risk and transaction costs, lower
overhead, simplified acquisition procedures, and fewer regulatory and reporting requirements.
However, most small businesses lack the knowledge, experience, and resources of financial,
regulatory, and legal assistance to operate successfully within the complex bureaucratic laws and
rules to compete in the Federal marketplace. Many struggle to sustain success. Sustained small
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business success requires the ability to navigate the somewhat unique government contracting
rules and ensure compliance with these laws and rules of the small business, its competitors, and
the multiple agencies involved. This compliance is essential to ensure full, fair, and open
competition within the policy guardrails legislated by Congress and representing the public as
described above. Hence, the need for an “inexpensive and expeditious” (31 U.S.C. §3554)
process to resolve disputes about the compliance with these government contracting mandates
that seek policy directed competition requirements and transparency. Using the GAO venue is an
American creation, although several other countries and the World Trade Organization have
considered systems modelled from the GAO protest system (White Interview). The GAO protest
system provides, or at least attempts to provide, this adjudication option, which may be more
suited for small businesses.
Policing, resolving, adjudicating, and correcting improprieties in the purchases made by
government agencies is accomplished by the multi-tiered Federal government acquisition protest
process. The design of this process includes informal, internal agency, administrative, and
judicial proceedings. These systems are governed by regulations, law, precedent setting GAO
decisions, SBA determinations and appeals, and court ruling.
Types of Protest
Several types of bid protests offer somewhat different venues, rules, methods, authorities,
and possible outcomes. These different types are protests with the individual agency to the
contracting officer or protest reviews above the contracting officer authorized by Presidential
Executive Order 12979; protests with the GAO; small business protests with the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA); and protests filed with the United States Court of Federal
Claims (CFC) and Federal appellate courts. Sometimes, each venue has competing, overlapping
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advantages. Such disadvantages make the timing and choice of forum for protest a critical. Each
type or venue is influenced by its specific government authority and the separation of powers
weighs heavily on the process and the outcome or remedies available for protest resolution.
Agency protests (including E.O. 12979 protests) and small business protests are filed with the
executive branch agency as well as conducted and remedied by the agency involved. GAO
protests are conducted by the legislative branch. The GAO is an office of Congress that can only
provide recommendations to the executive agency to remedy the protested impropriety. The
Federal COFC and appellate court system support the traditional Judicial Branch adjudication
and remedy resolutions. A summary of the basic types of protest described below are outlined in
Appendix 2.1, with further discussion included.
Agency Protests
Agency protests are addressed internally by the contracting agency. Informal protests or
concerns are raised by an offeror in discussion with the contracting officer regarding aspects of
the acquisition. Often, the source of concerns likely to be protested by the contracting office are
the posting of a solicitation and pre-award or post-award notifications and debriefings. The FAR
directs the required content of a solicitation and a requested or required notification and
debriefing (FAR 15.505/15.506). Generally, notifications and debriefings are required for
negotiated contracts and for those using small business set asides or other small business
programs.
A formal agency protest is a timely filed written objection to a solicitation, award, or
termination of a contract (48 CFR 33.103, 4 CFR § 21). The agency protest is filed with and
ruled on by the contracting officer, rather than the GAO. Protests filed directly to the Agency are
not decided on by a neutral party and often, are less successful. However, they trigger an often-
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useful automatic stay of contract performance in accordance with the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA) of 1984. This stay of performance is an important factor in a business’s, small or
large, decision on how to protest a bid. This tool is particularly useful in an Agency protest,
where the contractor has limited leverage, other than the possibility of escalation to a GAO
protest.
Additionally, Presidential Executive Order 12797 (E.O. 12797) directs that Agencies
also “provide for inexpensive, informal, procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of
protests… including alternate dispute resolution (ADR)” and “a review, at a level above the
contracting officer.” If timely filed, these E.O.12979 agency protests can trigger an often-useful
automatic stay of contract performance in accordance with the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984. This CICA stay is also available in protests with the GAO. This stay of
performance ruling is an important factor in any business’s decision on how to protest a bid. The
Presidential Executive Order is a particularly useful tool in an Agency protest, where the
contractor has limited leverage, other than the possibility of escalation to a GAO protest.
GAO Protests
GAO protests, the focus of this research, are general thought of as bid protests. Congress
intended and directed that the GAO “shall provide for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution
of protests” (31 U.S.C. §3554). The components of this bid protest system are defined in Title 31
U.S.C. Chapter 35, Subchapter V – PROCUREMENT PROTEST SYSTEM. Protests are filed
with the GAO in accordance with the bid protest regulation (4 CFR § 21), implementing the Bid
Protest System statute (31 U.S.C §3551-§3556). In deciding bid protests, GAO considers
whether federal agencies have complied with statutes and regulations controlling government
procurements, whether the alleged violation is materially prejudicial to the protest, and whether
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the violation is filed timely, with the required content, using the new Electronic Protest
Docketing System (EPDS).
Small Business Size Protests with the SBA
Although not covered as part of this research dissertation, there is a protest venue and
grounds that are vitally important to small business concerns of all socio-economic categories.
These protests of small business size issues are heard by the U.S. Small Business Administration
(SBA). Such protests involve alleged violations of the Small Business Act, implementing SBA
regulations, or FAR clauses related to small business programs. An interested party or
contracting officer can protest the following general type of protests (4 CFR § 21) with the SBA
that are excluded from GAO consideration:
•

Size Status Protests –challenges to offeror’s eligibility for a small business program
based on the determination of size in a particular designated industry.

•

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Industry Classification – argues
impropriety in designating the single-industry classification used to determine size
standard for that procurement.

•

Responsibility Determination – challenges the determination of capability of a small
business to perform on a proposed contract.

•

Compliance with Limitations on Subcontracting – challenges the procurer’s
determination about the owner’s ability to perform a service(s) or produce a product(s)
with own employees or employees of a similarly situated small business.

•

Non-manufacturing Rule (NMR) Compliance – a subset of compliance protests with the
limits on subcontracting where a small business must procure a product that it did/does
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not manufacture for a domestic small business manufacturer unless through a waiver by
the SBA or an exemption in regulation.
Small business protests can be filed and are ruled on with strict timeliness criteria similar those
of the GAO protest. To avoid time traveling, the determination is generally made by the SBA
Area Office Director (from the SBA regional office where the challenged small business is
located). Timely appeals of SBA rules are made by with filing before an administrative judge in
the SBA’s Office of Hearing and Appeals (OHA). Then, these appeals can be challenged or
appealed in Federal court. SBA hears challenges to a small business size status of an offeror(s)
for a specific solicitation. The GAO adjudicates challenges to the conduct of the protested
acquisitions for alleged violations by the agency.
U.S. Court of Federal Claims Protests
Judicially adjudicated protests and claims against a Federal agency are primarily heard by
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) and follow its rules and procedures. Important
distinctions of filing a protest with the CFC are as follows: the protestor must be represented by a
lawyer admitted to the CFC, the court hears the case de nova or with a fresh look, there are
different timeliness criteria, and there is no automatic CICA stay of performance of the contract.
However, a protestor can file for an injunction to stop performance. Unsuccessful GAO protests
can be filed with the COFC.
Appeals to CFC ruling can be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and eventually to
the Supreme Court of the United States. A (series of) protest(s) that began as GAO protests
became a landmark Supreme Court ruling favoring the SDVOSB protestor in Kingdomware
Technologies, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-916 (2016). This case involved a VA SDVOSB
protest of the VA’s violations of the Veterans First Program requirements to set aside a contract
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for the VA using the GSA schedule. The VA claimed that set asides for VA procurements using
GSA-assisted acquisition only applied if the VA had not achieved its SDVOSB goals.
Other cases involving the VA include several Kingdomware protests. GAO sustained
several Kingdomware and Kingdomware-related protests, recommending that the VA set-aside
requirements be applied to this and all contracts supporting the VA, regardless of being assisted
by other agencies. The VA did not agree, nor did it comply with the GAO decision and
recommended relief. As required, GAO reported the VA’s disregard for the recommended relief
to Congress in the annual bid protest report. Then, GAO stopped hearing and dismissed several
protests related to the same issue of compliance with the VA SDVOSB set-aside program
because their recommended corrective action would not be followed, making a GAO protest
academic. Then when the protest was filed in CFC, the GAO could also refuse cases that were
subject to current or past litigation. The case went to the Appeals Court and to the Supreme
court, which, resulted in a unanimous 8-0 in favor of Kingdomware in June 2016.
GAO Protest Venue
The Bid Protest System statute directs the current procedures for a “protest concerning an
alleged violation of a procurement statute or regulation [whereby the case] shall be decided by
the Comptroller General if filed in accordance with this subchapter [31 U.S.C §3551-§3556]”
(31 U.S.C. §3552 (a)). The GAO provides the following overview of the GAO bid protest
industry:
For more than 90 years, GAO has provided an objective, independent, and
impartial forum for the resolution of disputes concerning the awards of federal
contracts. Over the years, the decisions of the Comptroller General of the United
States, the head of GAO, in bid protest cases have resulted in a uniform body of
law applicable to the procurement process upon which the Congress, the courts,
agencies, and the public rely. - Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide (Tenth
Edition, 2018; GAO-18-510SP, May 1, 2018).
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Protests filed with the GAO are limited to Federal government procurements. These must
be protested to the GAO in accordance with the bid protest statute (31 U.S.C §3551-§3556), the
bid protest regulation (4 CFR § 21), FAR (Part 33), and the specific agencies’ policies and annex
to the FAR, including as reported by the GAO in their annual fiscal year. A bid protest is an
adjudicative process conducted by the GAO’s Office of General Counsel, Procurement Law
Control Group. Technically, a GAO protest decision is decided and signed by the GAO General
Counsel but is adjudicated by a GAO hearing attorney who writes the decision under the
supervision of the two co-Managing Associate General Counsels for Procurement Law. I
recommend that the reader supplement this baseline note with the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) 2018 updated analysis of protest process, Gordon’s research on the governments’
cost-benefit analysis of GAO protest (Gordon, 2013) and recent developments in the GAO’s
protest guide shown below.

Figure 2.1. Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide (10th edition, 2018)
This guide incorporates the 2018 changes requiring electronic filing through the GAO’s
Electronic Protest Docketing System (EPDS) and payment of a $350 filing fee. These changes
appear to have some impact on the reported outcomes as well as perception of the outcomes by
researchers and protestors.
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Timeliness is an essential threshold to meet and can be a significant hurdle for small
businesses trying to understand the requirements, putting together a competitive bid, and
ensuring they adhere to the rules that may provide competitive advantage. There are strict
timelines for filing, processing, and deciding a GAO protest; it is all challenging to protestors,
particularly small business owners more comfortable with informal, expeditious processes.
The protest timeline influences the conduct of the protest and the review of the protests
(White Interview). The timeline is driven by the statutory requirements to resolve protests
within 100 days (Bid protest rules also provides for GAO resolution of suitable protests in a 65
day express option rule on allegations, acquisition, and improprieties). The GAO timeline also
covers recommendation of relief, if warranted, and an annual report on protest trends and
specific instances of agency failure to follow recommendations. Except for government
shutdowns, GAO has not failed to meet the 100-day process timeline shown in Figure 2.2,
below.

Figure 2.2. Timeline of GAO Bid Protest Process (Source: GAO, Our Bid Protest Process,
https://www.gao.gov/legal/bid-protests)
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A timely GAO protest, whether filed originally, supplementally, or following an Agency
protest, must meet the original timeliness requirements discussed above (4 CFR § 21.1).
Generally, an Agency or GAO protest must be filed:
not later than 10 days after the basis of protest is known or should have been known
(whichever is earlier), with the exception of protests challenging a procurement
conducted on the basis of competitive proposals under which a debriefing is requested
and, when requested, is required. In such cases, with respect to any protest basis which is
known or should have been known either before or as a result of the debriefing, the initial
protest shall not be filed before the debriefing date offered to the protestor, but shall be
filed not later than 10 days after the date on which the debriefing is held (4 CFR §
21.4(b))
This paper focuses on the second venue for bid-protests, the GAO, the more familiar,
common bid-protest vehicle. A GAO protest is an administrative review process with no
mandatory enforcement power. This type of protest is considered to be quasi-judicial primarily
because of its statutory procedural process, the stay of contract award, and timely filed protests
with the GAO (or with the Agency under E.O. 12979). The “CICA stay” provision was added to
the GAO protest in 1984, when the current rules were codified in CICA, and in 1995 for E.O.
12979 agency protests. This stay provision is an important tool the protestors must use and some
would say abuse to force resolution of protests or extend an incumbent’s performance and
revenue. The CICA stay provision is one of the more contentious aspects of the protest process,
protest outcomes, and stakeholder motivations. The award and performance stay period can be
used by contractors who are incumbent for an existing service contract when a delay in award of
a new contract to a competitor may provide additional performance and funding to this
incumbent through contract extension or emergency contract until the new contract award can be
made while protest is adjudicated. The protest CICA stay provision is one area of concern by
agencies, especially DoD, because this protest provision can be abused or cause undue delay in
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awarding a contract for needed requirements. However, the bid protest law and regulations
authorize a “CICA stay override” when an agency justifies urgent or compelling needs.
Possible GAO Protest Outcomes
The GAO reports three basic protest outcomes: sustaining the prejudicial impropriety,
denying the protestor’s challenge, or dismissing the protest for mootness or procedural and/or
statutory defects. In the last several years, more protest decisions announce or publish the
decision a part of, or as a combination of, all three outcomes. However, the outcomes are
reported as only one of the three outcome types. GAO reports these decisions as sustained in
part, denied in part, and/or dismissed in the one category of the highest level decision, with
“sustain” being the highest and “dismiss” being the lowest (White, Interview). The reported
GAO protest outcomes, which are the focus of this research, are further described as:
•

Sustained – Outcome decided on the merits where GAO upholds the protested allegation
of impropriety. This outcome usually is due to violations of statute or regulation,
unreasonable action, or judgment by agency or protested party. GAO recommends relief
and possible payment of costs in such cases.

•

Denied – Outcome decided on the merits, where GAO rules against the protesting party.
This outcome is usually due to an inability to find a material violation of acquisition laws
or regulations, or the agency acted reasonably or in deference to authority (of contracting
officer or the agency or another government agency).

•

Dismissed – Outcome withheld. GAO does not rule on the merits of the protest; rather,
adjudication is terminated based on procedural or statutory flaw(s). This outcome is
usually due to untimeliness, lack of standing or interested party, clear substantive
deficiency, failure to state grounds for protest, legal insufficiency, failure to respond, no
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protestable impropriety, protest jurisdiction superseded, no relief possible, or technicality.
These types of dismissals do not provide any form of relief recommendation. However,
dismissal also can be based on corrective action taken by the agency prior to decision,
making the allegation moot or academic. GAO usually considers this approach to
provide the protestor with some element of relief if the relief is based on corrective action
taken by the agency. Another subset of dismissed protests is: Withdrawn. This outcome
often results when the protestor cancels the protest often due to corrective action taken by
the agency, alternate dispute resolution, new information, or protestor agrees with or
understands the agency’s action. Withdrawn protests usually are also considered to
provide some form of relief, unless the withdrawal is due to the protestor realizing s/he is
unlikely to prevail on the merits.
There are other variations of GAO protest outcomes, some of which are contained in the reports
and may skew the outcome data. These include:
•

Supplement or Amended Protest – a new, subsequent protest to the same acquisition
timely filed with 10 days of actual or constructive knowledge of new grounds for protest.
An example would be: provision of new information in the agency report. Each new
ground of protest must independently satisfy GAO’s timeliness and filing requirements.
Supplemental protests are listed under the same B-number but with the next subsequent
decimal.

•

Protest Reconsideration – an interested party files a timely request for reconsideration by
GAO, often with a new GAO hearing officer. Such a filing usually is due to the hearing
officer’s errors of fact or law or to the appearance of new facts that were not known and
could not have been known at the time of the protest. The Protest Reconsideration filing
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is reported as another protest with the same B-number but a different decimal. The party
requesting reconsideration must show that his/her prior decision contains errors of either
fact or law, or the party must present information not previously considered that warrants
reversal or modification of the decision (4 CFR § 21.14). Reconsiderations are
administrative reviews, like judicial appeals, that decide and report the outcome under the
three outcome categories; Dismissed, Denied, Sustained. Technically, a sustained
reconsideration could be sustained because there was procedural error(s) in law and/or
regulation, and the underlying protested impropriety may be re-adjudicated.
•

Cost Reimbursement Request Protest – If GAO determines that a solicitation for a
contract or a proposed award or if the award of a contract does not comply with a statute
or regulation, the GAO may recommend the Federal agency conducting the procurement
pay to an appropriate interested party the costs of filing and pursuing the protest,
including reasonable attorneys' fees and consultant- and expert-witness fees; even costs
for bid and proposal preparation may be recommended (31 U.S.C. §3554 ). The protestor
may also request through a subsequent, timely protest filing that GAO recommend
repayment of costs, if the protest is sustained or (the more likely case) the agency took
corrective action for the protested impropriety with unnecessary delay. Payment of the
protestor’s costs is usually considered if the agency took the corrective action after the
30-day due date for the required agency report. This protest is a new protest under the
existing B-number but with the next decimal. The new protest will have its own outcome.
There are cost-reimbursement limitations to the issue sustained or corrected as well as
limits on amounts that protestors who are not small business concerns may by paid.
When cost reimbursement is recommended by GAO and the agency and the protestor
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cannot agree on an amount the government will pay, then the protestor may timely file a
new protest asking for a cost determination.
Relief Recommendation Possible from GAO
If a protest is sustained or, in some cases, corrective action is taken that is not sufficient,
then the GAO can recommend relief. Since GAO is part of the legislative branch of Congress, it
may only recommend actions to the Executive branch agencies. The concerned agency must
report to GAO any recommended relief they do not provide. Next, the Executive branch
agency’s report is submitted to Congress by GAO, along with the GAO’s annual report. The bidprotest law and regulations provide for the GAO possible relief recommendations in 4 CFR §
21.8 Remedies:
(a) If GAO determines that a solicitation, cancellation of a solicitation,
termination of a contract, proposed award, or award does not comply with statute
or regulation, it shall recommend that the agency implement any combination of
the following remedies:
(i) Refrain from exercising options under the contract;
(ii) Terminate the contract;
(iii) Recompete the contract;
(iv) Issue a new solicitation;
(v) Award a contract consistent with statute and regulation; or
(vi) Such other recommendation(s) as GAO determines necessary to
promote compliance.
(b) In determining the appropriate recommendation(s), GAO shall, except as
specified in paragraph (c) of this section, consider all circumstances surrounding
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the procurement or proposed procurement including the seriousness of the
procurement deficiency, the degree of prejudice to other parties or to the integrity
of the competitive procurement system, the good faith of the parties, the extent of
performance, the cost to the government, the urgency of the procurement, and the
impact of the recommendation(s) on the agency’s mission.
(c) If the head of the procuring activity determines that performance of the
contract notwithstanding a pending protest is in the government’s best interest,
GAO shall make its recommendation(s) under paragraph (a) of this section
without regard to any cost or disruption from terminating, recompeting, or
rewarding the contract.
(d) If GAO determines that a solicitation, proposed award, or award does not
comply with statute or regulation, it may recommend that the agency pay the
protestor the costs of:
(1) Filing and pursuing the protest, including attorneys’ fees and
consultant and expert witness fees; and
(2) Bid and proposal preparation.
(e) If the agency decides to take corrective action in response to a protest, GAO
may recommend that the agency pay the protestor the reasonable costs of filing
and pursuing the protest, including attorneys’ fees and consultant and expert
witness fees. The protestor shall file any request that GAO recommend that costs
be paid within 15 days of the date on which the protestor learned (or should have
learned, if that is earlier) that GAO had closed the protest based on the agency’s
decision to take corrective action. The protestor shall furnish a copy of its request
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to the agency, which may file a response within 15 days after receipt of the
request, with a copy furnished to the protestor.
(f)(1) If GAO recommends that the agency pay the protestor the costs of filing
and pursuing the protest and/or of bid or proposal preparation, the protestor and
the agency shall attempt to reach agreement on the amount of costs. The protestor
shall file its claim for costs, detailing and certifying the time expended and costs
incurred, with the agency within 60 days after receipt of GAO’s recommendation
that the agency pay the protestor its costs. Failure to file the claim within that time
may result in forfeiture of the protestor’s right to recover its costs.
(f)(1) If GAO recommends that the agency pay the protestor the costs of filing
and pursuing the protest and/or of bid or proposal preparation, the protestor and
the agency shall attempt to reach agreement on the amount of costs. The protestor
shall file its claim for costs, detailing and certifying the time expended and costs
incurred, with the agency within 60 days after receipt of GAO’s recommendation
that the agency pay the protestor its costs. Failure to file the claim within that time
may result in forfeiture of the protestor’s right to recover its costs.
(2) The agency shall issue a decision on the claim for costs as soon as practicable
after the claim is filed. If the protestor and the agency cannot reach agreement
within a reasonable time, GAO may, upon request of the protestor, recommend
the amount of costs the agency should pay in accordance with 31 U.S.C. 3554(c).
In such cases, GAO may also recommend that the agency pay the protestor the
costs of pursuing the claim for costs before GAO.
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(3) The agency shall notify GAO within 60 days after GAO recommends the
amount of costs the agency should pay the protestor of the action taken by the
agency in response to the recommendation.
It is important to reiterate that GAO can only recommend relief. The agency has no
statutory requirement to follow the GAO recommendation. However, the repercussion for not
following the recommended relief is risking being reported in the annual report or potentially
blemishing the agency’s relationship with the Congressional committees and staff who oversee
the agency (White Interview). While the above-recommended relief options in the protest
regulation may seem substantial, many protestors, including this researcher, believe there is
rarely meaningful actual corrective action recommended or taken by the Agency. Common
relief, such as the agency’s cancelling the requirement or accomplishing the evaluation, are often
considered inadequate or viewed as a “do over” for the agency, which provides little benefit to
the protestor, particularly the small business owner. The relief offered in sustained protest
outcomes is an area where additional research may be needed to more clearly define the
outcomes of bid protests and the ultimate success or effectiveness of those protests. If the GAO
has unreported quantitative data on the specific relief recommended, it would be difficult to track
the ultimate relief or action recommended (White Interview). Further study of the actual remedy
taken will help illuminate the ultimate protest outcomes, their measures of effectiveness, and the
protestors’ perceptions of the outcomes.
The Industry
The goal of successful government contractors is to win and successfully perform
contracts for goods and/or services provided, within the contractor’s capabilities, at a profit, to
sustain and grow the business. As described above, Government acquisitions are governed by
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complex and extensive laws, regulations, agency-regulation supplements, policies, rules, interim
rules, protest decisions, and court decisions. A good, working knowledge of the laws, rules, and
venues for seeking relief for the agency acquisition improprieties is essential for a successful
government contractor. This required knowledge is particularly true for small businesses that
can be advantaged by those laws and policies that encourage small business participation. Bid
protests provide tools for contractors to challenge an agency’s potential errors that are
detrimental to the contractor, thereby limiting fair and open competition. Small businesses that
are in compliance with the laws, including those giving preferences to some socio-economic
categories of small businesses, deserve access to the accountability safeguards of the unique
GAO bid protest process, which is intended to give contractors, the public, and taxpayers
confidence in the government contracting industry.
The outcomes of GAO protests and how they are reported are the focus of this paper.
Specifically, the researcher looks to assess whether the GAO provides the needed level of
effectiveness for contractors and is the necessary accountability within government agencies.
GAO describes an effective protest outcome as one in which the protestor receives some sort of
relief. An effective protest by commercial vendors’ participation in the protest system is an
outcome where the benefits, most notably profitable sustainability, ultimately outweigh the costs
imposed. The accountability of government in its procurements helps maintain a consistent and
fair playing field, ensuring full competition in the government marketplace. Protest outcomes
and how they are reported are key measures of effectiveness for contractors as well as
accountability for the government in the fair application of procurement rules, including small
business preferences.
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The industry for this research is protests filed with the GAO by contractors seeking
remedy for violations of acquisition laws and regulations. The reported outcomes from GAO
protests are studied from the perspective of SDVOSB small business protestors. However, as
discussed below, subsequent research compares the stakeholder’s perceptions of the outcomes in
pursuing effectiveness and accountability.
Stakeholders
A stakeholder is a party that has an interest in the industry and can affect or be affected
by the outcome of a decision or action by another stakeholder (Chen, 2020). To analyze the bid
protest reported outcomes, it is essential to understand what the bid protest system is intended to
accomplish, enforce, improve, or at least correct. The GAO protest system is the legislative
branch’s oversight of public procurement policy and processes by executive agencies. The GAO
aims “to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the [government] customer,
while maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling public policy objectives” (48 CFR § 1.102
Statement of guiding principles for FAR). An example is the promotion of competition and
encouraging and developing the actual and potential capacity of small businesses. Like many
government ecosystems, there are complex and somewhat obscured or subtle interactions among
stakeholders.
The GAO bid protests lean heavily on the unique interactions of stakeholders in the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our Federal government while respecting the
interests of the public, taxpayers, public policy, and commercial companies. Companies have
their own set of internal stakeholders, including investors, employees, customers, and suppliers.
The various stakeholder interests often do not align. As the 2018 RAND study of protests within
the Department of Defense (DoD) found, tension exists between the agencies’ need to move
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forward with procurements and the companies’ need for information about how a contract award
decision was made. In fact, the interests of the most visible stakeholder, the government agency
and the protesting company, are often in direct conflict in seeking resolution of allegations of
impropriety in government acquisitions. Government contractors are the protagonists, and the
executive agencies are the antagonists in this struggle to expeditiously fulfill agency
requirements while providing full and open competition. In such cases, the GAO serves as a
referee to ensure that the rules set in law and the agencies’ rules are followed.
The Public and Congress
The ultimate stakeholders in government acquisitions are the U.S. taxpayers and the
general public, all of whom want to have confidence that public money is being spent efficiently
and effectively with full and open competition under our free enterprise system. Americans
desire consistent legislated policies, such as assistance to small businesses, to strengthen our
industrial base and overall economic security. Our representatives in Congress are proxies for
the taxpayers; they provide direction to the GAO and proper laws for the executive agencies to
implement. Congress is an important stakeholder in ensuring the executive agencies follow the
laws in the acquisitions of goods and services; those laws must build trust, ensure competition
leading to best value, and achieve policy objectives.
Government Accountability Office
The GAO is the legislature’s administrative organization that evaluates, adjudicates,
recommends, and reports on agencies’ conduct during the procurement of supplies and services.
More broadly, the GAO scrutinizes the government’s (primarily the executive branches’)
implementation of law by using oversight and the power of the purse. The Constitutional
separations of power give an important distinction for the GAO stakeholders, even though the
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GAO technically has neither executive nor judicial authority over agencies’ acquisitions. Rather,
GAO only makes recommendations to the agencies and files reports on protest outcomes. The
GAO reports to Congress about agencies not following recommendations (such reports are sent
primarily through four Congressional committees (GAO Annual Bid Protest Report to Congress,
31 U.S.C. §3554). The GAO stakeholders’ power, while statutorily directed, is politically-based
and derived from GAO’s relationships with executive agencies through the respective
Congressional committees (White, Interview).
The political interaction between two branches of the Federal government may have
some impact on the GAO’s bid protest mission to provide an objective, independent, and
impartial forum for the resolution of disputes concerning alleged agency improprieties. Possibly,
discussion between the two branches of government may sometimes prove detrimental to
interested offerors of Federal contracts (GAO-18-510SP, 2018). While the stated primary
objective of the GAO bid protests is to resolve alleged violation of a procurement statute or
regulation in Federal acquisitions (31 U.S.C. §3552), the overall purpose, as the GAO’s name
highlights, is accountability. The GAO’s interest is to ensure accountability that the executive
agencies comply with the law to ensure full, fair, open competition for contractors and the
fulfillment of policy objectives for the public. As with many bureaucratic government
organizations in a political environment where implementation of policy and law is disputed and
regulated, the GAO can be influenced by growth of the administrative state and social trends,
such as regulatory capture. These factors can influence outcomes and/or the reporting of
outcomes.
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Federal Judicial System
The Court of Federal Claims (CFC) and the entire Federal judicial system have a stake in
the bid protest, including the process, documentation, and outcomes. While the CFC venue has
primary jurisdiction over suits against the Federal government for claims and violations of
acquisition laws and regulations, the CFC decides a case “de novo,” or a new adjudication, by
the judicial venue. The Court’s new trial starts with and relies on documents contained in the
administrative record of the acquisition under dispute. The federal judiciary has interest in the
outcomes of GAO protest decisions because it can inform the courts of legislature’s view of the
acquisition laws and rules. The judicial branch venue, CFC, is a formal process following the
Federal court procedures. This formality and “de novo” review may create the impression of a
more objective adjudication of law than the informal administrative resolution of protest disputes
by the GAO; however, they are non-binding and subject to pressures from regular contracts with
the agencies and the Congressional oversight staff. The judiciary can also be subject to sway by
political influences and activism, particularly on the interpretation of laws set by the legislature,
implemented by executive agencies, and reviewed by the GAO. Additionally, the courts
influence the GAO protest dispute resolutions, which can be reviewed all the way to the Supreme
Court for binding decisions. CFC rulings have binding precedence on the GAO administrative
decisions.
Executive Agencies
The entity “Federal agency” is defined as any executive department or independent
establishment in the executive branch, including any wholly owned government corporation and
any establishment in the legislative or judicial branch, except the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Architect of the Capitol (4 CFR § 21.0 (c)). These executive agencies,
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and their respective acquisition organizations and contracting officers are essential stakeholders
trying to follow policy restrictions to efficiently purchase items to meet their users’ requirements.
Often, contracting officers (the agency decision authority for each acquisition) are concerned
about the risks from bid protests of increased costs to settle a terminated contract(s), time delay
to the mission, embarrassment/shame, increase in workload to resolve the protest, career
repercussions for making a mistake or omission that caused a bid protest (Hawkins 2018).
While the agencies are important stakeholders prominently on one side of the protest
dispute seesaw, on the other side are also key counter stakeholders: the contractors competing to
make money for providing quality supplies and/or services to the Federal government.
Meanwhile, the agencies and their legal staffs have a big stake in the outcome of GAO protests,
as they set the tone and, in many cases, set informal precedent or basis for future GAO protests.
Agencies are also concerned about conduct and rulings in agency protests, including E.O. 12979
agency protests. The administrative record of a procurement includes all the protest
documentation and required agency acquisition reporting that must be maintained by the agency.
The agency’s interest is dominated by a desire to acquire the services or items required by their
agency to accomplish their mission without undue delay. An agency’s alleged violations of
procurement rules are subject to accountability by GAO when potential non-binding
recommendation of corrective action is considered accountability.
Government Contractors and Offerors
The commercial contractors, also referred to as vendors and offerors, that compete for
government contracts are key stakeholders in the GAO protest research. This reality is
particularly true for small business concerns with limited financial and legal resources who are
especially interested in the inexpensive, expeditious resolution of protests by an organization
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outside of the executive agency. The contractor’s interest in government acquisitions is to win
contracts with which they can profitably fulfill government agencies’ requirements for goods and
services. The agency is the contractor’s customer whom they seek to please by providing quality
performance of contracts. Responsible government contractors view bid protests as a business
decision with short and long-term costs and benefits if the outcome leads to a positive return on
investment. While the protestor’s decision to protest is a tactical choice to win a specific
contract, it is more importantly a strategic decision that colors his/her relationship with the
contractor’s government customers.
A protest is a challenge to the contractor’s customer, the government agency, for alleged
unfairness in the acquisition that the contractor seeks to win. The government contractors’
interest is primarily within the business cost-benefit tradeoff. Antagonizing one customer with
an allegation of impropriety may result in delay, even briefly, of a procurement, which would
have a substantial long and short-term detrimental impact on the vendor’s business and financial
viability. For example, I have seen protests that have been sustained or dismissed for corrective
action for which the protestor never receives the purported benefit of the corrective action or
remedy and is never again able to do business with, or win a contract from, that agency. In some
cases, a single protest outcome can cause the small business’ major revenue stream to be negated
or ceased all together, which is particularly true for small businesses with limited resources,
often pro se protestors, who are not able to spread the animosity created over the broader
organization or other divisions. Large contractors, particularly in the defense market, have
multiple divisions that can have billion-dollar contracts with multiple agencies, so a protest on a
major procurement is considered just part of business with that division. In such cases, one
protest outcome is simply a blip on the large company’s business radar.
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In addition to being able to weather protest setbacks and costs, there is an important
fissure in this research among the contractor-stakeholder group. This fissure concerns small
businesses and large businesses. Many small business protests are challenges to an agency’s
conduct concerning small business programs: some agencies do not avoid set-aside contracts for
small businesses supporting large contractors. Many times, I have experienced a large business
or a non-VOSB/SDVOSB small business seeks to protect its revenue, market share, and
relationships with an agency. Another tactic of some agencies is limiting suppliers for dealing
with small businesses to prevent small business from being able to meet the requirements.
RAND (RAND 2018) and GAO (White Interview) find that more than half of the GAO protests
are by small businesses. Many of these GAO protestors make accusations of favoritism, feeling
that bid winners are large businesses with whom the agency has been working. Another tactic of
agencies is to pit a sub-category of small business (e.g., SDVOSB) against another small
business for similar reasons. Kingdomware and its related cases are instructive because it appears
the VA did not want to follow the law to set aside requirements for VOSB/VOSB to open the
solicitation to a bigger pool of established small businesses or a large business. Examining the
outcome data from a SDVOSB’s perspective, where large businesses and even small businesses
are distinct subsets of the commercial contractor/vendor/offeror stakeholder groups, the interests
of the different sets of contractors can be different and even conflicting. Although the reported
protest outcome data are quantifiable, the measures of effectiveness analysis are influenced by
the role of the stakeholder. GAO protest outcome data is reported using metrics from the
perspective of the GAO; conversely, the present study factors in the experience and action
research of a SDVOSB stakeholder.
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Government Contracting Community
In addition to the public, Congress, the courts, executive agencies, and the
vendors/protestors, the government contracting community (referred to collectively as
“GovCon”) is another broad subset of stakeholders. The GovCon community is the business
ecosystem that builds up, represents, advises, supports, litigates, and counsels in the government
protest area. This community includes the consultants, government contracting companies,
government lawyers, private lawyers, corporate counsels, and government firms dealing with
contracting, legal compliance and accounting firms, the media, and private/non-profit
government watchdogs. With other stakeholders, it is clear that the bid-protest system has
created a significant GovCon body of stakeholders dependent on the bid protest system to help
with challenges to government contracting. The GovCon community may be generally united in
support of the present system’s source of their livelihood, but the members can still have
different views of protest outcomes.
Stakeholder Balance
In its 2009 report to Congress, the GAO addressed concerns about the impact of protests
on defense procurement. The report articulated an important balance among stakeholders. The
report reads,
CICA’s 1984 changes to GAO’s bid protest forum confirmed and strengthened GAO’s
long-standing role as a quasi-judicial forum for objective, independent, and impartial
resolution of disputes concerning the award of federal contracts. At the heart of the law’s
bid protest provisions is a balancing act that attempts to ensure that procurements can
proceed without undue disruption, while also providing a mechanism for holding
agencies accountable, and protecting the rights of aggrieved offerors to fair treatment by
the government. (GAO B-401197, 2009)
The GAO goal to provide “the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of protests” (31 U.S.C
§3554) seeks a balance between agency stakeholders and the contractors. As in most conflict
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resolution schemes, the misalignment of stakeholders’ interests creates scrutiny of reported
outcomes, their practical implications, and the corresponding perceptions of the outcomes. The
present analysis provides illumination of the outcomes as reported by the GAO. First, I discuss
the SDVOSB protestor’s interests followed by attention to small businesses and finally,
contractors.
Method
One question this paper endeavors to analyze is: What are the reported outcomes for
GAO protests and how effective are those outcomes for protestors, particularly small business
SDVOSB contractors. The foundation of the research methodology I used is a literature review
of protest outcome reports and analyses. What I view as the authoritative articulations of GAO
protest outcomes are Daniel L. Gordon’s 2013 research paper for the American Bar
Association’s and The George Washington University’s “Bid Protests: The Costs are Real, But
the Benefits Outweigh Them.” Gordon is the Associate Dean for Government Procurement Law
Studies at The George Washington University Law School and the former Administrator for
Federal Procurement Policy. Prior to his nomination to the Administrator position by President
Obama, Dean Gordon worked in the Office of General Counsel of the Government
Accountability Office where, for several years, he led GAO’s bid protest office. Gordon’s paper
is a powerful articulation of the implications and meaning of reported outcomes. He makes the
case that the costs of these reports, particularly to the Federal agencies, are significant. He and
Ralph White also make a strong defense of the real benefits to the Federal acquisition processes.
My research from the vantage point of a frequent small business protestor indicates that the
benefits to the protestor are negligible and the costs, including over the long-term, are
substantial, particularly for SDVOSB protestors.
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The issues in the Gordon paper were supported by the Congressional Research Office’s
report, “2013 GAO Bid Protests: Trends and Analysis,” which provided Congress with
background on the GAO bid-protest process. That report analyzed (1) trends in bid protests filed
with GAO, (2) the impact bid protests have in delaying contracts, (3) reasons companies protest,
(4) the most common grounds for GAO to sustain a protest, and (5) trends in bid protests filed
against DOD. More recently, Congress directed in the “National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, December 23, 2016. Section 885”, a definitive plan requiring
“comprehensive study on the prevalence and impact of bid protests on Department of Defense
acquisitions.” The paper demanded “the systematic collection and analysis of information on bid
protests and their associated contracting outcomes. [Congress] directed that the study take into
account related input from DoD acquisition professionals.” The research questions analyzed in
that research, published in 2018, included: What are the outcomes of bid protests? This
quantitative industry analysis of GAO protest outcomes also drew from data published by the
GAO in bid protest annual reports and research reports by the 2019 RAND, Section 809 Panel,
other CRS reports, and the GAO. In addition, I participated in a variety of protest-focused
meetings, such as a full day hearing at GAO; a protest conference at CFC with the Chief Judge;
an 809 Panel review meeting; conferences of the VA, SBA, and other agency small business
conferences, and numerous meetings with protest-specific legal professionals.
My interest in this question began in 2014 with personal experience as a SDVOSB who
sought relief from what I view as frequento systemic improprieties in VA small business
acquisitions. Research informed and educated me on the laws and rules of government
contracting, particularly SDVOSB program contracting and the same activity for the GAO
process. My background as a government official tasked with performing critical missions
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(often involving government contracting) and my 12 years as a veteran owner of a small business
competing exclusively in the Federal government market gives me insight into the motives of the
key stakeholders; this experience enhances my analysis of the outcomes for the agencies and
small business contractors. My action research as the protestor in more than 200 GAO protests
also provides empirical evidence of all the different protest outcomes.
The source of data used in the present industry analysis relies on data from GAO’s
required annual report to Congress from the 2002 fiscal year (FY 2002) when quantitative
outcome data was first published by GAO. GAO continues to publish such data to the present
(FY 2019 is the year for which the tabular data is compiled). The tabular data from each annual
report is consolidated with the other years’ data, which is helpful in looking for trends.
Bid Protest Annual Reports: These are GAO's annual reports dating to 1995. As
required by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(2),
the Comptroller General reports annually to Congress on federal agencies that do
not fully implement a recommendation made by GAO in connection with a bid
protest decided the prior fiscal year. – GAO Bid Protest Annual Reports
To understand how the outcome data is reported and categorized, I first conducted a
structured interview, then I had months of phone and e-mail correspondence with Mr. Ralph O.
White, Managing Associate General Counsel for Procurement Law, GAO, to clarify what and
how GAO protests are reported so that I might analyze where, how, and why GAO protest
outcomes are reported as well as the broader issues of stakeholder interests, protest historical
context, protest reform efforts, and how one manages the bid protest system processes,
procedures, and reporting of outcomes.
I have experience with all the possible protest outcomes--from sustain, deny, and dismiss
to dismiss for corrective action and withdrawal--by participating in reconsiderations, alternate
dispute resolution (ADR), and hearings. My experiences and personal empirical data provide
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meaningful context for, and understanding of, the protest outcomes and their implications. This
detailed understanding of the costs, procedural hurdles, legal barriers, and evasive benefits to
small business protestors provides invaluable insight into what the reported outcomes really
mean to a SDVOSB small business protestor.
Also, I gained research insight and understanding on protests through multiple
conferences, webinars, and interactions with government organizations, small businesses,
lawyers, contracting officers, and others in the GovCon industry. All this research, discussion,
and personal experience informed my research and helped to form my conclusions.
Analysis
The data analyzed from GAO outcomes, aggregated from each year’s GAO annual bid
protest reports to Congress, is summarized in Figure 3 (on page 80). This is the same reported
data used in nearly all the studies of protests outcomes, although different time frames and
sources were consulted, including Gordon, RAND, CRS, and Panel 809 Report. The data with
green background are derived from my research calculations to determine relevant outcome
metrics obscured in the GAO annual report data.
Overall Protest Filings
The data from the last two decades of GAO protests show an increase of protests filed
from 2002 through 2019, peaking in 2016 at 2789. The last decade of FY 2010-2019 shows an
average of approximately 2490 cases filed and cases closed, which represents an increase from
the average of approximately 1450 cases filed/closed in the previous decade. RAND reports that
protest filings approximately doubled in the period FY 2008 and FY 2016 (Rand, 2018). The
increased filing at the end of last decade into the beginning of this decade spurred efforts by
agencies and congressional staffs to identify “frivolous” and frequent protests and reduce
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protests that were viewed as delaying critical acquisitions (White Interview). Many government
agencies, particularly the Department of Defense (DoD), view the protest process as hindering
efficient acquisitions (GAO, B-40119, 2009). Many reviews of, and adjustments to, the bid
protest system law and FAR were aimed at addressing concerns dominated by senior defense and
veteran’s administration officials. Some of these efforts throughout the last decade include: the
limitations of jurisdiction of GAO, such as for delivery and task order contracts under larger,
indefinite, quantity-indefinite delivery (IDIQ) contracts; establishment of 809 Panel (Section 809
Panel, 2019) and report; and the RAND Corporation study (RAND, 2018).
Gordon and RAND find that while the number of protests has increased slightly over the
past decades, the percentage of the acquisitions protested remains relatively low, between 0.30.9%. RAND concluded the overall percentage of DoD contracts protested was very small—less
than 0.3 percent. This finding means that more than 99.5 % of all acquisitions were not subject
to protests. When the number of protests per billion-dollar contracts’ value remained below
0.3% (RAND, 2018), the number of protests as a burden on the agency’s acquisitions was very
small, relative to the number of procurements and the dollar value of all the procurements.
Conversely, the burden on each contractor who protests an acquisition is substantial, especially
for small business concerns with disproportionate burdens, such as opportunity costs on effort
and time not spent on the main line of business, protest workload, customer relationship
deterioration, and the cost of legal advice.
GAO Outcome Effectiveness Metric
This industry analysis of the Federal government procurement protest outcomes finds
that, while GAO reported relatively steady average of 37% effectiveness rate in the 2002-2009
decade, it increased only slightly to a 44% effective rate in the 2010-2019 decade. The GAO
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measure of effectiveness rate is defined by the GAO’s (argueably subjective) assessment, which
is based on a protestor obtaining some form of relief from the agency, as reported to GAO, either
resulting from voluntary agency corrective action from a dismissal or GAO sustaining the
protest. These reported outcomes support the GAO narrative that the process provides a
reasonable opportunity for protesting, based on a protestor obtaining some form of relief from
the agency. The sustained rate of 16% to 21% seems small, relative to the protest outcomes from
which the protestor received some sort of relief for their efforts to endure the hurdles of a timely
protest.
As a small business protestor, I believe that even the overly generous one-in-five sustain
rate is inadequate to justify protestors’ costs and time expended enduring the many protest
hurdles to achieve even this elevated success rate. The analysis identifies the flaw in the
outcome effectiveness rate: the flaw includes all protests where GAO determined to offer some
form of relief, but it also includes dismissed protests, more than half (51.6 % average over last
decade) of which are deemed “effective.” For example, in 2019, there were 587 merit decisions
(77 sustained and 510 denied) of 2,200 protests closed, which indicates that 1,613 protests were
dismissed. This 2019 dismissal rate is 73.3% of closed protest dismissed. A dismissal rate of
nearly ¾ of all protests closed is surprising for an informal, expeditious, inexpensive protestresolution process. Of the 1,613 protests dismissed that year, the GAO reported (through
research calculation) that 891 protest outcomes were categorized as the protestor receiving some
relief, implying that 55.24% of the dismissed protest outcomes were effective by offering some
relief, which means that only 77 of the 2,200 protest outcomes were sustained by the GAO, equal
to a 3.5% sustain, effectiveness, or success rate. In over 200+ action research protests of my
own, as a SDVOSB, I have almost never received meaningful relief from a dismissal outcome,
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nor have I encountered meaningful relief in my review or research of other dismissed protest
outcomes. Even in the cases where the protestor withdraws the protest because the agency
agreed to some corrective action, the actual corrective action was never made, was reneged, or
was merely a faux corrective action by agency protest counsels—all of which, at best, resulted in
more work, after expending effort and lost opportunity cost on protesting, only to have the
protestor recompete, be reevaluated or resolicited at some unknown time in the future.
It is likewise deceptive to use the less-than 4% sustain rate for effectiveness because of
the way protests are numbered or counted. For example, one protest (B-412940) counted for 18
sustains of the 139 rules sustained by the GAO (Bosco, 2017), with one protest representing 13%
of that year’s sustained or effective protest outcomes based on a single, improper acquisition.
This outcome is not uncommon as supplemental, intervenor, reconsideration, cost
reimbursement, and cost-amount protests concerning the same acquisition can lead to multiple
sustained protest data points for a single solicitation. This inequity further disguises the sustain
rate as an effectiveness metric.
As noted above, when the small number of sustained protest outcomes is added to the
“effective” dismissed rate, the GAO effectiveness yields the 43.8 % average over the last decade,
calculating to or approximating 45% effectiveness (suggesting that the protestor received some
form of relief) rate. The practical effectiveness rate is less than 4% of all the protests filed that
were sustained if one counts all the sustained protests outcomes as giving meaningful relief. My
empirical research indicates that most sustained protests do not provide significant relief,
particularly to small business concerns. Rather, they simply offer an opportunity for more work
in redoing the offer or inviting another round of protests even for seeking cost reimbursement.
For the sake of statistical clarity, I concede that all the sustained protests could be reasonably
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reported as effective from the government’s perspective, but not any or most dismissed protests,
which leaves a miniscule 4% rate at which an agency procurement impropriety was validated,
therefore “effective” in holding the agency accountable and providing some form of often
limited remedy to the protestors. Effectiveness or success is in the eye of the beholder, but the
beholder in bid protest outcomes, at least in this industry analysis by a SDVOSB protestor, is all
protesting contractors, especially small businesses.
Protests’ Ineffectiveness Rate
The inverse of the GAO-reported effectiveness metric is the ineffectiveness rate from the
perspective of the protestor. If effectiveness is generously measured at roughly 45%, where
there is some sort of merit outcome, then there is a 55% ineffectiveness rate for protestors who
do not even get a liberally described decision offering the protestor meaningful relief. Nearly
half the time, protests fail to get heard for some procedural deficiency, and they are dismissed
without any relief. My action research informs me that there are substantial procedural hurdles
where agency lawyers are trained on what I describe as “gimmicks” to dismiss GAO protests for
any one of a variety of procedural flaws. Even some corrective action gimmicks get a dismissal.
This informal, quasi-judicial protest system has, or at least implements, strict technical
requirements that are antithetical to the informal nature that makes the dismissal challenge likely.
Some requirements have been added recently to limit protests, particularly by small
businesses, such as the $350 filing fee requirement, which I call the “small business protest
deterrent nuisance fee.” Nonetheless, the implementing law and GAO rulemaking claim this fee
recovers the costs of EPDS docketing system implementation. Other corrective efforts include
studies, such as by RAND, GAO, CRS, and Section 809 Panel, that may recommend changes,
like increasing the GAO filing fee, eliminating protests for acquisitions below some threshold
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($100K - $250K), excluding task/delivery order contracts below a threshold, narrowing and
complicating the timeliness rules, etc. The reported outcomes indicate that over half of the
protests are not decided on the merits. This paper does not allow for a detailed discussion of all
the procedural challenges protestors face in the time-sensitive process of submitting and winning
government contracts.
Protestor Successful Outcomes
The GAO reports the effectiveness rate based on a protestor obtaining some form of relief
from the agency, either as a result of voluntary agency corrective action or GAO sustaining the
protest (GAO Reports). However, as shown in Figure 2.3, the calculated Protestor’s Sustain
Rate derived from the number of sustains as a percentage of the experience leads to an
assessment that the actual measure of successful or effective outcomes for protestors tops at a
4% overall sustain rate. As discussed above, this number represents a more meaningful top limit
of effectiveness rate, especially for small businesses.
Actual SDVOSB small business success rates from my research and other articles is
closer to 1%. My protests resulted in 42 denied, 176 dismissed, 13 withdrawn (dismissed), 7
open with no decision (but all were unsuccessful), and only 2 protests sustained. The generous
interpretation of my action research of 237 protests resulted in only 2 sustains, or a less than 1%
(.84%) sustains rate. This percentage assumes that the actual sustains were successful outcomes.
While the researcher’s 1% sustain rate relative to the 4% GAO reported sustain rate may not be
meaningful because my 1% sustain rate is not an independent event and is achieved, or more
accurately not achieved, by the same researcher. Nearly all these protests involved challenges to
the SDVOSB set-aside and preference rules. Additionally, these protests are skewed toward
small business protests involving supply contracts with low dollar values (under a simplified
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acquisition threshold). In two sustained protests, the solicitation was cancelled and not known to
be resolicited or the contract had already been performed, so the protestor was given the only
relief available: to ask for reimbursement for sustained protest costs, which presented additional
timeline hurdles to prevail in a new protest requiring documentation of the cost under strict rules
for small businesses. Both of my sustained protests were ultimately unsuccessful, resulting in
long and short-term net losses.
Prevalent Reasons for Sustained Protest Outcomes
This analysis relies on effective or successful protest outcomes, especially for small
businesses being no greater than the protests that were sustained relative to the total protests
closed. Insight into the reasons for sustaining rulings illuminates the common improprieties that
were corrected, sustained, and considered effective outcomes. Recently, the most prevalent
reasons reported, as required, to Congress for sustaining protests were: (1) unreasonable
technical evaluation; (2) inadequate documentation of the record; (3) flawed selection decision;
(4) unequal treatment; and (5) unreasonable cost or price evaluation (GAO Bid Protest Annual
Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019). The GAO describes these reasons as common for
sustainment consistent year to year with just the relative order shifting. Clearly, there are
consistently common prejudicial flaws in the government acquisition process (White Interview),
which may indicate that changes in rules or law may be able to correct or mitigate the acquisition
procedures that most commonly have agency improprieties.
Implications from Recent Studies
The major studies, such as Gordon, CRS, RAND, GAO, and the Panel 809 Report, used
the same GAO reported outcome data of their specific timeframe. This research confirmed that
the GAO reported outcome data showed a slight increase from the last decade to a relatively

75

steady rate, approximately 45% effectiveness rate. The RAND study of DoD protest outcomes
provided several observations specific to GAO protests relevant to this research question about
reported outcomes and effectiveness for small business protestors (RAND 2018). The data
RAND reviewed pointed to several GAO-specific observations:
• The stability of the bid protest effectiveness rate over time — despite the increase in
protest numbers—suggests that firms are not likely to protest without merit.
• Small-business protests are less likely to be effective and more likely to be dismissed
for legal insufficiency.
• Protest filing peaks at the end of the fiscal year.
• Task-order protests have a slightly higher effectiveness rate than other types of protests.
• There are measurable differences between the services and defense agencies, but
overall, DoD services and agencies have a slightly lower effectiveness rate than non-DoD
agencies.
• The largest DoD contractors have slightly higher sustained and effectiveness rates, but
these differences are diminishing with time.
• Cases in which legal counsel is required (i.e., a protective order was issued by GAO)
have higher effectiveness and sustained rates.
• DoD uses stay overrides infrequently. A CICA stay override occurs when an agency
overrides the automatic hold of execution (award or performance) during a protest at
GAO.
• The number of protestors and protest actions tends to grow with a contract’s value.
This finding supports the analysis of effective protest outcomes being relatively stable at
slightly below and small businesses protestors are less likely to be successful or effective. The

76

present research and other research note that the distinction in analysis of outcomes are those
outcomes decided on the merits of the alleged legal or regulatory impropriety. GAO data
categorizes all protests that are denied or sustained as merit-based decisions while those
otherwise dismissed are not.
Another key analytical delineation concerns outcomes that offer the protestor some form
of relief. Protests that are sustained are categorized as the protestor relieving some form of
relief. But, the remedy recommended is often of little or no benefit to the protestor. Typically,
the remedy involves redoing the evaluation or the solicitation, which usually does not provide
meaningful relief. “Redone” outcomes mean a termination of the acquisition; it is akin to a “Get
Out of Jail Free” card or only allows for a redo on the specific flaw where the agency selects the
“corrective action” they take. While GAO is authorized to make a recommendation or
combination of recommendations, including any recommendation GAO “determines to be
necessary to promote compliance with procurement statutes and regulations” (31 U.S.C. §3554),
their ruling is only a recommendation. Conversely, if the agency does not accept the
recommendation, the GAO must report so in its annual report to Congress. The natural
bureaucratic and pollical pressure to not alienate an executive agency (especially if it may mean
more work to report the agency for not following the recommendation) is to offer the minimal
corrective action remedy. Therefore, the GAO corrective actions appear to be minimal, giving
the agency every chance to redo the questionable action. It is extremely rare, and my research
has not provided an example where the GAO sustained a protest with the recommendation to
“award a contract consistent with the requirements of such statute and regulation” (31 U.S.C.
§3554). Even sustained protests often do not result in meaningful relief or benefit to the
protestor.
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The categorizing of the outcome as providing the protestor some form of relief is even
more contentious in the third type of protest outcome, the dismissal. The outcome reporting of
relief is a subjective GAO determination not annotated in the data other than being aggregated
and imbedded in GAO effectiveness rate. The present analysis shows the majority of the
reported outcome data when a protest is dismissed for a variety of reasons, including withdrawal
or alternate dispute resolution (ADR). The GAO includes this offer of relief in its report on the
effectiveness rate percentage. GAO may use a predictive outcome form of ADR to encourage
the protestor to withdraw, or the agency may take corrective action to avoid a decision on the
merits. These cases are examples of GAO’s (I believe incorrect) determination that the protest
was effective with some form of relief granted. GAO may predictively foreshadow a decision
prompting dismissal for withdrawal or corrective action, which makes effective relief even more
evasive for the protestor. My research relies in large part on the reported dismissed outcomes
that GAO considers offering relief and are therefore effective. When determining these
outcomes by extracting this data from the reports, my research shows the obscuring of the
“effective” dismissal reported outcomes to be counted in the effectiveness rate. This industry
analysis research indicates that calling these, and counting these, dismissals in the effectiveness
rate is a significant contributor to what is an incorrect effectiveness rate.
Protest Effectiveness for Small Business
Industry analysis of the Federal government procurement protests questions GAO’s
reports of a slightly increasing 44-45% effective rate with the protestor obtaining some form of
relief from the agency for all protest. It seems that these reported outcomes support the GAO
narrative that its protest process provides reasonable opportunity for vendors to achieve
accountability for alleged prejudicial improprieties in the government’s procurement of supplies
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and services. However, if up to 45% of protests are effective, at a minimum, 55% of the time
protests are ineffective, based on not getting a loosely described merit decision, (i.e., the protest
was dismissed for a procedural flaw). GAO reports that outcomes of protests sustained on the
merits are in the range of 16% to 21% for all protestors. However, this is only a percentage of
the reported outcomes where GAO considers the protestor receiving some sort of relief
recommendation.
Small business, and I would argue VOSB/SDVOSB protestors as well, receive a much
smaller amount of sustained protests (RAND 2018). GAO’s outcome success rate is misleading
because I and other small business protestors have rarely received any minimal relief from a
dismissed protest. Very few, if any, protest outcomes that are dismissed as a result of voluntary
corrective action provide meaningful relief to small business protestors. As an example, when I
withdrew my dismissed protests because the agency promised corrective action, they did not
follow through with meaningful corrective action.
I also believe, as my action research indicates, that a significant portion, at least half, of
the sustained protest outcomes result in minimal, practical, effective relief. My action research
from over 200 protests and an extensive literature review indicates that effective relief is below
1%. This low effectiveness rate is reinforced with interviews from protest stakeholders and
some of the literature research. This low rate for protesting vendors leads to the conclusion that
the claimed utility of the current GAO protest system is evasive for many contractors. The costs
of bid protests are real and substantial; the benefits, as expressed in a practical effectiveness rate
of 4% or less, dwarf these costs, especially for the small businesses who supposedly are the main
benefactors of the acquisition’s adjudication.
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Figure 2.3. GAO Protest Outcome Data, 2002 - 2019
Outcomes of What Does Not Happen
A potentially important, unreported outcome is what Gordon and White believe is one
major benefit of the protest process: “things that don't happen because people in the agency
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know that if they did that, someone would file a protest. It is all the stuff that does not happen
because you have a right to complain” (White Interview). Agencies know that the bid protest
vehicle is available to vendors to seek accountability, and accountability can be reported in
public protest decisions and to Congress in annual reports in certain cases. White and his
predecessor as Managing General Counsel of GAO bid protest team, Dan Gordon, describe the
“private attorney general” concept of bid protests, where the prejudiced contractors can raise an
issue of potential impropriety. If a protestor does not pursue accountability or the impropriety is
not prejudicially material, then the potentially improper actions by the agency go uncorrected.
While this outcome may be a real and important successful one that is not reported in the GAO
outcome data, the cost of being subject to a “private attorney general’s” arguments is born by the
protestor, particularly the lower resourced small business owner. The reported outcomes data
shows clearly that the protestor receives negligible success or gain in pursuing this
accountability. The benefit is to the government acquisition process as a whole or to future
vendors who do not have to protest an impropriety that does not happen (Gordon, White). This
intangible benefit to the collective government vendors is hard to quantify, yet the costs to the
protestor are real and quantifiable.
Outcomes of What Happens
While I agree with White and Gordon that some unreported outcomes of agency
improprieties do not happen because of the GAO protest system, I conclude that a much bigger
set of outcomes do happen, such as dismissal or even protests not being filed, because of the
agency efforts to “protest proof” acquisitions or make procedural traps to gain dismissal. One of
the government conferences I attended had a session for contracting officers on reducing
protests. The speaker told us about a tactic of calling procedures by different names, which
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serves to change the protest rules. Any impropriety that does not happen because of the visibility
of protest system and outcomes is more than offset by things that do happen. The fact that more
than three quarters of the outcomes are dismissals, as shown by the merit decision subtracted
from the total cases closed, indicates that the system is gamed by agencies to garner dismissal
outcomes. I have also experienced GAO hearing officers who appear to be looking to dismiss or
dispose of a protest, perhaps to minimize their workload, prevent agonizing a government
agency, keep from pushing the all-important 100-day decision threshold, or keep from
recommending corrective action that may not be followed, resulting in subsequent report to
Congress or CFC litigation.
In summary, the GAO reports an approximate 44% effective rate in the current decade of
likely relief favorable to protesting vendors. This moderate, less than 50%, effectiveness rate
gives a distorted picture of outcome effectiveness, particularly from the outcome impact on small
businesses. Over half of the dismissed protests are included with all the sustained protests as
“effective” because they claim to offer some sort of relief. A closer examination of protests
reported as sustaining the vendor’s allegation of impropriety in the acquisition shows that only
4% of the protest’s allegations are sustained. Although it is not an independent data set, my
extensive action experiential research of 237 protests by the small business researcher indicates a
negligible (< 1%) sustainment for successful outcomes from my dependent protest empirical
data.
The experiential analysis of those sustained protests indicated that actual meaningful
relief for small business protestors is near non-existent. The cost of accountability in the Federal
procurement process is disproportionally borne by protestors acting as a “private attorney
general.” Yet, the benefits from effective or successful outcomes for the protestor(s), primarily
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small businesses, are negligible while the benefits to the government are real, as Gordon
concluded. The costs are real for the government and the agencies too, but the body of study
reviewed indicates that the benefits to the government--in terms of accountability, improprieties
that do not happen, corrected violation, and confidence and trust garnered--are substantial and
outweigh the costs. I do not necessarily dispute this argument; however, my research indicates
that the benefits of, or effectiveness of, small business protest outcomes is negligible at no
greater that 4%.
Conclusions
This study concludes that reported protests outcomes based on the GAO determination of
protestor receiving some sort of relief are relatively steady at less than the time for all protestors.
However, a closer examination of GAO reported data shows that only 4% of the protests filed
result in a sustainment decision with recommended corrective action. This 4% success rate is a
better metric for effectiveness of all protest outcomes. However, the 4% rate more accurately
represents the maximum effectiveness rate for small business protestors. In fact, for many small
business protestors and more so from the perspective of SDVOSB protestors, this minimal 4%
success rate should be roughly halved because often, the sustain recommended relief is not
implemented or does not provide practical relief (the definition of success). These success or
effectiveness rates are consistent with other recent quantitative analysis of protest outcomes,
although those studies do not provide a small business protestor’s perspective.
In GAO protests, the small business protestor faces steep odds, for the substantial costs
are borne by the small business protestor while the benefit as well as some of the costs to the
agencies accrue to the procurement system as a whole. The protestor bears the burden of being a
“private attorney general,” yet s/he receives virtually no, or miniscule, benefit.
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I conclude that the reported outcome effectiveness of vendors participating in GAO bid
protest processes is virtually non-existent, and that favorable long- and short-term cost benefit
tradeoffs are elusive. Based on these reported outcomes, I believe contractors, particularly small
businesses, should not file GAO protests except in specific rare cases where there is a tactical
advantage, such as an extension of incumbent contract or a gain in important business
intelligence on competitors, evaluation standards, and/or solicitation requirements. These
tactical, and even the strategic, protest decisions are more applicable to large-business protestors.
These conclusions call for an analysis of the perceptions of GAO protestors, particularly for
small-business protestors, to determine if protest outcomes actually support the objectives of the
GAO protest process to ensure full, fair, and open competition and to hold agencies accountable
to follow their rules.
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Appendix 2.1. Summary of Protest Types
Table 2.1 Types of Protests
TYPES OF PROTESTS
VENUE
Agency

GAO

SBA

Court

PROTEST FILED WITH

PROTEST SUBSETS

Specific Federal Department or
Informal
Agency Contracting Officer
EO 12979

discussion with CO
written with all elements
written above CO review up to HCA

Government Accountability Office
Pre-Award
Post-Award
Termination
A-76 Government Service
Reconsideration

solicitation, negotiations, pre-award
award of contract or delivery/task
notification
contract cancelation based on award
order privatization
reverse
re-adjudicate GAO decision

Small Business Administration
NAICS
Size
Limits on Subcontracting
Responsibility
OHA Appeal

challenge to solicitation industry
challenge awarded size qualification
classificationwith work portion or
compliance
ability to perform the contract
NMR
administrative
court appeal of SBA

Federal Court System
COFC
Federal District Court
Federal Court of Appeals
SCOTUS

decision
claims against government
limited cases
appeal of CFC or District Court
final appeal
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE ACCOUNTABILITY FAÇADE: PERCEIVED GAO PROTEST OUTCOMES FOR
SMALL BUSINESSES
“The role of GAO is to dispose of protest based on the information in the case” (GAO Attorney
2018 Telephone Conference)

Abstract
The GAO protest system is a well-intentioned American innovation in accountability in
government agency acquisitions of supplies and services. The GAO reports that bid protests
achieve a moderately effective outcome level of approximately 45% when measured in terms of
voluntary agency corrective actions or GAO decisions to sustain protests. However, the GAO
reports that bid protests achieve a minimally effective outcome level when measured in terms of
GAO decisions to sustain alleged improprieties and recommend relief. This effectiveness rate is
negligible for many small business protestors and is perceived as such. The minimal practical
effectiveness of the GAO protest system has caused some businesses to see the system as a
façade of fair, independent adjudication of acquisition improprieties. This analysis of perceptions
of these reported outcomes held by stakeholders within the government contracting community,
particularly small business concerns, is the subject of this paper. The overall objectives of the bid
protest system are to instill confidence in the federal acquisition process, to ensure full and open
competition within the guidelines of national policy objectives, and to provide an accountability
venue for contractors. To meet these objectives, an understanding of stakeholder perceptions of
reported outcomes is essential. Empirical research of stakeholder interviews and protest action
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indicates that protest perceptions range across three interactive spectra: cost-benefit tradeoff,
fairness, and communications. These spectra are impacted by a fourth element: emotions. Some
stakeholder perceptions tend to reinforce the GAO narrative of moderate effectiveness, which
implies that the benefits outweigh the costs. However, evidence that small business stakeholders
are more attuned to GAO-reported outcomes of minimal effectiveness reinforces perceptions of
limited utility. Years of action research supports the proposition that the accountability façade is
real. The appearance of moderate protest success obscures the serious challenges small
businesses face when pursuing GAO protests. The research concludes that small businesses
should only rarely consider filing GAO protests.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the outcomes of Government Accountability
Office (GAO) protests, which are by far the most used protest venue in U.S. federal government
purchasing. There has long been a question of a difference between the effectiveness statistics
reported by the GAO and the perceptions of participants in the protest process. This paper
analyzes the protest process outcomes and interviews to assess whether these perceptions differ
from what the protest process purports to deliver for small businesses in particular.
The GAO offers the protest venue for challenging a federal agency with an alleged
violation of a procurement statute or regulation. These GAO bid protests are said to provide
accountability and advance the transparency, fairness, and integrity of the procurement system
for over $550 billion in goods and services annually required by the federal government while
potentially offering successful protestors some form of relief (CRS, 2018). This quasi-judicial
venue is part of congressional oversight of executive agency acquisitions to ensure full and open
competition consistent with policy objectives, such as supporting small business participation. If
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a protest of an alleged violation is sustained, the GAO can recommend an array of corrective
actions to provide remedy for the aggrieved protesting contractor. The GAO reports a 45%
effectiveness rate of protests that provide some form of relief to protestors, with approximately
20% of the protested allegations decided on merit sustained in the protest decision outcomes
(RAND 2018, Murray 2017, Snyder, 2020). This reported rate supports the GAO claims that
protest outcomes support effectiveness and utility for the protest system. Previous research
concludes that the practical effectiveness rate is lower than 4%, indicating that protesting
contractors, especially small businesses, receive minimal benefit (Snyder, 2020).
These outcomes reported to the GAO bid protest system stakeholders are essential to
boost confidence in and increase the use of GAO protests. GAO protests are often the only viable
venue for challenging agencies with alleged violations of acquisition laws and rules for small
businesses. However, stakeholder perceptions of these protest outcomes are also critical to the
viability and utility of and participation in the GAO protest system. The stakeholders have a
variety of often conflicting interests in this accountability regime. They also have markedly
different perspectives on the protest process and the outcomes of that process. This research
focuses primarily on small business protestors’ perceptions of GAO-reported bid protest
outcomes and the key factors influencing those perceptions.
Research Question
Specifically, this research answers the question: How do stakeholders in the federal
government contracting process, particularly small business contractors, perceive the bid protest
outcomes reported by the GAO that claim a moderate effectiveness rate?
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U.S. Federal Government Purchasing and the GAO
The system for acquisition of goods and services by the federal government is
simultaneously massive, diverse, and complex. Contractors who operate and compete in the
government contracting industry rely on understanding the complex rules and have a compelling
interest in agencies’ compliance with these rules to ensure full and fair competition within the
statutory policy framework of the government.
The more than one-half trillion dollar annual procurements of goods and services by the
U.S. government are directed by a variety of statues and are implemented through the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA, pronounced “Seekah”) legislates through a collection of laws that federal agencies shall obtain full and open
competition using competitive procedures that are best suited for the circumstances of the
procurement. The GAO bid protest forum is the most used venue for adjudicating alleged
violations of federal acquisition laws and regulations committed by executive agencies. The
competition and small business preference requirements are the source of many of the
procurement impropriety protests. More than half of GAO protests are filed by small businesses
(RAND 2018, White Interview). The reported outcomes of the protested violations are
represented by the GAO as measures of effectiveness of the GAO system in resolving conduct
disputes regarding federal acquisitions. Perceptions of these outcomes held by the most common
protestors, small business concerns, are significant for a practical understanding of the
effectiveness of bid protests. The key factors influencing these perceptions of small business
stakeholders provide insight into the recommended utility of using GAO bid protests for
effective resolution of small business challenges of agency improprieties.
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GAO Protest System Stakeholders
To analyze the perceptions of bid protest outcomes, it is essential to understand what the
bid protest system is intended to accomplish, enforce, or at least correct. The GAO protest
system is the legislative branch’s oversight of public procurement policy and processes by
executive agencies “to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the
[government] customer, while maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling public policy
objectives” (48 CFR § 1.102 Statement of guiding principles for FAR), such as the promotion of
competition and encouraging and developing the actual and potential capacity of small business.
Like many government ecosystems, the GAO protest system is complex with somewhat obscure
or subtle interactions among stakeholders. GAO bid protests lean heavily on the unique
interactions of stakeholders in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the U.S. federal
government combined with interests of the public, taxpayers, public policy, and commercial
companies. These contracting companies have their own set of internal stakeholders, including
investors, employees, customers, and suppliers. The various stakeholder interests often do not
align. As the 2018 RAND study of protests within the Department of Defense (DoD) found,
tension exists between the agencies’ need to move forward with procurements and the
companies’ need for information on how a contract award decision was made. In fact, the
interests of these most visible stakeholders, the government agency and the protesting company,
are often in direct conflict when seeking resolution of allegations of impropriety in government
acquisitions. Government contractors are the protagonists and the executive agencies are the
antagonists in this struggle to expeditiously fulfill agency requirements while providing full and
open competition within the small business preference policy, and the GAO serves as the referee
to ensure that the laws and the agencies’ rules are followed.
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The stakeholders identified in Snyder’s earlier industry analysis are used for this
research. The ultimate stakeholders are the U.S. taxpayers who want confidence that public
money is being spent efficiently and effectively with full competition under our free enterprise
system, consistent with legislated policies. Congress is an important stakeholder, ensuring that
agencies follow the law in the acquisitions of goods and services while building trust, promoting
competition resulting in overall value, and ensuring that policy objectives are achieved. The
GAO is Congress’s administrative organization that evaluates, adjudicates, recommends, and
reports on agencies’ conduct concerning the procurement of supplies and services and more
broadly on the government’s (primarily the executive branch’s) implementation of law through
oversight and power of the purse. The Court of Federal Claims (CFC) and the entire federal
judicial system have a stake in the bid protest outcomes as well as in its process and
documentation. The U.S. agencies are prominent stakeholders on one side of protest disputes,
seeking to efficiently acquire goods and services for their agencies’ needs. The contractors who
compete to provide every type of supplies and services to the federal government for profit are
the key counter stakeholders on the other side of protested acquisitions. The government
contracting community of practitioners (GovCon) are also stakeholders. The GovCon
community consists of organizations and individuals involved in representing, advising,
supporting, litigating, and counseling in the government protest area. These include consultants,
government contracting companies, government lawyers, private lawyers, corporate counsels,
government contracting legal compliance and accounting firms, the media, and private/non-profit
government watchdogs.
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GAO Bid Protests
Enforcing and adjudicating challenges to the fair application of acquisition laws and rules
is the purpose of the bid protest system. It is intended to ensure full and fair competition while
promoting policy objectives. Among these policy objectives, the small business preference
programs are prominent. The bid protest system is “absolutely critical to the continued
maintenance of private- and public-sector confidence in the integrity of the U.S. federal
acquisition system” (Kim, 2020). As Ralston states, bid protests enhance the integrity and
transparency of the federal procurement process by providing prospective offerors with an
effective tool to challenge terms an agency has included in the solicitations and by providing
disappointed bidders with an opportunity to challenge contract awards to determine whether the
agency’s actions conform to procurement laws and regulations and solicitation terms (Ralston,
2017).
Simply described, a bid protest is a challenge that asks the question: Is the government
agency following their own rules correctly in the procurement? If not, did that impropriety
prejudice the protestor?
However, like most government programs, the GAO bid protest system is associated with
a multitude of exceptions, qualifiers, and pitfalls. The protested impropriety must be filed in a
timely manner by an interested party, an actual or prospective bidder with a likelihood of award,
alleging materially prejudicial violations of laws, agency regulations, or the terms of a specific
solicitation. A protestor must also demonstrate competitive prejudice, or the GAO cannot sustain
the protest even if there is a violation of law or regulation.
There are three primary forums for protests of agency violations of procurement laws: 1)
agency protests, documented protests filed with the agency, 2) commonly used and referenced
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protests filed with the GAO, and 3) bid protests filed in the CFC. This research addresses only
the protests filed with the GAO, which are 25 times more common than CFC protests and have
their own set of rules.
The CICA bid protest statue states that the GAO shall provide a decision on a protest
concerning an alleged violation of a procurement statute or regulation in the solicitation, award,
or termination of an agency acquisition in an inexpensive and expeditious (statutorily less than
100 days or in some cases 65 days) process. These protests filed with the GAO are decided by
one of approximately 40 hearing attorneys in the Procurement Law Control Group within the
GAO Office of General Counsel following the FAR,4 CFR §21. The protest decisions fall within
one or a combination of decisions from which the highest level determines the outcome. The
three protest decision outcomes are described:
•

Sustained – Outcome decided on the merits of the bid wherein the GAO upholds the
protested allegation of impropriety. This decision usually is due to violations of statue or
regulation or an unreasonable action or judgment by the agency or protested party, and
the GAO recommends relief and possible payment of costs.

•

Denied – Outcome decided on the merits of the bid wherein the GAO rules against the
protesting party. This decision usually is due to an inability to find a material violation of
acquisition laws or regulations, the agency acting in a reasonable manner, or in deference
to the authority of the contracting officer or the agency or another government agency.

•

Dismissed – Outcome wherein the GAO does not rule on the merits of the protest; rather
adjudication is terminated based on procedural or statutory flaw(s). This usually is due to
untimeliness, a lack of standing or an interested party, clear substantive deficiency,
failure to state grounds for protest, legal insufficiency, failure to respond, no protestable
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impropriety, protest jurisdiction superseded, no relief possible, or a technicality. These
types of dismissals do not provide for any form of relief recommendation. However,
dismissal can be based on corrective action taken by the agency prior to a decision, which
makes the allegation moot or academic. The GAO usually presumes that a dismissal
provides the protestor with some element of relief if it is based on corrective action taken
by the agency.
•

Withdrawn is an alternative to the three decision-based outcomes wherein the protestor
cancels the protest, often due to corrective action taken by the agency, an alternate
dispute resolution, new information, or the protestor’s agreement with or understanding
of the agency’s action. Withdrawn protests usually are considered to provide some form
of relief unless the withdrawal is due to the protestor realizing that the protest is unlikely
to prevail on its own merits.
If the GAO sustains the protest, the ruling may recommend relief for the protestor. As

part of the legislative branch oversight function, the GAO can only recommend remedies to the
agency. If the agency elects not to implement the relief, the only real recourse is for the head of
the procuring agency responsible for that contract to report the failure to the GAO. The GAO can
then report this failure to Congress in the GAO annual bid protest report to congressional
committees.
The CICA bid protest law authorizes recommended remedies or corrective action for the
contracting agency to implement any one or combinations of the following relief
recommendations:
•

Issue a new or revised solicitation.

•

Recompete the contract.
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•

Award the contract.

•

Terminate the contract.

•

Pay the protestor direct protest costs within these limits:
o Costs of filing and pursing only the sustained protest grounds, including
attorney and consultant fees limited to $150 per hour for all but small
businesses
o Cost of bid and proposal preparation when no other substantial relief is
possible, such as when the contract has already been performed or there is no
reasonable opportunity to recompete the contract.

•

Any other relief the GAO determines necessary to promote compliance with
acquisition laws and regulations applicable to the procurement.

The recommended relief or remedies are the only real benefit a protestor can hope to receive
from a successful or effective protest. These recommendations often fall short of providing
practical relief to protestors, particularly to small businesses, and rarely provide benefits that
offset the real and intangible costs. Even if the protestor receives a recommendation for some
form of relief, it is only a recommendation, one that usually requires more expense and effort
such as resubmitting a bid or reconsidering a new solicitation, and ultimately the agency can
elect not to implement or even superficially implement the recommendation.
The GAO bid process exclusively provides a potential benefit: the statutory “CICA stay”
of award or performance until the GAO protest is decided. This is primarily used to temporarily
benefit incumbent contractors, who usually do not represent small businesses, to extend
performance on the existing contract or grant a bridge contract to the incumbent. However, even
the CICA stay can be overridden by an agency’s urgent and compelling interest justification. The
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GAO also does not administer or enforce the CICA stay, so a violation of the stay does not offer
any grounds for further protest. The recommendation(s) of relief are the only tangible benefits
that a protestor can hope to receive to offset the costs of protesting other than the
recommendation of payment of costs for only the sustained protest grounds, which is nearly
impossible to obtain.
Reported GAO Protest Outcomes
The GAO announces protest decisions on the GAO’s Electron Protest Docketing System
(EPDS) and in published and unpublished ruling summaries. The reported outcome is
documented internally in the GAO database. If the agency fails to implement the recommended
remedy, the head of the procuring activity responsible for that contract shall report such failure to
the GAO. The GAO is then required to conduct a comprehensive review of the pertinent
procurement, including the circumstances of the failure of the federal agency to implement the
GAO recommendation. A summary of this data is sent to applicable congressional committees
and published on the GAO website in the GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to Congress for each
fiscal year (FY). The annual report or letter to Congress is statutorily required to provide a
summary of each incident in which a federal agency does not fully implement a
recommendation, describe each incident in which a final decision in a protest is not rendered
within 100 days of submission, and include a summary of the most prevalent grounds for
sustaining protests during the preceding year. Since 2002, the annual report also includes a
tabular summary of the protest outcome data in categories determined by the GAO as shown in
Figure 3.1 below with the researcher’s calculated data highlighted in green. These GAO-reported
outcomes include a representation of the annual change in number, type, and effectiveness of
protests for the benefit of Congress, GovCon, contractors, and the public. This research examines
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the perceptions of these reported outcomes and factors that influence these perceptions,
particularly for small business contractors.
Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2002-2019
Fiscal Year

FY
2019

FY
2018

FY
2017

FY
2016

FY
2015

FY
2014

FY
2013

FY
2012

FY
2011

FY
2010

FY
2009

FY
2008

FY
2007

FY
2006

FY
2005

FY
2004

FY
2003

FY
2002

Cases Filed1

2198

2607

2596

2789

2639

2561

2429

2,475

2,353

2,299

1,989

1,652

1,411

1,327

1,356

1,485

1,352

1,204

-16%

<1%

-7%

6%

3%

5%

-2%

5%

2%

16%

20%

17%

6%

-2%

-9%

10%

12%

5%

% Change from
Previous FY2
3

2200

2642

2672

2734

2647

2458

2538

2495

2,292

2,226

1,920

1,582

1,394

1,274

1,341

1,405

1,244

1,133

Merit (Sustain +
Deny) Decisions

587

622

581

616

587

556

509

570

417

441

315

291

335

249

306

365

290

256

Number of Sustains

77

92

99

139

68

72

87

106

67

82

57

60

91

72

71

75

50

41

Number of Denies

510

530

482

477

519

484

422

464

350

359

258

231

244

177

235

290

240

215

Number of
Dismissed

1613

2020

2091

2118

2060

1902

2029

1925

1875

1785

1605

1291

1059

1025

1035

1040

954

877

Sustain Rate

13%

15%

17%

22.56%

12%

13%

17%

18.6%

16%

19%

18%

21%

27%

29%

23%

21%

17%

16%

Cases Closed

Calculated Sustain
Rate
Protestors Sustain
Rate9
Effectiveness Rate

4

Dismissed But
Some Relief
Rate of Relief of

5

ADR (cases used)

Hearings Cases

Hearings % s

7

7

3.50%

3.48%

3.71%

5.08%

2.57%

2.93%

3.43%

4.25%

2.92%

3.68%

2.97%

3.79%

6.53%

5.65%

5.29%

5.34%

4.02%

3.62%

44%

44%

47%

46%

45%

43%

43%

42%

42%

42%

45%

42%

38%

39%

37%

34%

33%

33%

891

1070

1157

1119

1123

985

1004

942

896

853

807

604

439

425

425

403

361

333

55.24% 52.99% 55.32% 52.82% 54.52% 51.78% 49.50% 48.93% 47.77% 47.78% 50.28% 46.82% 41.43% 41.45% 41.08% 38.72% 37.79% 37.96%

Dismissed10

ADR Success Rate

13.12% 14.79% 17.04% 22.56% 11.58% 12.95% 17.09% 18.60% 16.07% 18.59% 18.10% 20.62% 27.16% 28.92% 23.20% 20.55% 17.24% 16.02%

6

40

86

81

69

103

96

145

106

140

159

149

78

62

91

103

123

120

145

90%

77%

90%

84%

70%

83%

86%

80%

82%

80%

93%

78%

85%

96%

91%

91%

92%

84%

21

5

17

27

31

42

31

56

46

61

65

32

41

51

41

56

74

23

2.00%

0.51%

1.70%

2.51%

3.10%

4.70%

3.36%

6.17%

8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 6.00%

1

8.00% 11.00% 8.00%

All entries in this chart are counted in terms of the docket numbers (“B” numbers) assigned by our Office, not the number of procurements challenged.
Where a protester files a supplemental protest or multiple parties protest the same procurement action, multiple iterations of the same “B” number are assigned (i.e., .2, .3).
Each of these is deemed a separate case for purposes of this chart.
Cases include protests, cost claims, and requests for reconsideration.
2
From the prior fiscal year as provided by GAO in parathetical text of report. Note: Fiscal Year is from October 1, previous calender year to September 30, that calender year.
3
Of the 2,734 cases closed in FY 2016, 375 are attributable to GAO’s jurisdiction over task or delivery orders placed under indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts.
3
Of the 2,672 cases closed in FY 2017, 256 are attributable to GAO’s jurisdiction over task or delivery orders placed under indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts.
3
Of the 2,642 cases closed in FY 2018, 356 are attributable to GAO’s jurisdiction over task or delivery orders placed under indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts.
3
Of the 2,200 cases closed in FY 2019, 373 are attributable to GAO’s jurisdiction over task or delivery orders placed under indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts.
4
Based on a protester obtaining some form of relief from the agency, as reported to GAO, either as a result of voluntary agency corrective action or GAO sustaining the protest.
5
Alternative Dispute Resolution.
6
Percentage of cases resolved without a formal GAO decision after ADR.
7
Percentage of fully developed cases in which GAO conducted a hearing; not all fully-developed cases result in a merit decision.
8
From the prior fiscal year as calcualted by researcher from GAO tablular data. Note: Fiscal Year is from October 1, previous calender year to September 30, that calender year.
9
Percentage of sustained protests reported by GAO from the total number of cases closed reported by GAO as calculated by the researcher.
10
Percentage of some relief of dismissed protests as assessed by GAO from the total number of cases dismissed reported by GAO as calculated by the researcher.
Source: GAO Annual Bid Protests Reports to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019, GAO-20-220SP, Nov 5, 2019; through Fiscal Year 2002, GAO-03-427R: Jan 29, 2003

Figure 3.1. GAO Reported Protest Outcomes, 2002 - 2019
The reported GAO data is a tabulated summary showing:
•

the annual number of protests filed.

•

the percent change in protests filed.

•

the number of protests closed.
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9.00% 13.00% 5.00%

•

the number of protests decided on merits.

•

the number of protests sustained.

•

the rate of sustained protests relative to only the number of protests decided on
merits.

•

the effectiveness rate of the percentage of all protests sustained or dismissed with
some form of relief.

•

the number and percentage of hearings from fully developed protest cases.

•

the number of cases using alternate dispute resolution (ADR).

•

the percentage of ADR cases that successfully resulted in resolution without a
decision (i.e., withdrawn or dismissed for agency corrective action).

These reported outcomes create the perception that the protest process is moderately successful
and beneficial to the acquisition system and specifically to protestors. However, this perception
is deceptive in part because the effectiveness rate, sustain rate, and ADR success rate
measurements use questionable denominators or numerators in the success metric calculations.
The researched calculated data highlighted in green determines the number and percentage of
sustained protests. The researcher also deduced the number of dismissed protests that the GAO
considers having received a form of relief. The hidden number makes up the bulk of the protests
that the GAO reports in the effectiveness rate.
Summarizing the representative data from recent fiscal year 2020, we see:
•

Of the 2137 protests closed, GAO reports 51% that we calculated as 968 protests
outcomes (1006 dismissed plus 84 sustained) are rated “effective,” where the GAO
determined the protestor received some form of relief.
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•

Of the 2137 protest closed, only 545 were decided on the merits, or approximately
26% of the all the protests closed.

•

Of the 545 merit decisions, only 84 were the protests sustained or approximately 15%
of the merit decisions.

•

Of the 2137 protests closed, only 84 were sustained for a nominal 3.93% sustained
effectiveness rate as calculated by the researcher.

•

A sustained protest outcome indicates the allegation of violations of acquisition laws
or regulations were confirmed by the GAO, resulting in some offer of relief to the
protestor.

A longitudinal view of the data aggregated by the two decades, where data is available, the
decade mean is calculated as shown in Figure 3.2. The key protest outcome mean metric for
each decade, there is nearly 70% increase in protests from the 2000s decade to the recent 2010s
decade. On average, the GAO reported an effectiveness rate of nearly 45%, increased from 38%,
where GAO subjectively determined some form of relief was received by the protestor.
However, the mean GAO reported sustain rate (from only those protests with merit decision)
decreased to 17.78% from 21.16%. The key metric highlighted with red text and not reported by
GAO is the actual sustain rate (from all protests filed) of 3.58% over the last decade, a decrease
of 23% from 4.54% the previous decade.
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Bid Protest Decade Mean Metrics for Fiscal Years 2002-2019
Fiscal Year

FY
2019

FY
2018

FY
2017

FY
2016

FY
2015

FY
2014

FY
2013

FY
2012

FY
2011

FY
2010

FY
2009

FY
2008

FY
2007

FY
2006

FY
2005

Average Cases Filed

2,494.60

1,472.00

Average Cases
Closed

2,490.40

1,411.63

Effectiveness Rate

43.80%

37.63%

Sustained Reported

16.24%

21.48%

Actual Sustain

3.56%

4.65%

Relief of Dismissed
Rate

51.67%

41.94%

FY
2004

FY
2003

FY
2002

Source: GAO Annual Bid Protests Reports to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019, GAO-20-220SP, Nov 5, 2019; through Fiscal Year 2002, GAO-03-427R: Jan 29, 2003

Figure 3.2. GAO Protest Outcome Mean Metrics by Decade
Summarizing, the GAO reports and researchers universally use an effectiveness or
success rate based on outcomes wherein the protestor potentially received some form of relief as
determined by the GAO. In the most recent decade, the average of protest outcomes based on
those standards is 44.7%. The GAO-reported protest outcomes paint this picture of a moderate
effectiveness or success rate for slightly less than half of the protestors. This level of success or
effectiveness is not realized by protestors. The level of confidence and participation in the protest
system is, however, dependent on stakeholders’ perceptions of protest effectiveness outcomes.
This analysis finds the overall rate of sustained protest outcomes deceased by nearly a
quarter to 3.58% in the current decade from 4.54% in the previous decade. This minimal
“effectiveness” rate of total protests sustained is inconsequential to contractors’ writ large
because this rate represents the times when a protestor is effective in obtaining a ruling that
sustains a prejudicial violation of acquisition laws or regulations in a particular procurement.
This data is not widely known because the GAO reports a much higher subjective “efficiency”
rate while an individual contractor is primarily concerned with their specific protest. The
individual vendor measures success on that protested procurement impropriety, not the aggregate
sustain rate. Perception of effectiveness depends on each individual protest outcome.
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The reported outcomes may be skewed to benefit the federal acquisition system by
creating the impression of moderately favorable effectiveness outcomes and thus, accountability.
However, many small business concerns perceive the protest system as minimally effective, as
the previous research has shown that these reported outcomes create false perceptions of
accountability (Snyder 2020). While small business concerns make up more than half of the
GAO bid protests filed, small business perceptions of the bid protest outcomes and its ultimate
utility are underrepresented in the current research literature.
RAND concluded, in part from trends in bid protest outcomes, that federal agencies [the
Department of Defense in the recent congressionally directed study] and the private sector have
differing views on the bid protest process (RAND 2018). The business problem this empirical
research addresses is the stakeholders’ perceptions of the reported outcomes and whether those
perceptions support the GAO’s reported outcome of moderate effectiveness in correcting
improprieties in acquisition procedures. The empirical and action research has a primary
emphasis on small business protestors’ perceptions of the reported protest outcomes. The
research also explores the salient factors that influence these stakeholder perceptions. The role of
and interaction among these perceptions are important to the viability of the system and its
perceived effectiveness.
Review of Research
Since the GAO protest system’s infancy in 1926 (GAO Descriptive Guide), there has
been considerable debate and substantial research on the process, effectiveness, costs, and
benefits of protests. Nearly all the research assumes that the effectiveness rate reported by the
GAO is a valid measure of success or effectiveness. While stakeholders have different
perspectives, much of the research has been aimed at the two competing perceptions of
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effectiveness. The first is that the quasi-judicial GAO protest process provides real benefits to
contractors and public confidence in the acquisition process that are greater than the very real
costs. The former chief of the GAO’s protest system and perhaps the godfather of GAO protests,
Dan Gordon, published a seminal research report articulating this view, as summarized in the
title: “Bid Protests: The Costs are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them” (Gordon 2013).
Contrasting this view is the perception that the GAO protest costs to the federal acquisition
system outweigh the benefits by delaying acquisitions, using resources, and being somewhat
redundant to the judicial protest process. Many agencies, most notably the DoD, have pushed
this concern, prompting much of the congressional interest and research. Limited research has
focused on the perceptions of protest outcomes and the elements influencing the contractor
perceptions, particularly for small businesses.
Congress mandated two important studies by RAND and the Section 809 Panel Report
that partially addressed these perceptions of bid protest outcomes and the cost effectiveness of
the process. RAND concluded that federal agencies (in this report, the DoD) and the private
sector have differing views on the bid protest process. Government agencies are concerned that
the process incentivizes protests, potentially preventing timely awarding of contracts for agency
requirements, while the private sector (vendors) view protest as a means to hold the government
accountable for providing information about how acquisition decisions are made (RAND 2018).
The study examined trends in bid protests and their effectiveness rate. The RAND study
specifically addressed “Stakeholder Perspectives on the Bid Protest System,” concluding:
“Perspectives on the bid protest system varied greatly between DoD personnel and the private
sector. DoD personnel expressed a general dissatisfaction with the current bid protest system.
The prevailing thought was that contractors have an unfair advantage in the contracting process
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by potentially impeding timely awards with bid protests. They asserted that the federal
government allowed too many ‘weak’ allegations in a protest and that contractors had too much
time to protest, delaying procurements. In contrast, private-sector representatives strongly
supported the bid protest system because they viewed it as providing transparency to the
contracting process and holding the government accountable for following the law and its own
solicitation procedures.”
Much of past research focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of the GAO bid protest
system and its outcomes, while a limited amount of practitioner literature focuses on stakeholder
perceptions of the protest system. Most of the literature on perceptions of protest outcomes
aggregates the “perceptions from trade associations and private law firms of the impact that bid
protests have on their corporate [vendor] decision making” (RAND 2018). This research expands
the discussion on stakeholder perspectives of GAO bid protest outcomes and factors that
influence these perceptions, with emphasis on protesting small business stakeholders.
The literature review and previous papers provide the largely accepted data which
support the GAO reports of a moderate effectiveness rate of about 45% for all protests, offering
what the GAO determines is some form of relief. RAND and other research conclude that private
sector contractor perceptions of bid protest outcomes and the cost effectiveness of the process
differ from the perceptions of the government and other GovCon stakeholders.
While most of the literature accepts the moderate effectiveness reported by the GAO due
to the determination of meaningful relief obtained, this data is based on opaque determinations
generally only known by the GAO. The current analysis of perceptions generally revolves
around the both the real and unintended costs relative to this moderate effectiveness rate
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reported. Much of the reported effectiveness is a result of corrective action from some sort of
dismissal.
Recently, Canayaz et al.’s research concluded that even vendors who receive some form
of relief in their protest outcomes suffer negative impact on future government contracts. The
study also concludes that the common government agency perception that protests unduly delay
procurements is inaccurate. The paper summarizes:
Firms that successfully protest a government agency’s conduct or terms of a
procurement contract observe a reduction in future business opportunities with the
government. These firms receive fewer and less valuable government contracts,
face more contract cancellations, and experience significant reductions in sales
growth and employee growth. Despite widespread belief, successful bid protesters
do not delay government procurement due to lengthy dispute resolutions.
(Canayaz et al., 2021)
The Canayaz study also accepts the assertion that corrective action assumes that a protest is
successful for the protestor in the short-term. However, the study identified long-term
detrimental impacts on successful protestors. Their conclusion supports this paper’s contention
that even if a protest is reported as having an effective outcome, that outcome is rarely, if ever
successful, for the protestor.
My analysis of the industry reveals that even short-term effectiveness of protest outcomes
is extremely low and rarely successful for small businesses. The overall sustain rate is a much
better measure of effective success, particularly for small businesses. Truly effective protest
outcomes are minimal at an upper limit of 3.5-4%, especially since even the minimally efficient
sustained protest outcomes are often not successful for the small business protestor. The question
this paper explores is How do stakeholder perspectives of outcomes vary from reported
outcomes. This research assesses the perceptions of protest outcomes and the factors that have
the most influence on those perceptions.
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The Protocol
This outcome perspective research builds on empirical research on participating in small
business GAO protests with literature reviews, coded interviews with GovCon protest
participants, analysis of GAO annual reports, and more detailed interviews with small business
protestors and GAO bid protest leadership. The primary research source for obtaining bid protest
stakeholder perceptions is the 13 coded (one interview transcript is unavailable and therefore not
coded or used) and an uncoded structured interviews with protest stakeholders. The interview
questions were designed as a research framework from a literature review, protest experience,
and extended dialogue with fellow small business colleagues and GovCon professionals. The
interviewees were not explicitly provided with research data such as the GAO-reported outcomes
on the moderate reported effectiveness rate or the calculated 4% sustained effectiveness rate
before or during the interviews. The interview protocol was designed to elicit the interviewees’
perceptions of outcomes, the effectiveness of those outcomes, and the important factors
influencing the outcomes. The coded interviews utilized the questionnaire in Appendix A, given
to interviewees ahead of time, to stimulate a more free-flowing discussion wherein key concepts
are coded. Most of the structured interviews were conducted over a three-month period in 2017,
but the unstructured follow-up interviews and protest experience continued through 2020. The
interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded by key phrases and concepts from the transcript
as informed by the more thorough context of the interview discussion. The key factors
influencing the protest outcome perspectives identified in the coded interviews and research
literature were assessed along the spectra to conceptualize their interaction with major
stakeholders, particularly small businesses.
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The individuals interviewed were initially selected for their accessibility and willingness
to take at least an hour to discuss their views of the protest system. They are highly experienced
and knowledgeable of GAO protests, particularly of current vested stakeholders. The study
sought a balance among the three major stakeholder groups: government agency contracting
officials, GovCon lawyers, and experienced vendors that are primarily small businesses. The
majority of the small business interviewees are CEOs, and two of the small business executives
also have experience in large businesses. Most of the agency stakeholders interviewed have
experience in multiple agencies and/or with vendors. The legal stakeholders have extensive
experience with small businesses, and several have experience representing large businesses. The
overview of the stakeholders’ backgrounds and a key reason for selecting them is listed in Figure
3.3 below.
The 14 interviews plus the one of the 15 not available for coding, were conducted with
groups of three major types of stakeholders: small business federal contractors (5), U.S.
government contracting agencies (4), and protest/contracting lawyers (6). While only small
business contractors were interviewed, several of the contractors had experience with large
business contractors as did several of the government agency representatives and all the lawyers.
This experience provided insight into the perceptions of contractors that were other than small
business in a particular category. This is a representative group of the major stakeholders
regarding protest perceptions because it includes experienced and invested participants, many
involved in small businesses yet experienced with large businesses and government agencies.
Several of the interviewees are renowned for their expertise in protests. Another important
criterion was the ability of the interviewees to explain the concepts and factors that influence
protest outcome perceptions along with the ability to articulate these perception factors from
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other perspectives. Though numerically small, the 14 interviews were sufficient to ascertain a
meaningful representation of outcome perceptions and key factors that impact stakeholder
perceptions. The interviews reinforced much of the protest concepts, perceptions, and factors
from previous interviews.

Role

Reason Selected

CEO SDB 8a govcon

Extensive protest experience

CCO SDVOSB govcon
Govcon Executive

Protest experience as protester
and protested
Detailed knowledge of
procurement rules

Category
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business

CEO SDVOSB govcon

Balanced protest experience

SB CEO and Consultant

Renown serial protestor

SBA BD and former CO

Both CO and regulator
experience

Agency

Senior contracting officer

Agency contracting executive

Agency

Reserve CO, Former active CO

Experience on both sides

Agency

GAO Associate Managing General
Counsel

Global government expert and
experience in large law firm
Extensive protest experience
and as JAG

Partner, Practice Chair

Agency
Legal

Partner

Practicing partner on both sides

Legal

Lead Protest Lawyer

Prolific protest consultant and
lawyer

Legal

Partner, Practice Chair

Firm practice chair

Legal

Partner

Current protest case experience

Legal

Associate

Fresh perspective

Legal

TOTAL

15

Figure 3.3. Interviewed Stakeholders
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The interviews were conducted, when able, in the interviewee’s office or work location.
An outline of the interview questions was provided prior to the interviews. More than half of the
interviews were conducted over the phone or webinar. Interviews were recorded and transcribed
by an independent transcription web site. The give and take in the interviews allowed for a more
detailed, nuanced understanding of factors and interviewees’ perceptions of others. The findings
of protest outcome perceptions are derived from the interviews as informed by the research
literature review, the action research experience, participation in GovCon seminars, and in-depth
discussions with GAO officials, GovCon attorneys, and some other small business protestors.
Initially the interview outcome perception findings were not explicitly quantified. Rather, the
major factor themes influencing perceptions emerged.
When initiating the research coding protocol, the transcripts were reviewed several times
to capture major themes before they were coded by highlighting the key perceptions, the
influencing factors, the measure of protest outcome success/effectiveness, the interviewees
perceptions, their take from other perspectives, and a major theme of the interview. The key
phases that identified the influencing factors were compiled in a list organized by major
categories or themes. The key interview phrases describe a more detailed perception or
explanation/perception of a factor. The organization and existence of key elements was
influenced by the focus of the interview questions and the further exploration of these concepts
in follow-up questions, which is based on the researcher’s experience and action research. This
experience gave me invaluable insights into the bid protest process, the long and short-term
costs, the legal tactics, and principles used, the implications of reported outcomes, and the
perceptions of outcomes as well as the interaction of the key perception elements.
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Initially, the recordings and transcripts were reviewed several times for a broad
understanding of significant discussions on major elements reflecting the interviewed
stakeholders’ perceptions of reported outcomes and overall effectiveness as described by that
stakeholder. Additionally, the interview records further informed the view of the protest process
and how the outcomes are reported. The interviews were then “open-coded,” a rigorous
procedure involving line by line scrutiny of each transcript to identify fragments of text and/or
discussion of key concepts. This coding identified 939 phrase or discussion fragments and 35
key concepts identified in the transcript margins. The open-coded highlighted phrases were then
manually sorted to group similar or reoccurring phases or discussion fragments into six broad
areas by common dominate themes. The major coded phrase or discussion fragments were
manually listed in these six identified general categories. The transcripts were re-read to further
consolidate narrower four major themes considering the duplication and overlap between these
concepts. For example, the fairness and accountability categories were combined into one of the
four themes because of the commonality between the two. In fact, this process identified that
accountability was viewed as the positive extreme on the fairness spectrum. Then, the coded
transcripts were reviewed for meaningful discussions of the four concepts or themes and for each
interviewees’ measure or meaning of success or effective outcome. Each interview transcript
was then identified for the stakeholders’ respective positive or negative perceptions of the
outcome effectiveness perception.
The interviews were tabulated, indicating for each interview a positive or negative
description of where these theme factors influenced the actual outcome of protests, the
perception of outcomes, and/or the perception of protest success/effectiveness. Many of the
interviews had both negative and position perceptions on or of the protest outcome as the
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interviewer discussed the theme in more detail. Some of the themes were not meaningfully
discussed in a positive or negative perspective. The tabular values for these are blank.
The researcher then quantified the overall perception by assigning a value on a 0-5 scale
of each interviewee’s aggregate subjective view of the effectiveness of the bid protest system.
These values are averaged for the total and for each of the three major classes of stakeholders, as
seen in Table 4.1. Additionally, the general description the interviewees conveyed on what
constitutes success or effectiveness from their perspective as well as a predominant theme of the
interview are recorded. Finally, the findings briefly include a relevant note about each interview.
The interview findings are organized into the major themes. The interviews were then
reassessed to inform the researcher of how the major factors or themes influenced outcome
perceptions, including perceptions of success/utility/effectiveness, and how these factors interact
in the complex environment of government contracting protesting. Government contracting is a
consuming, intense human endeavor fueled by many influences and motivations. Protesting
government acquisitions is probably an order of greater magnitude. Understanding the influence
of these factors on perceptions of protesting, protest outcomes, and their interaction from
different perspectives is an important aid for understanding how the protest outcomes are
perceived.
Findings
Effectiveness Perceptions
The empirical research followed the protocol described above to document stakeholder
perceptions and concepts and themes that interact to create these perceptions. I evaluated each
interview for overall perception of effectiveness for that stakeholder on 0-5 scale with 5
indicating very effective or highly successful. Although effective protest outcomes are generally
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measured by levels of confidence that rules were followed, leading to a fair acquisition, the
perception of success is in the eyes of the beholder or stakeholder. Therefore, it is important to
note what each interviewee considers a significant measure of success. Figure 3.4 summarizes
the individual effectiveness scores, measures of effectiveness and perception theme summary.
Figure 3.5 provides the average effectiveness score for each major stakeholder group and the
summary of the findings by stakeholder category.

Role
CEO SDB 8a govcon
CCO SDVOSB govcon
Govcon Executive
CEO SDVOSB govcon
SB CEO and Consultant

Perception of Measure of Success or
Effectiveness

Category Effectiveness
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business

2

Theme

Notes

Long term business and
Branding and small business risks Opportunity costs main focus
relationship

1

Depends on strategic
benefit

Cost burden of protesting

Damaged business
relationships

2

Mitigating issue is
minimized

Business decision with limited
accountability

Importance of
communications with agency

1

Winning the contract

Cost-benefit tradeoff

Costs main importance more
than complexity

0

Government
Accountability

Accountability at any cost

Serial protestor one year bar
Unable to locate interview
transcript

SBA BD and former CO

Agency

Senior contracting officer

Agency

3

Depends

Reserve CO, Former active CO

Agency

4

Protest upheld
(sustained) or denied

Win award or best value for
owners, 2nd/3rd order impact

Each protest is unique

Things that don't happen

Private attorney general, legislature
recommends to agency

Expert and defender of system

Equitably playing field between Corrective action benefit/cost
government and vendor
unknown

GAO Associate Managing General
Counsel

Agency

5

Partner, Practice Chair

Legal

4

Partner

Legal

3

Compete on a level
playing field

Compressed time to manage client
expectations

Noted low likelihood of
success

Lead Protest Lawyer

Legal

5

Corrective action

Protest to correct errors

Not question of fairness, but
strength of argument

Partner, Practice Chair

Legal

5

Client gets a fair chance

Quasi-legal unequal treatment
venue

Example of more bidders

Partner

Legal

5

Agency review action

Strategic use of protests

Importance of timeliness

Associate

Legal

4

Reported outcome

Strategic use of protests

Importance of timeliness

15

3.14

Call attention to agency
Correcting unfairly treated clients
improper conduct

Figure 3.4. Perceptions, Effectiveness, and Theme
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Have educated counsel on
other side to minimize costs

Figure 3.5. Effectiveness Perception Scores and Summary
Figure 3.4 shows that the average assigned value for the relative perception of
effectiveness is just over three on a 0-5 scale. The interviewed stakeholders on average perceived
that the outcome success rate is slightly higher than the moderate effectiveness rate reported by
the GAO. This suggests the overall perception is in line with the claimed effectiveness rate. The
1.20 average of the small business protest executives seen in Figure 3.5 indicates that these
stakeholders have a considerably lower perception of effectiveness, roughly corresponding to a
20% perceived success/effectiveness rate. This is significantly below the moderate 45% outcome
effectiveness rate reported by the GAO; however, it is above the 3.5-4% sustain rate that marks
the upper end of the realistic small business protest success. Small business stakeholders are,
therefore, more attuned to the minimal effectiveness of the reported outcomes, reinforcing the
small business perceptions of limited utility.
The research literature describes government agencies, in particular the DoD contracting
officers, and contracting officers perceive protest outcomes as often delaying the award and
performance of contracts needed to meet mission requirements. They perceive that protests are
too frequent, can be frivolous, may be micromanaged, and constitute unwarranted infringement
of the agencies and contracting officers’ authority. Consequently, they surmise that the burdens
(costs) outweigh the benefits, and therefore the protests are ineffective. However, our research
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shows that agency stakeholders have a 4.00 average effectiveness perspective value, suggesting
they think the effectiveness, success, and therefore the utility of protest outcomes is higher than
the GAO-reported moderate effectiveness rate. This figure may be skewed by the makeup of this
small sample of agency stakeholders because it includes GAO leadership as well as SBA official
and former contracting officers.
The legal stakeholders scored the highest at 4.33 on the effectiveness perspective score.
This is understandable since these lawyers’ careers are vested in the bid protest system and in the
effective resolution of bid protests. This score may also be partly explained by the fact that many
of the lawyers have represented large companies that are the subject of a protest. Additionally,
some of the lawyers implied that in some cases a denial or dismissal may be an effective
outcome.
Measures of Success and Significant Interview Themes
The findings in Figures 3.4 also list a summary phrase of each interview’s key measure of
success. For example, one small business CEO stated the key measure of success is building
long-term business relationships. Another small business CEO conveyed the main measure of
success is mitigating or minimizing the damage from the specific contracting action in dispute.
Seeking to understand or at least identify each interviewee’s definition of success aids in
assessing that stakeholder’s perception of protest effectiveness. The measure of success based on
“things that don’t happen” because agencies want to avoid protests is a case in which
effectiveness is not directly reflected in the findings. However, this key measure provides
invaluable increased understanding of stakeholder perceptions. It provides an interesting and
notable insight into perceptions of effectiveness not captured in the data.
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Figure 3.4 also describes what the researcher believes is the major theme of the interview.
The catalog of key themes helps summarize the different perceptions in the human interactions
of bid protests. Protests involve social interaction such as exchange, competition, conflict,
cooperation, and accommodation. Protest interactions, and to a larger extent government
contracting, involve these human exchanges that are influenced by emotion. These themes
inform the analysis of outcome perceptions. Some of the most interesting insights are not directly
reflected in the findings. The GAO leadership interview theme describing the “private attorney
general” theme is one example of this.
Factors Influencing Protest Outcome Perceptions
The interviews identified four major elements factoring into the perceptions of GAO
protests and measures of success. The four elements are:
•

Cost-Benefit: the cost-benefit tradeoff considerations in participating in a GAO
protest.

•

Fairness and Accountability: the impact and consideration of GAO protests offering
accountability and fairness in the protests and/or the U.S. federal acquisition system.

•

Communications: the utility of protests stakeholders effectively communicating with
other stakeholders or protest parties.

•

Emotions: the impact of stakeholder human emotions on the participation in and/or
outcome perception of GAO protests.

The interview coding identified phrases and comments in the major elements. Many of the
comments, phrases, and discussions identified in the research apply to multiple elements and
conceptually describe perceptions of the interaction and interrelationship between the elements.
Figure 3.6 below indicates interviews in which each of the key element concepts were
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meaningfully discussed in terms of whether each element has a positive or negative influence on
the perception of protest outcomes and/or the usefulness of participating in GAO protests. The
“X” indicators in the positive or negative columns of each element identify whether that element
was meaningfully articulated once or any number of times in the interview in a favorable or
unfavorable light. Many of the interviews registered both positive and negative
discussions/multiple discussions of a particular element. This finding is the often the result of
probing follow-up questions that explored the interviewees’ perceptions of the conceptional
element. Figure 3.6 also lists the predominant measure of protest success that each interviewee
described. Additionally, the interview figure describes a dominant theme of the interview, as
well as key notes from the researcher when coding the interview. This tabular data is qualitative.
It is only quantitative in that it provides for the compilation of the number of interviewees in
general and the number of interviewees in each category that did or did not significantly describe
any of the four protest elements as having a favorable, unfavorable, or no impact on the
interviewee’s perception of protest outcomes and/or the participation in GAO protests.
Many of the comments, phrases, and discussions identified in the research apply to
multiple elements and conceptually describe perceptions of the interaction and interrelationship
between the elements.
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Role
CEO SDB 8a govcon
CCO SDVOSB govcon
Govcon Executive
CEO SDVOSB govcon
SB CEO and Consultant

Category
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business
Small
Business

Cost - Benefit

Fairness and
Accountability

Communications

Emotions

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

-

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

SBA BD and former CO

Agency

Senior contracting officer

Agency

X

X

Reserve CO, Former active CO

Agency

X

X

GAO Associate Managing General
Counsel

Agency

X

X

X

Partner, Practice Chair

Legal

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Partner

Legal

X

X

X

X

X

X

Lead Protest Lawyer

Legal

X

Partner, Practice Chair

Legal

X

X

Partner

Legal

X

X

Associate

Legal

X

X

15

10

6

X

X

X

11

X
X

X

X

X

X
7

12

7

6

10

Figure 3.6. Interview Elements and Theme Discussion Summary
The interviewed stakeholders described perceptions of protest outcomes in terms of the
key elements and those elements’ interactions in favorable, unfavorable, both, or neither spectrum
of degree. These descriptions provide a qualitative conceptual framework to understand GAO
protestors’ perceptions of the reported outcomes to answer, or at least clarify the research question:
How do stakeholders in the federal government contracting process, particularly small business
contractors, perceive the GAO-reported bid protest outcomes that claim a moderate effectiveness
rate? The answer is: It depends. In most complex human endeavors, especially those involving an
individual’s or even an organization’s livelihood, the perception is dependent on the perspective.
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As the old fable says, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” Some of the stakeholder
descriptions may seem to be contradictory, but they show a complex interaction based on
perspective. The meaningful protest outcome perceptions describe the stakeholders’ perspective
concept. Appendix B provides excerpts organized by each of the four major themes from the
transcripts to support the findings of complex interactions of positive and negative perceptions of
key elements in the GAO protest bid environment. The comments also provide insight and
understanding of the complexities of the various elements. A few notable excerpts are listed here:
•

People protest for a couple of reasons. They protest, and historically they protested, I
believe, when they honestly felt that they were not treated fairly.

•

Being a small business, people didn't want to spend the money, or[they wanted to
spend] very little, to protest.

•

The number of protests that are actually successful…lately it's been two to four
percent, and it's never really much more.

•

A lot of long-term intangible [protests]cost, yeah, because you're going to get the
[agency] upset.

•

What [is] called private attorneys general… such that you incentivize someone to
identify waste is spawned in a government contract and you do that by rewarding
them for having done it.

•

The best purposes of having a protest run are all the things that don't happen because
people in the agency know that if they did that someone would file a protest. It's all
the stuff that doesn't happen because you have a right to complain.

•

The reason that we don't protest a whole lot other than the financial burden associated
with it, is that the ability to win some of the small business protests, we think, isn't
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worth the effort to the potential negative repercussions of the small business in the
space.
•

Showing them why and how they weren't mistreated, why and how the offer selected
was a better offer than theirs, and to show them that if they pursue a protest, they
won't win… that's a type of communicating.

•

I'm a vendor; it's not my job to enforce the code of federal regulations.

•

The process itself represents compromise between a lot of different and competing
interests in the procurement system. We have a system that needs to be as fair as
possible and allow for the thorough adjudication of protests wherever possible. It also
exists in a world where the government must procure certain goods and services by a
certain time.

•

Both sides of it [protest] got very subjective and emotional.

The findings roughly quantify the outcomes perceptions of major stakeholders. The more
significant qualitative contribution these findings make to the field is the provision of greater
insight into the perceptions, factors influencing these perceptions, and the interaction of some of
these factors to inform the answer to the complex research question: How do stakeholders in the
federal government contracting process, particularly small business contractors, perceive the
GAO-reported bid protest outcomes that claim a moderate effectiveness rate?
Discussion
The research reveals in the 3.14 average rating that most of the interviewees generally
think GAO bid protest outcomes have a moderate level (20%-50%+) of effectiveness. This
perception is especially true for government, GovCon, and protest bar stakeholders whose
livelihood is dependent on a robust and useful bid protest process. It is important to note that
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these stakeholders vested in the system do not necessarily equate effective outcomes with
successful outcomes. The GAO staff and leadership interviewees naturally appear to perceive bid
protest outcomes as effective since many are participating in government contracting oversight
careers. The contractor or protestor stakeholder interviewees also generally think the protest
system is a moderately effective tool to be utilized in a narrow manner to achieve tactical success
in specific instances and that success is based on individual circumstances. White, an
interviewee, modeled this factor by commenting that when he meets with private sector business,
he asks how many have protested and whether they believe it was effective. He reports that most
have filed protests and think bid protests are a fair and effective tool. However, when he asks the
same group of contractors if they have had any of their awards protested by another contractor,
they disparage the bid protest as unwarranted, somewhat unfair, delaying the provision of needed
goods and serves, and ineffective (R. White, personal communications, May 3. 2019).
Most of the stakeholders interviewed measure success or system effectiveness as a costbenefit tradeoff, whether they are contractors, protestors, and their legal advisers, who view bid
protests as a business decision, or they are government, agency, and GovCon stakeholders who
tend to view effectiveness based on the cost-benefit tradeoff to the federal acquisition system, the
confidence in the system, or the agencies’ ability to efficiently acquire goods and services for
needed requirements. However, some small business interviewees perceive the protest system
and individual protests as unsuccessful and therefore ineffective because the overriding
motivation and goal is accountability. These interviewees often are pro se protestors who view
the protest as a business endeavor they most often pursue to ensure government agency
accountability for the legislated preferences that small businesses rely on to sustain growth,
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experience, capability, and performance records. This accountability is consistent with the
GAO’s name, Government Accountability Office, and its mission statements.
For the most part, the protest system does not offer meaningful effective relief or
effectively rectify specific improprieties nor systemic improprieties such as gaming acquisitions
to make them “protest proof.” Many small business stakeholders perceive most outcomes as
ineffective and unsuccessful not only because they did not achieve accountability, but more
importantly because the tangible and intangible costs exceeded any minimal benefit received.
The protest outcome perceptions are derived from the research and summarized as follows:
•

The GAO, GovCon attorneys, and practitioners perceive bid protest outcomes as
moderately effective in adjudicating alleged violations of acquisition laws and
regulations, believing the benefits to the acquisition system outweigh the costs.

•

Surprisingly, government agencies, or at least the interview sample, perceive bid
protests as effective. With a 4.00 average effectiveness perception assessment value,
these agency stakeholders conveyed that the effectiveness or success rating is above
the GAO-reported moderate effectiveness. The significance of this difference from
the literature in which protests are perceived as a burden is diminished by the small
sample size and nature of the agency officials as senior leadership personnel.

•

Government contractors perceive protests as useful tools to achieve tactical and
occasionally strategic goals. While the protest outcomes provide limited effectiveness
and the costs often exceed the minimal tangible benefits, they are viewed by this
demographic as a necessary part of government contracting and a tool whose use
should be minimized.
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•

Small business contractors, particularly those from certain socio-economic
subcategories like SDVOSB, perceive outcomes as ineffective with substantial costs
and minimal benefits but feel they may play an important role in agency accountable
to follow the unique policy objectives such as small business preferences. The high
number of dismissed protests and the small number of sustained protest outcomes
demonstrate negligible effectiveness. However, protests provide opportunity to
identify improprieties that disadvantage small businesses despite the negligible
success or effectiveness rate.

These outcome perceptions highlight the role of the main factors that influence perceptions. This
research finds that there are four major areas that influence stakeholder perceptions of bid protest
outcomes. These elements interact to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of various stakeholder
outcomes and thus influence contractor decisions to participate or file protests. The research also
indicates that stakeholders who are invested in the GAO protest system, such as agencies, protest
bar lawyers, contracting officers, government protest adjudicators, and many large contractors
that are supported by outside counsel, perceive outcomes as moderately effective at adjudicating
improprieties. Since no large businesses are directly represented in the research interview cohort,
the perceptions of large businesses were extrapolated from protest bar interviewees who
represent large business, the literature review, interviews with contracting officers, and
discussions with GAO leadership. The small businesses that are represented in the interview
cohort are more likely to perceive the protest outcomes as minimally effective. The perceptions
of outcome effectiveness are influenced, in slightly different ways for different stakeholders, by
the key factors identified in the interview coding.
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Key Factors Influencing Outcome Perspectives
The researcher coded the interviews based on key phrases and concepts. These coded
phrases were grouped into major perception categories as shown in Figure 3.5. These key
outcome perception themes are aligned along three axes: cost-benefit tradeoff, fairness and
accountability, and communications. Clouding and in some cases illuminating or overlaying
these basic perception themes is the role of emotions in procurement protests. The most
significant factor is the cost-benefit tradeoff, whether it is a business decision, system
effectiveness measure, or a program oversight accountability outcome.
Elements influencing or coloring the perceptions of protest outcomes are:
•

Cost-Benefit Tradeoff – the business decision that the return on investment in a particular
action to protest or not protest is the primary measure of outcome effectiveness. The
acquisition system effectiveness outcomes are dependent on the trade-off. Both the shortand long-term benefits should outweigh the costs to the stakeholder.

•

Fairness and Accountability – the degree to which the protest and the protest system
provide “an objective, independent, and impartial forum for the resolution of disputes
concerning the awards of federal contracts” (GAO Descriptive Guide 2018), or a level of
fairness. Accountability, one of the primary objectives of the GAO bid protest system, is
on the extreme end of the fairness spectrum and relates to achieving identification,
adjudication, and correction of alleged violations of acquisition laws and regulations by
government agencies.

•

Communications – the level to which bid protests, the protest system, procurement
regulations and the government acquisitions process aid in articulating stakeholder
messages. Communications include contractors learning more about the requirements,
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communicating with the agency, marketing their capability with the agency, and learning
about industry capability.
In this competitive bid protest environment, emotions interact with the other factors and can
weigh heavily on perceptions of successful outcomes. Some basic emotions (Ortony and Turner,
1990) that appeared both implicitly and explicitly in the interviews include anger, aversion,
courage, contempt, disgust, distress, dejection, desire, despair, fear, guilt, interest, shame, envy,
fear, and hope. The element that overlays or influences the other three perception elements,
particularly for small businesses, is:
•

Emotions or the Emotional Cloud – building a business, winning a contract, making a
profit, challenging authority, timely fulfilling a requirement, enforcing rules, litigating
disputes, adjudicating disputes, and correcting improprieties are all human endeavors
where emotions impact both actions and perceptions of outcomes. The three protest
spectra are heavily influenced by the various emotional factors of different stakeholders.
The bid protest system and corresponding perceptions exist in an emotional cloud
environment that influences the outcome perceptions.

Protests by small businesses can be especially emotional because they may often be a proposition
about the company, or at least the company’s business model. Contracting officer and agency
counsel interviewees also viewed emotional influences as a challenge to their authority,
judgement, and professional reputation. Generally, GovCon legal stakeholders believed that
successful protests defined by fair resolutions are largely defined and better argued as devoid of
emotion. However, they acknowledge the influence of these human emotions on the success of a
protest and perceptions of the outcome.
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These findings provide a conceptual framework for better understanding the different
stakeholder perspectives and the operative elements or themes having most influence on these
perceptions.
Outcome Effectiveness Perceptions
On average, the stakeholder interviews indicated that the outcome perceptions were
consistent with the reported outcomes, providing moderate effectiveness. Notably, the small
business interviewees, in accordance with my action research, generally perceived that GAO bid
protests are marginally effective as represented by the overall low sustain rate and the frequent
lack of meaningful relief. This small business perception finding is significant, given that slightly
more than half of GAO protests involve small businesses (Gordon, 2013; RAND, 2018). That
demographic is understandable since small businesses with limited resources favor using the
quasi-judicial “expeditious and inexpensive” (31 U.S.C §3554) protest venue that does not
require legal representation. However, the RAND study found that GAO protests from
contractors with attorneys are more successful or effective in gaining some form of relief.
The findings confirm my expectations that most major stakeholders are invested in the
bid protest system and believe the GAO representations of the bid protest system’s moderate
effectiveness and utility with a positive rate of return. Most of the recent research and literature
is aimed at marginal modifications to improve the acquisition process by eliminating or
minimizing what are considered “frivolous” protests to expedite the acquisition of needed
supplies and service. While some agencies and congressional committee staffers believe there
are some frivolous protests that need curbing, interviewee White believes there is no such thing
as a frivolous protest because it would require accessing the protestor’s thoughts and implying
motive.
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The experiential action research confirms my view that regulatory capture and
bureaucratic inertia encourage the GAO to “dispose of” protests through dismissal outcomes
primarily based on procedural or technical irregularities. In fact, during a hearing one GAO
hearing attorney stated, “The role of GAO is to dispose of protest based on the information in the
case” (April 9, 2018, B-41588). This sentiment is perceived as consistent with the attitude of
many hearing officers and especially agency counsels who seem to seek out procedural and
technical tactics or gimmicks to dismiss or dispose of a protest. There are numerous, confusing,
and short duration timelines that result in protests, particularly by small businesses or per se
protestors whose protests are dismissed or disposed of for timeliness. Another common tactic
used by agencies, and encouraged by the GAO, is to dispose of or seek to dismiss a protest
because the protestor is not an interested party, the legal principle of standing. The CICA defines
the “term ‘interested party’—with respect to a contract or a solicitation or other request for offers
… [this] means an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would
be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract” (31 U.S.C.
§3551(2)). Yet GAO protest outcomes use an expansive interpretation and precedent for
dismissing a protest when the protestor is not an interested party. The protest will be dismissed if
the protestor is not considered an interested party because they are not next in line for award of
the contract, or the agency evaluates the offer as technically unacceptable, or the protest does not
meet a term of the solicitation, or the protestor is a teaming partner or subcontractor, or the
protestor does not show that the outcome was prejudiced, as well as other bases for dismissal.
Previous research extracts from the GAO reported two thirds of the protests filed were dismissed
(Snyder 2020). Further research analysis on the number and reasons for dismissal is warranted,
but this high number of protests dismissed is an extraordinary dismissal rate for a quasi- judicial,
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expeditious, and inexpensive resolution of procurement improprieties, particularly when relying
on contractor protestors to bring protests forward as a “private attorney general” (White, 2019)
with limited possibly of receiving a remedy to offset the costs of protesting.
The protest outcome perceptions of the various stakeholders generally support, albeit for
different reasons, the prevailing narrative that the protest system is moderately effective in
correcting violations of acquisition rules and achieving accountability. The major stakeholders
are commercial contractor protestors since the measure of effectiveness is thought of in terms of
protestors receiving remedy for prejudicial procurement improprieties sustained in protests.
Prominent among these protesting vendor stakeholders, and the focus of this research, are small
business concerns, which represent over half of the protests filed. Additionally, the inexpensive,
expeditious, and relatively informal venue make GAO protests the preferred forum for seeking
relief. These small businesses more often perceive the protest outcomes as only minimally
effective, as is shown in the reported sustaining outcomes relative to the total protests
filed/closed, particularly regarding the costs outweighing the benefits.
The recent RAND study and a prior legislated study highlighted the different perceptions
between the agencies and the private sector, concluding:
•

DoD personnel are concerned that the process incentivizes protests, potentially
preventing the timely award of contracts.

•

The private sector think bid protests hold the government accountable for providing
information about how a decision was made. (RAND)

To illuminate the perceptions of protests, RAND considered approaches to reduce and improve
protests from small businesses since more than half of the protests at the GAO and the CFC are
from self-identified small businesses. While small businesses are awarded more than half of the
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DoD contracts, such contracts represent only 15–20 percent of total contract dollars. As RAND
explains, this disparity raises another cost-effectiveness question: Should more than half of
protest activity be focused on less than 20 percent of contract dollars? The frequency of protest
activity by small businesses suggests that any improvements to the bid protest system should also
address small businesses. For example, the current “loser-pays” pilot program for the DoD
excludes businesses with annual revenues under $250 million (Section 827 of the FY 2018
NDAA). This program is analogous to a situation in which a civil case is settled out of court
because it is more cost-effective for both parties. Furthermore, the fact that small businesses are
generally less successful at the GAO (but not at the CFC) suggests that small businesses’ reasons
for protesting differ from those of larger businesses. This aspect was corroborated in RAND’s
discussions and my interviews. Sometimes, when debriefings are uninformative, small
businesses lodge protests to gain an understanding of why they lost a procurement. To the extent
that this is the case, the changes to the debriefing process, a form of communication, could help
to eliminate some small-business protests.
Other changes related to small businesses could also be considered. Protests by both
large and small businesses have a higher effectiveness rate at the GAO when under a protective
order. Small businesses are also more likely to have their cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
or for being legally insufficient. These differences suggest that small businesses might benefit
from better legal representation when filing protests at the GAO. One option to address this issue
would be to require all protests at the GAO to be filed through legal counsel. However, this
approach might be viewed as unfair since small businesses might face more significant economic
barriers to filing than larger businesses. Another option would be to provide legal assistance to
small businesses, perhaps through the Small Business Administration. Such advice might be
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useful if it is provided early enough that small businesses can determine whether they have valid
cases, which could allow them to craft more persuasive arguments and possibly reduce the
number of dismissed protests (RAND, pages 67-68).
Key Stakeholder Perception Elements
The different stakeholder perspectives of protest outcomes are shaped by the elements
found in this research. The empirical research identifies these elements or factors, grouping them
into protest perception themes that influence each stakeholders’ perspectives in a conceptual
framework across the spectra of these key themes. The coded phases representing perception
concepts are often overlapping and apply to two or more key elements. The elements are used to
conceptually describe the key factors. These identified elements from the interviews affecting the
perception of protest outcomes and corresponding view of effectiveness are grouped into the
spectral themes below. Some notable interview excerpts are provided in Appendix B to illustrate
each of these factors or elements in stakeholder perspectives.
Cost-Benefit Spectrum
The most prominent perception theme is the cost benefit tradeoff represented across this
spectrum by nearly all stakeholders. Competing for contracts, whether in the private sector or the
unique government market, is about sustaining a return on investment, just as it is for any free
market enterprise. The return on investment is achieved when the benefits of business decisions
exceed the costs, and the amount determines the ROI rate. The decision to protest a government
contract is a fundamental business decision with long- and short-term benefits and cost-benefit
tradeoffs involving intangibles such as goodwill, relationship building, business development,
undetermined outcomes, and competitive intelligence. Intangible costs and benefits of
participating in the unique GAO protest process are particularly difficult to quantify. This factor
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makes perceptions of these protest outcome costs and benefits the primary element of success or
effectiveness. This cost-benefit tradeoff perception is also central to other stakeholders such as
government agencies, legal staff or outside counsels, the GAO itself, congressional staff, and
ultimately the American public. Academic research, practitioner reports, and congressional
legislation directing research and adjustments to the bid protest system focus on whether the
benefits or costs outweigh the other. This tradeoff is central to all stakeholders. These tradeoffs
can be expressed across a continuum with a negative and positive axis. The more experienced
stakeholders such as large businesses, legal counsel, the GAO, and, to a lesser extent,
government agencies have a much better appreciation for the actual and practical costs and
benefits.
Fairness Spectrum
The second most important factor influencing perceptions identified in the interviews is
an amalgamation of fairness and accountability as these concepts appear repeatedly in the coded
interviews (Appendix B). A more accurate description of this perception element is across a
fairness spectrum with different degrees of fairness, starting with zero or no fairness and
continuing out to full accountability. The concept of accountability is the positive open-ended
extreme across the fairness spectrum. Although not explicitly stated, the overall purpose of a bid
protest system is to ensure fairness, whether through full and open competition, fairness to small
businesses who have earned it, or a legislated procurement policy preference. The maximum
fairness is accountability.
One view of how accountability or ultimate accountability is pursued is through what
Gordon and White describe as a “private attorney general” model wherein the cumulative impact
of businesses protesting is the “things that don’t happen” effect, meaning that agencies avoid
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procurement improprieties because of threatened and actual protests. Small business
interviewees did not perceive this scenario as a successful outcome. Their sentiment is that it is
not the responsibility of small businesses, nor do they have the resources, to hold agencies
accountable. In fact, these interviewees expressed that, rather than preventing things from
happening, protests encourage improprieties because contracting officers may try to obscure
improprieties, insert dismissal traps, or protest proof a solicitation. The “private attorney
general” model of agency accountability through individual protests fails because of the high
dismissal rate since individual protests for individual acquisitions need to be within the GAO
interpretation of interested party, must show prejudice, and must be timely. The cost-benefit
tradeoff perception element described previously applies here. Few protestors, this researcher
excepted, pursue individual protests can afford to incur the substantial burdens and costs of being
a “private attorney general” to hold the agency accountable when an unsuccessful outcome is
likely with a less than 4% effectiveness rate.
Communications Spectrum
The opportunity to communicate between the agency contracting officer and the
contractor is another perception element of bid protest outcomes. Businesses may protest for a
variety of reasons to facilitate communications, such as learning more about the requirement,
learning more about the competitors, learning about the evaluation process, better understanding
the terms of the solicitation, marketing the company’s capabilities, and/or sending a message of
concern, resolution, or experience. Recent moves to reduce protests have focused on more
thorough and timely debriefs of awards, evaluations, and solicitation terms. Agencies may learn
more about vendor capabilities, past performance, and availability from protests. This learning is
a form of communication. Agencies also use protests and pre- and post-protest actions to
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communicate with protestors, the GAO, agency leadership, and the GovCon community to
express policy differences, to be resolute, and exercise or convey control. The GAO
communicates with protestors, agencies, and GovCon practitioners by announcing all protest
decision summaries, publishing selected decisions, using hearing and alternate dispute resolution
(ADR), reporting to Congress, and publishing studies. The communications element’s impact on
the perceptions of bid protest outcomes is also understood across a spectrum. Some protests have
minimal communication while the other end of the spectrum emphasizes forms of
communication such as standing up to an agency and trying to hold it accountable. In between
there are communications factors to learn more about the acquisition, competitors, the agency,
and to communicate a performance stay for incumbent contract extension.
Emotional Cloud
As RAND concluded, the overall number of contracts protested relative to the total dollar
value is very small, on the order of .3%, and these outcomes depend greatly on the characteristics
of the solicitation or contract (RAND 2018). A legal or quasi-legal challenge against a
protestor’s customer, the federal agency, is an exceedingly emotional endeavor, particularly for a
small business who may only consider protesting once. For the contracting officer and the
agency, it can also be an emotional experience as a black mark on their record, a reflection on
their training and expertise, and certainly will require more work and documentation. For
attorneys, whether they are representing or advising the protestor, the agency protest counsel, or
the GAO and its hearing officers, the emotional desire to win a victorious or successful outcome
is ever-present. In one of my protests, the GAO hearing attorney’s LinkedIn profile prominently
mentioned that he had never had a protest sustained out of the 180 protests that he had
represented the agency on as agency counsel before moving to the GAO. It seems that most
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protest attorneys view a successful or effective protest as one that is not sustained, regardless of
whether it is dismissed, summarily dismissed, or denied. Sustained or not sustained is the metric
of success for attorneys just as it is for most protestors.
The emotional element in protests is not best understood as a continuum or spectrum,
although to a degree, emotions play a role in the outcome and the perception of the outcome.
Protest emotions are better understood as a broad and often-present cloud of influence on
outcome perceptions.
Protest Perception Environment
After these four key elements in bid protests were identified in the interview coding, the
researcher developed the conceptual framework of the impact and interaction of each element in
the GAO bid protest ecosystem. The researcher conceptualized the protest environment in four
categories: an illustrative matrix of key factors, do not apply to all in the stakeholder category,
have members of the stakeholder category that do not share or completely agree, and are
generalized as a common or the predominant stakeholder perception. This conceptualization
occurred in an illustrative matrix of key factors or elements that are included from the GAO bid
protest environment to describe the interactions of the key elements along spectrums of protest
outcome perceptions as shown below in Figure 3.7.
In this explanatory concept the major axis, both negative and positive, is the cost-benefit
tradeoff element that influences every protest, that protest’s outcome, and the perception of the
outcome. Different stakeholders can have vastly different values conceptually assigned to this
element. A protestor may, and often does, view the tradeoff as a ratio of positive revenue to the
costs. The agency may perceive the tradeoff as a benefit in terms of most expeditious and
cheapest acquisition of required goods/services or also as a benefit to the agency or the
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acquisition system writ large. The GAO, GovCon, and researchers may assign a tradeoff value
that corresponds to their view of the value versus cost to the acquisition system and their
perception of the protest system.

Figure 3.7. Protest Outcome Perception Environment
This conceptual description of the interaction between the major perception elements in
the protest environment is a novel explanation of complex factors influencing the perception of
protest effectiveness outcomes, which is particularly significant in identifying the emotional
cloud element where these perception spectrum interactions occur as well as the interactions
taking place on the periphery or outside the fog of emotions. This is an area where further
research is warranted to inform stakeholders of the role of this murky emotional impact on bid
protest outcomes, their perceptions, and the effectiveness of bid protests.
This conceptual protest outcome perception environment is useful to describe the
elements that a protestor should consider or at least be aware of when entertaining a decision to
protest as well as that protestor’s individual perception of protest outcomes in general, and the
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outcome of the protest under consideration. The environment model is a tool to better describe
the key perception elements and their interaction from the interview coding and action research.
Conclusions
Coming from a lifelong military background, I find it useful to break down my research
into tactical and strategic conclusions regarding the perceptions of bid protest outcomes and
corresponding recommendations.
From the tactical perspective of the researcher as a small business operating exclusively
in the federal government contracting market, I conclude on the tactical or operational level that
GAO protests create an overwhelming negative ROI for small business protestors with a tangible
beneficial success of less than half of the generously represented success rate of less than 4%.
This practical opportunity for a successful outcome is near zero when considering the elusive
benefits of sustained protest relief recommendations. Both the tangible and intangible costs are
immense.
This conclusion leads me to the recommendation that small business government
contractors rarely, if ever, file a GAO protests. This recommendation appears to directly
contradict my action research of participating in more than 200 bid protests with a success rate of
well below the nominal 4% rate. This counter intuitive view is explained in large part due to my
perception of reason for protesting in the outcome environment. My motivation driven by the
need to seek accountability as a key benefit to the larger small business contracting community.
Arguably, I have not reached success in achieving accountability. Collateral motivation is to
expand the knowledge base of this complex human endeavor of government contracting and
ensuring confidence in the process. Arguably, this research more effective in expanding the
knowledge base than it is in gaining accountability.
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This research also yields a softer conclusion that small business protestors perceive
protest outcomes as significantly less than the stated moderate effectiveness rate, but they
perceive it as somewhat more effective than the 4% overall sustain rate identified in the research.
Small business does perceive protests and the limited chance of success as a course of action to
The rare times a protest might be warranted for a small business case are when: an obvious and
egregious violation of acquisition law, for limited specific reasons (such as initiating a CICA
stay primarily to gain a few months of continued incumbent performance), or in specific cases
for asserting a business’s capability, knowledge, and seriousness in following the proper
procedures. More research is needed for small businesses to better understand the disparities
between reported protest outcomes and the ways these outcomes are perceived by other
stakeholders and small businesses like themselves. The factors that influence and interact to
create these perceptions provide insight into participants’ perceptions of success and the decision
to engage in bid protests.
The strategic conclusion is that the GAO bid protest system at best provides the public
and government contractors with a façade of accountability. I conclude that a case can be made
that the GAO protest system has become a façade at best and possibly much worse, a
misrepresentation of the protections afforded contractors, especially small businesses. This
strategic conclusion leads me to recommend that the GAO system be replaced or significantly
restructured to accommodate the impairment presented by our constitutional separation of
government powers and inherent flaws as government bureaucracies metastasize and the size and
longevity of our federal acquisition system grows.
In conclusion, most small business protestors perceive the GAO’s reported bid protest
outcomes as ineffective and not worth the cost, contrary to the reported moderate effectiveness
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mirage. The perception that the “role of the GAO is to dispose of protest based on the
information in the case” is very much alive in the minds of some stakeholders, especially small
businesses. The fact that the GAO discards most protests is evident in the more than 50%
dismissal rate combined with the 46% denial rate in the last decade. The heavy bias in favor of
dismissal or disposal of protests is also the conclusion of my extensive action research. The
novel conclusions of this research are:
•

The actual sustain effectiveness rate is less than 4% while the GAO reports outcomes at a
moderate effectiveness of nearly half the protests filed.

•

The reported protest “effectiveness” rate is a façade where the outward appearance is
maintained to conceal a less pleasant or creditable reality.

•

Stakeholders’ outcome and effectiveness perceptions depend on each stakeholder’s
engagement in the bid protest environment.

•

Stakeholders’ perceptions of protest outcomes are influenced by the interaction of key
factors.

•

Most small businesses perceive the reported bid protest outcomes as ineffective and not
worth the cost contrary to the reported moderate effectiveness mirage.
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Appendix 3.2. Excerpts from Interview Transcripts

These are excerpts from interview transcripts to support the findings of outcome perceptions and the
complex interactions of positive and negative perceptions of key elements in the GAO protest bid protest
environment:
Cost – Benefit
•
•

•

•

•

Being a small business, people didn't want to spend the money, or very little, to protest. –
agency contracting officer and former small business executive.
More and more, what I'm seeing now, especially on large acquisitions in the services arena,
is that protesters protest because they know that they can get extra time on the contract. If
you protest today, an award decision comes out today, you're the incumbent. You protest. You
know you're probably going to get at least three more months of whatever your margin is in
those three months, and if you can string it out longer, maybe you can push it to six months…
you protest because you do anything you can to capture that business. - agency contracting
officer.
The number of protests that are actually successful, I think in the Air Force lately it's been
two to four percent, and it's never really much more. It's usually less than that, so the vast,
vast, vast majority of protests [are not successful] …a sustained process would be successful
from the protesters' point of view. A protest that is denied would be unsuccessful, from a
protesters' point of view, and a good news story. The government always wants the protest to
be denied. The protester always wants the protest to be sustained. Most protests are not
sustained. Most are denied, the vast majority. - agency contracting officer.
Oftentimes we're protesting something we have a relationship with or hope to have a
relationship with and we want to make sure it's done professionally and it's not, that we
minimize any discomfort or pain and damage to a long term relationship in the process and
also because it can be expensive, those have to come across my desk and I have to justify the
cost relative to the benefit for them…the cost is the hard and direct cost, that's the time for
your employees to prepare a protest and file for it as well as third party costs. It's not unusual
for them to need assistance from an attorney. Sometimes, we can use in house counsel,
simpler GAO protest, state, local, education protests, we can do so, but other times it ends up
in federal court and it's necessary to bring in a lawyer who's a specialist in federal…The real
hidden cost that I'm always very focused on is the opportunity cost. That is the employees are
no longer selling. They're about to spend days continuing this pursuit of this potential loss,
the sale's already been lost at least through the customer's eyes in that process and then the
opportunity cost of you knows, the brand impact to the company. Always trying to balance the
circumstances and ask you, is this gonna brand this better long term, because I do believe
some protests can brand you positively or is it gonna brand us negative. – small business
CEO
The benefits outweigh the costs…both sides learn 90% of the time. That's your consolation
price. The government gets smarter about how they could have avoided that protest. I as a
contractor get smarter about how I could have avoided the [costs/pain] to protest. Would it
be in improving my proposal or the government gets smarter by being more clear and
specific about what it was that they were out looking for. That's almost, so 90% of the time,
that's your minimum benefit and then, often I say 20, 25% of the time, you get specific
revenue off of that specific procurement action. – small business CEO
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It seems like particularly a lot of DOD; a lot of the government agencies view the protest
process as hindering of efficient acquisitions ... he or she wants to get the requirements met
and get the best things acquired for the best price. Protests are just big bumps in that
process. – GAO attorney
It's a lot of costs and expense and disappointment to pursue protests, so … it's hard to
identify frivolous protests. – GAO managing attorney
In my experience with a lot of my peers has been that unless you have something definitive
that you are going to protest, you're really wasting your time. Plus, reputation-wise, too,
many contracting officers obviously are not very fond of protests. If you have to work with
that client again in the future, that's something you always have to consider if you're going to
submit a protest. – small busines CEO
The best case would be if we feel that we should have been awarded the contract, success for
us would be that we would be awarded the contract. That they would overturn the award to
the previous awardee and would see the point that in this case for example we feel based on
the previous scoring, we should have been awarded. Now we understand, of course, that the
government could clearly go back and rescore all the contracts and maybe we wouldn't win.
That wouldn't be success for us. It's not just a matter of overturning. It's a little more than
justice. I know some people will submit a protest because they feel that justice needs to be
served. But I look at it more from a business standpoint that my outcome is that we would be
awarded the effort. That we showed that there was obviously an error in how they made the
determination for award and that we would get the award. – small business CEO
One common reason to protest in which we have also done is: if you're the incumbent
contractor and you're not awarded, and you have grounds for a protest ... either you have an
argument with an evaluation that the government provided, or things of that nature, you can
protest often, we'll extend your incumbency out for extended periods of time. We've done that
on multiple occasions, where we've not been the awarded contractor on a re-compete, we've
protested, and on a number of occasions won the protest and continued to support the
contract. That's a principal reason. Other times we've protested because the government has
not used their own procurement rules properly ... they'll list out their evaluation criteria and
they'll tell the contractor this is how we're going to evaluate you, and they just don't evaluate
you that way. They'll say, "minimally qualified, pass/fail on your technical and past
performance, low price". Low and behold you're the low price, but they do some kind of cost
trade off benefit and apply it to another party, yet their solicitation does not give them that
purview. Really it depends on what the government is doing with the solicitation; are they
following their own procurement rules correctly. – business contracting executive
A lot of long-term intangible [protest]cost, yeah, because you're going to get the [agency]
upset. If this is an agency that you work with a lot or you want to work with, the one thing you
don't want to do is get the agency upset. They can always find things in your past
performance and whatever, particularly in a negotiator procurement where it's not a lowfixed price but a competitive solicitation and there's more subjectivity to it from the source
selection board committee, you don't want to get them upset with you for a future
procurement. So, in the cost benefit analysis, we always counsel the client about the customer
relations. – protest bar attorney
What is the client perception about the likelihood of success, often when we get clients
sometimes, they're just getting into the federal government contracting? We know that this is
generally new to them. They are unaware of the statistics. They just know that they have a
right to protest this and that, and they come in with their complaint and you walk through
everything and then they are generally, I would say, surprised at the low likelihood of success
– procurement bar attorney
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That is an important concern for businesses to have, not only in bid protest litigation, but in
any type of legal action against anybody, to think of what the potential adverse consequences
are and to make sure that those factor into the calculation as to whether or not to proceed
with, in this case, the bid protest. I think, ultimately, most procurement professionals are just
that, they're professional, and they understand that bid protests are an important part of the
procurement function and that when they are done correctly and for the right reasons, they
make the system better. – bid protest attorney
An important factor on the automatic [CICA] stay, with respect to pre-award protests, is that
sometimes clients, don't quite understand that the stay as-of the pre-award protest, doesn't
mean that the agency just has to stop doing everything. It just means that they can't make the
ultimate award. They can continue to evaluate and continue to conduct discussions; they just
can't make the award. – procurement bar attorney
The stay is obviously a very important consideration. It's automatic at GAO. – bid protest
attorney

Fairness and Accountability
• People protest for a couple of reasons. They protest, and historically they protested, I believe,
when they honestly felt that they were not treated fairly. The protest is an opportunity for
those vying for public funds to say, "Hey, I didn't have an equal shot.” - agency contracting
officer.
• The first thing that I do when a client calls me and says, I want to do a bid protest. I think I
have good grounds for a protest, particularly if they're a small business, is I tell them. I read
them a small riot act, and I say, look unless you have absolutely dead-to-right grounds and
you better check them, you're going to get this agency annoyed. If they’re your customer and
you want to continue to do business with them, you shouldn't be making a protest to "make a
point," and show them we won't be rolled over, which is what you get a lot of. No, the
purpose of a bid protest is because there wasn't a level playing field, and you want to call to
the attention of the agency that they didn't have a level playing field, and that the
procurement system has to work correctly when there is a level playing field. So, there's a
role for bid protests to play, but we have to be very careful. – protest attorney
• In my estimation, on both sides of the street, I would say that the protests, the pseudo-legal or
legal protest decision-making process at the protest level is, I think, very fair. Occasionally,
you get some protest decisions that really make you scratch your head. Occasionally, you get
a wild hare, but by and large, I think that when the government fouls up, it gets discovered,
and identified, and addressed, and when the protesters are on sinking sand, that shows as
well. I really feel that from both sides, that in general, the process is very trustworthy. What I
don't think is fair, to be honest ... I hate the word fair, in many ways. It sounds like we're on
the playground, but I don't think it's fair to taxpayers, as much as anything, and this could be
a bigger problem with our legal system, but that protesters ... It costs very little for them to
protest, beyond their legal fees, if they're going to hire attorneys, or even just to put in the
protest and gum up the [procurement]. – agency contracting officer and former small
business executive.
• The idea was to create what they called private attorneys general… such that you incentivize
someone to identify waste is spawned in a government contract and you do that by rewarding
them for having done it. And so, I think there's a private attorneys general aspect that they
protest. That's why successful protestors get reimbursed their costs. – GAO managing
attorney
• Some of these rather seemingly arcane rules that often create protest denials upfront [for]
things like timelines. – agency contracting officer and former small business executive.
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Time zero's a moment in which I started incurring costs to respond to the procurement. So,
whatever the rules were at that moment, they should stay relatively steady because I made a
decision to bid it because I believed I had the order of precedence as a strategic advantage.
To change that after the fact, which would have affected my decision to bid the work and
mine would be you know bad faith…, I would have known the rules to that procurement, and I
could have made a business development decision based on those rules. – small business
CEO
[Protesting for Accountability] I'm a vendor, it's not my job to enforce the code of federal
regulations to the Department of Defense. That responsibility belongs to … the oversight
guys and or the SBA themselves who, or the congressmen themselves who took the time and
trouble to pass that law and put forth this hub zone initiative. They sponsored that legislation.
As a vendor, that's where I agree with the client [government agency]. If you tell me what the
rules are and then I decide to bid, I only ask that they implement those rules. If they want to
challenge their authorities, if the contracting officer wants to challenge the SBAs, CFR
authority, if they want to challenge the congressional legal intent. While I don't agree with
that by any means, I think they should honor it, that's not my role in that process as a vendor.
As a taxpayer, if I want to get up and complain about them not acting lawfully, I have every
right. But as a vendor, I'm not accountable, I'm not responsible. In fact, I think that's what
[the agency] felt was happening. I think [the agency] thought we were trying to act as the
procurement police and enforce procurement law and so every time we said, you're aware the
law and you should be honorable and do it. They heard the, I'm gonna make you follow the
law. – small business CEO
I see us as victims, our interest is driven from our victimization of we lost the business
development money or we lost some opportunity to perform the revenue so no more than I
would say is a mugging victim the one that should be making any citizen's arrest of a
criminal, nor would I say a small business should be enforcing those rules. We're just
bringing to the right people's attention our opinion of victimization through a protest process.
– small business CEO
A successful one is simply where whatever the mitigating issue is, is neutralized. So, a
preferred outcome would be where a Contracting Officer or an agency rules in our favor and
gives us an advantage. That's a preferred one, but that's usually not the case. The acceptable
one is whatever of the offending element becomes neutralized. Often ... this is a good
example. Often the government and the Air Force, when you protest to the GAO, the Air
Force will often look at it and say, "You know what, there's reasonable merit to this
argument", instead of letting the protest go forward and the judge making the decision, we're
voluntarily going to reevaluate. Or we're voluntarily going to re-propose or solicit this
requirement ... To get rid of whatever the offending element is. That doesn't give us an
advantage, it doesn't give us reward. What it does is whatever was the problem becomes
neutralized, now we're at the level playing field. Now a preferred method would be going to
GAO or Federal Court, and they make an affirming decision that benefits us, not just
neutralizes the offending issue, but benefits us in some additional way. – small business
executive.
The best you may get here is the agency to issue some corrective action, but at the end of the
day, you're not going to get this award. – procurement bar attorney
The process itself represents compromise between a lot of different and competing interests in
the procurement system. We have a system that needs to be as fair as possible and allow for
the thorough adjudication of protests wherever possible. It also exists in a world where the
government has to procure certain goods and services by a certain time. – protest attorney
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Whether or not a protester is successful doesn't necessarily have any indication on whether
or not the process is itself fair or not. Instead, that's a function of the strength of the
argument and the underlying documentation. – bid protest attorney
I do think that the protest is fair. I think sometimes fairness is, folks that protest might not ... I
think fairness is often times in the eyes of the beholder, where sometimes folks might be
disappointed in a particular outcome but the process itself is fair. That is, as a protester, you
are having your issues decided, evaluated, and decided, by knowledgeable and competent
folks who actually review the underlying documentation and evaluate the underlying
documentation to assess whether or not the evaluation was flawed and if so, whether or not
you were prejudiced by that. I think that is absolutely a fair outcome, excuse me, a fair
process for the protest process – bid protest attorney
Most protests are denied. But the effectiveness rate, you can see two-thirds of the way down
there, is the important one to look at. That is the percentage of protests, where the protestor
got some relief. Either through a sustained decision, or the agency took corrective action. So,
46 percent of the time that happened in Fiscal Year 2016. That was up a little bit, but
basically in line with the previous years. You see there, interestingly the sustained rate for
decisions issued by GAO on the merits, either sustained or denied, the rate of sustains went
up from 12 percent to about 23 percent last year, and when that number came out, there was
a lot of hubbub about it. "What's going on here? Why are so many more protests being
sustained?" But the effectiveness rate barely changed, so with that says is, last year, for
some reason agencies were more likely to take protests all the way to decision, rather than
taking a corrective action in meritorious protests, for whatever reasons. Not entirely clear.
As you can see, I have a note there that a single protest decision chad 18 sustains. So, that
swayed the statistics a bit. That's because every supplemental protest filing gets its own new
protest under these statistics. So, a single protest with several protestors and lots of different
supplemental protests, had 18 sustains in the same protest. So, as you can see the odds of
getting as sustained decision are relatively low. Had been hovering around 12-15 percent,
went up to 23 percent. We'll see if that's just a blip. But generally, protests, if they get all the
way to a decision, are more likely to turn out in a denial than a sustain. But, nearly half of
protests, overall, the protestor gets some kind of relief. So usually, in those cases, the agency
has taken corrective action. - procurement bar attorney

Communications
•

On role of communications …My sense, industry days, and in other forums where small
businesses will attend, is there's a tenacity to them, too. Small business owners, they're taking
a lot of risk. They're trying to build something. They're usually folks that feel pretty confident.
They believe they can provide something and do well, and they've typically been successful
along the way, so they will bandy about the protest, oftentimes, more readily than a threat ...
Threaten protest, rather, more readily than the large companies. Large companies will
sometimes worry about that. Small companies, I think, sometimes pull that out as something
that a ... Maybe the businesses that are more ... Have less to lose, perhaps. I'm not sure, but I
have seen that. I have seen companies say, "Hey, if you don't change this or address this, I'm
going to protest before you even put your RFP out," for example. On the government side,
the government tries, if they're doing their job, and some do it better than others ... If they're
doing their job, they try to head off a protest by communicating why a protest would be a bad
idea, or why the offer doesn't have a leg to stand on, or to be open along the way, to show
how fair they're being. One of the things I found maddening when I worked with [small
business executive] with the smaller agencies, the non-DOD agencies, for example, they often
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didn't want to give us a post-award debriefing, or didn't work hard to give us meaningful
information, whereas the best post-award debriefings give an offer or a potential protester as
much information as they possibly can, with a view towards showing them why and how they
weren't mistreated, why and how the offer selected was a better offer than theirs, and to show
them that if they pursue a protest, they won't win… that's a type of communicating. – agency
contracting officer and former small business executive.
From a marketing standpoint, and particularly a small business, that use it communicate... I
would consider that a pretty lousy way to communicate my capabilities. You should be doing
that in your response to the RFP. If you can't articulate your capability and your proposal, I
don't know ... Protest is kind of like blowing things up and hoping that it goes your way, I
guess. Maybe some do that. I've never ... I guess it depends on how you would pull that one
apart. Usually, a protester in some way, shape, or form, through the protest is trying to tell
you, trying to show you why you should have picked them, because they're obviously the best
[inaudible], and they will do that within a protest by saying, "See what we can do, and see
what we said we would do, and see why we're better than whoever you picked?" – agency
contracting officer and former small business executive.
Typically, in a protest, both sides feel they've been wronged, and contracting officers,
unfortunately, speaking in wide generalities, have grown callous over time, and it's easy for
them to label all contractors as thieves, and cheats, and other bad things, and for small
businesses and other businesses, especially small business realm, to consider the contracting
officers as callous, and unfair, and biased, and whatnot. I found it true on both sides… I have
seen small businesses, in my mind, be mistreated by contracting officers, and by the
government, because it's easier to mistreat them. Because they have fewer resources, and
they're often less likely to go hire a lawyer, it's often easier for contracting people to dismiss
them, or to make the process harder for them than it should be, and I have seen that happen.
– agency contracting officer and former small business executive.
[Follow-on awards after voluntarily dismissing protest] was through a function of developing
that relationship, that marketing relationship. As we interacted with them and we built some
trust, they started being more frank with us…Communication and relationship. I know it
sounds odd, but I've made a lot of friends, who I met them for the first time and got to sit with
them for the first time as a result of a protest. – small business CEO
The reason that we don't protest a whole lot other than the financial burden associated with
it, is that the ability to win some of the small business protests, we think, isn't worth the effort
to the potential negative repercussions of the small business in the space. – small business
CEO
GAO cannot force the agency to do anything. It only makes a recommendation. It is an arm of
congress, it's not a court. It can't issue injunctions. But it an arm of congress, so there are
potential consequences for an agency to simply ignore the recommendations of GAO, and it
rarely happens. They almost always follow the recommendations of GAO, but not always. bid protest attorney
If those simple [protest] actions are that costly [for the government] that quickly, protracted
protests and then reevaluation, it's gotta be an expensive number. I've never seen an amount
on the government side on what protests are averaging. Perhaps your research will lead you
to that if it hasn't already. It's gotta be pretty steep. From the industry side, I haven't seen ...
Obviously if you invest in a protest and it doesn't go your way, meaning you don't get the
award, obviously the cost benefit turned out to be a negative benefit and you spent more
money than you should have. I don't know what the cost is to the company. They're all a little
bit unique. It depends on the magnitude of the contract and how many people you get
involved in it. I know I've had an entire senior staff of executives from the CEO's down to me,
I'm not a senior executive in the company ... But when you wrap that many people up in
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sometimes days and days, sometimes weeks in meetings over a single protest, it's very
absorptive. Often cases, when it gets to be that lengthy, that [is a lot]. I don't have a dollar
value for it, but unless you're just got a very solid case on your protest, it usually doesn't
seem like it's, and this is just opinion, it just doesn't seem like, to me, it's worth it. I also think
there's another side to cost that perhaps doesn't get discussed enough. That's your reputation
as an industry provider. Negatively viewed ... I'm sorry. Negatively viewed companies that
protest. Human nature is what it is, and so I just think it creates bad will when you protest.
You've gotta be very sure it's the cards you want to play. If there's a little bit of ambiguity in
your case, you've gotta think long and hard if you want to do that, and I always recommend
that to my leadership. What's the second and third order effect of this decision. – former and
current reserve contracting officer and small business executive/consultant
Emotions
•
•

•
•

•

•

I think when you decide to do a protest there's a lot of emotion in it, because you feel harmed,
and you feel it's justifiable to do one. – small business executive
The best purposes of having a protest run are all the things that don't happen because people
in the agency know that if they did that someone would file a protest. It's all the stuff that
doesn't happen because you have a right to complain…I do get the sense because if they're
all human beings involved in this that if there wasn't any kind of accountability you would see
behavior that was less good – GAO attorney
The emotion comes from when it feels nefarious. – small business CEO
They [Government agency] didn't do anything retaliatory, but it was obvious that we weren't
gonna be welcome going forward. If we were to put another proposal on their desk, they
were, because they were emotional about it. They really, what it came down to was they were
their own, what they would say to you was well this small business from Florida came up
here and decided that they were gonna order us to buy from them and we just weren't gonna
have that. They really felt like us insisting on them honoring the rules was what, we crossed
the line in their opinion, that by honoring the rules, they were saying that they thought we
manipulated things that take their appropriate power away from them. They didn't take
responsibility for their own rules. They weren't willing to accept responsibility for the fact
that we relied on their rules and that we felt like we had an outcome we were entitled to…. –
small business CEO
Both sides of it [protest] got very subjective and emotional and it lost that air that we now
pride ourselves on of objectivity and a great deal of care that respectfully disagree. Come in,
and we try to come in very humbly, you know, you made this decision, we're a little
disappointed, we'd like permission to share with you why we think that decision could have
been better and doing it in the manner or gesture that at no time makes a contracting officer
or a source selection committee feel like we're being disrespectful…. Emotion was the
primary factor on both sides of that. There's no doubt, yeah. – small business CEO
From a business perspective, we have to take those emotions and put them to the side. That's
one of the reasons that generally speaking, almost 100% of the time we do send it to our
lawyer because he gives us a different set of eyes and helps us take the emotion out of it. That
way we are not making knee jerk reactions or decisions based on emotion that will cost us
money. It'll use our legal budget and down the road it could impact teaming decisions in the
future if we go against a teammate as I mentioned before, or impact internally within the
government spaces. But the emotional phase is something that after a day we generally, it's
gone after that. It's an immediate just frustration that all the time and effort and money that
has been put into that proposal response, the business development activities leading up to
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that. You significantly invest time, effort, travel, and everything like that in a lot of these ...
Especially larger, IDIQ proposals that we submit. So we do, there is an emotional piece to
that, generally. – small business CEO
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